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Exploited and Empowered Inclusion:
Contesting the Flawed Consumer
in the United States
Wendy A. Wiedenhoft Murphy
John Carroll University

Compared to affluent consumers, the consumption practices of poor and
low-income consumers have received less attention in the global North,
where they have been marginalized as flawed. This paper hopes to address
this neglect by providing an exploratory profile of poor and low-income
consumers in the United States. It will challenge that these consumers are
flawed by explaining how they participate in consumer society via exploitative inclusion and empowered inclusion. It concludes by suggesting ways
that less-affluent consumers can experience expanded empowerment.
Keywords: poor and low-income consumers, poverty industry, poverty
premium, discount retailers, windfall spending

According to Thorstein Veblen, “no class of society, not even
the most abjectly poor, forgoes all customary conspicuous consumption” (1994, p. 40). However, little contemporary research has
examined the consumption practices of poor and low-income consumers, especially in affluent societies like the United States (exceptions: Ekström & Hjort, 2009; Hamilton & Catterall, 2005; Hill, 2002,
2008; Hohnen, 2017; Leipämaa-Leskinen et al., 2016). One reason
for this neglect is that poor and low-income consumers have been
categorized as “flawed” or “failed” because they are thought to
possess insufficient discretionary income—and therefore the power
of choice—to adequately participate in consumer society (Bauman,
2005, 2007; Lawson, 2009). Bauman, in particular, contends that
flawed consumers are deviants who suffer social exclusion because
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare • March 2021 • Volume XLVIII • Number 1
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of their material vulnerability, or inability to purchase the “right”
consumer goods “that are considered necessary to be a member of
society” (Ekström & Hjort, 2009, p. 700; Pugh & Miller, 2015). He
suggests that unlike the poor in a production-dominated society,
who serve a role via reserve labor as potential workers, the poor
in a consumer society are completely useless because without purchasing power they have no role to play (Bauman, 2005, 2007; Pugh
& Miller, 2015).
This paper will challenge Bauman’s notion that most poor and
low-income consumers are flawed by explaining how they are included in the marketplace in both exploitative and empowering
ways (2005, 2007). It will begin by using quantitative data from
the Bureau of Labor’s U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, and the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Current Population Survey to provide an exploratory profile of
poor and low-income consumers in the U.S. and will demonstrate
that while financially insecure, these consumers are not flawed.
Not only do they participate in consumer society, their consumer
behavior is comparable to more-affluent consumers in terms of the
general categories of products they purchase. However, consumer
inequality often constrains where (and how often) they can shop
and the quality of products they purchase. The next section discusses the “exploitative inclusion” that poor and low-income consumers confront in the marketplace—in particular, the poverty premium charged by businesses that profit from exploiting poor and
low-income consumers’ constraints (Caplovitz, 1963; Caskey, 2005;
Desmond, 2016; Fellowes, 2007; Rivlin, 2010; Sturdivant, 1969). The
following section integrates qualitative evidence from various published research to explain how poor and low-income consumers
experience “empowered inclusion” through boosts to their discretionary income (including receiving their annual earned income tax
credit and “windfall” money), relying on social capital, and patronizing businesses that do not charge a poverty premium (Alkon et
al., 2013; Leipämaa-Leskinen et al., 2016; Pugh, 2009; Sykes et al.,
2015; Tach et al., 2019). The paper concludes by suggesting ways
that poor and low-income consumers can experience greater empowerment and more fully participate in consumer society while
avoiding exploitation.
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Poor and Low-Income Consumers
in the United States: An Exploratory Profile
Though Bauman’s flawed consumers may exist in a small segment of the population, empirical evidence confirms that most
poor and low-income consumers1 are not flawed in the sense that
they are excluded absolutely from consumer society (2005, 2007).
The official 2019 poverty guidelines were $12,490 for one person,
$16,910 for two people, $21,330 for three people, and $25,750 for
four people, which are prohibitively low in terms of potential purchasing power (Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation,
2019). However, these numbers do not capture money distributed via the earned income tax credit (EITC) or benefits from other
means-tested government programs, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid, and Section 8 housing vouchers. Importantly, the official poverty guidelines are based solely on
income and fail to measure the consumption poverty rate, which
has declined from 30 percent in 1960 to 3 percent in 2016 (Meyer
& Sullivan, 2018). The consumption poverty rate derived from the
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey and the U.S. Current Population Survey measures products and services that households are
able to buy—such as food, housing, and durable goods—and may
be more accurate than income in evaluating the material conditions
and relative deprivation of households (Meyer & Sullivan, 2018).
Given that poverty is temporary for the majority of individuals who
experience it (Iceland, 2013), consumer goods (particularly durable
ones) purchased when individuals are above the poverty line often
remain in their possession when they fall below it, too.
Data show that poor and low-income households contain many
of the same types of consumer goods as more-affluent ones (see Table 1). For example, 92 percent of households below the official poverty line owned microwaves, 98 percent owned televisions, 50 percent owned personal computers, and 43 percent had internet access
(Iceland, 2013; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2009). In addition, 99 percent of poor households owned a refrigerator, 66 percent owned a clothes washer, 60 percent owned a clothes dryer, 96
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percent owned a telephone, and 82 percent owned an air conditioner.
Surprisingly, 75 percent owned a vehicle and 41 percent owned their
own home (Iceland, 2013; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).
Table 1. Percentage of Consumer Goods in Poor and All Households.

Consumer Good
			

Percentage of
Poor Households

Percentage of
All Households

Home				41			68
Vehicle				75			92
Refrigerator 			99			100
Clothes Washer		66			84
Clothes Dryer			60			81
Telephone			96			98
Air Conditioner		82			87
Microwave			92			96
Television 			98			99
Personal Computer		50			76
Internet Access 		43			71
Note. Adapted from Iceland (2013), p. 46.

According to Attanasio and Pistaferri (2016), data from the Consumer Expenditure (CE) Survey2 conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics demonstrate that over time there has been a convergence
between the rates of ownership in consumer durables between the
top and bottom income deciles. CE Survey data show that there are
little to no discernable differences between the ownership of cooking durables, refrigerators, and entertainment durables (televisions,
DVD players, sound systems) in low- and high-income households.
The cost of many basic consumer goods—such as color televisions,
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vacuum cleaners, and toasters—has decreased over the years, providing the opportunity for the poor of the early 21st century to enjoy
a higher standard of living than the middle class did in the early
1970s (Horwitz, 2015). After examining the price for nondurable
goods across different income groups between 1994 and 2005, Broda
and Romalis (2009) found that lower income groups experienced less
inflation for nondurables than higher income groups. Thus, even as
wages have been slow to increase over the past several decades, the
low prices of many consumer goods have helped many poor and
low-income consumers avoid being flawed.
Poor and low-income consumers are also experiencing growth
in transportation, housing, and education. In the past few decades,
vehicle ownership rates have increased faster in lower-income
households than in more-affluent ones: 22 percent compared to just
2 percent between 1985 and 2005, respectively (Fellowes, 2007, p.
434). According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2016 American Community Survey, only 20 percent of individuals living below the poverty line did not have access to a vehicle (Vock, 2018).
Fellowes (2007) discovered home ownership rates among lower-income households have also expanded due to changes in public policy, such as the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, and transformations in financial lending. The number of mortgages sold to
higher-income households in the 1990s rose only 52 percent compared to the rise of 90 percent in lower-income households (Fellowes, 2007, p. 435). Furthermore, more individuals from low-income
households are attending institutions of higher education. Recent
Pew data show that the increased enrollment of undergraduates at
U.S. colleges and universities has been “fueled almost exclusively
by an influx of students from low-income families and students of
color” (Fry & Cilluffo, 2019, para. 1). In 1996, only 12 percent of undergraduates were in poverty, compared to 20 percent in 2016 (Fry
& Cilluffo, 2019).
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Table 2. Percent of Annual Household Spending by Income Quintile.
Expenditures			
Housing			
Food				
Transportation			
Entertainment			
Apparel and Services		
Education			
Cellular Phone Service		
Pets				
Furniture			
Major Appliances		
Small Appliances		
Reading			
Toys, Hobbies, and
Playground Equipment		

Bottom 20%

Top 20%

40		
15.6
13.4
4.9		
3.4		
3		
1.9		
1		
.8		
.5		
.2		
.2		

30
11.2
15.5
5.9
3.1
3.8
1.5
1.3
.9
.4
.2
.2

.2		

.2

Note. Adapted from CE Survey (2017).

Unsurprisingly, wealthy consumers have more money to spend
on goods and services than poorer consumers. U.S. households in
the highest income quintile ($188,103) spend $116,988 annually,
while households in the lowest income quintile ($11,394) spend
$26,019 (CE Survey, 2017). However, on average, all consumers
spend most of their income on housing, food, and transportation
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). Data from the 2017 CE Survey indicate that the lowest-earning 20 percent of U.S. households spend
an equivalent percentage of their income on many goods and
services (including reading materials, education, furniture, major
and small appliances, apparel and services, and entertainment) as
the highest-earning 20 percent does. More specifically, rich and
poor households spend approximately 19 to 20 percent of their
food budget on fruits and vegetables, 16 to 18 percent on meats
and poultry, 13 percent on cereals and bakery products, 10 percent
on dairy products, and 3 percent on fish and seafood (CE Survey,
2017). Like their higher-earning counterparts, the lowest-earning
households are increasingly eating out or spending more money
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on “food away from home.” In 2017 the lowest-earning 20 percent
of households spent 5.7 percent of their food budget on food away
from home compared to 5.5 percent of the highest-earning 20 percent of households (CE Survey, 2017).
While lower-income households, including those below the official poverty line, clearly possess at least marginal purchasing power to consume goods and services beyond basic necessities, they
undoubtedly have less discretionary income than more-affluent
households do. Engle’s law holds that poorer households spend a
higher percentage of their income on food than wealthier ones do
(15.6 percent compared to 11.2 percent in 2017, respectively) (CE
Survey, 2017). They spend considerably more of their income on
housing, too—40 percent of their income compared to the 30 percent that higher-earning households spend (Desmond, 2016; see Table 2). Therefore, though they may not be flawed in the exact way
that Bauman (2007) suggests, poor and low-income consumers can
encounter difficulties achieving “normal” consumption patterns
due to their limited purchasing power beyond food and housing
(Hamilton, 2009). Thus, their inclusion in the consumer marketplace is not necessarily equal.
Furthermore, the data discussed does not capture the quantity
or quality of consumer durables (Attanasio & Pistaferri, 2016). Poor
households may own one used (and perhaps unreliable) vehicle,
while wealthy households may own several new ones. Their homes
may be located in high crime areas or in need of major repairs that
they cannot afford. Students who are impoverished are more likely to attend public two-year colleges and less-selective four-year
colleges (Fry & Cilluffo, 2019). Price differentials can also be difficult to discern from the available data on consumer expenditures.
It appears low-income consumers often pay more for goods and
services than middle- and high-income consumers and are more
likely be indebted as they spend more than they earn, on average.
Thus, though data show a trend in convergence between lowerand higher-income households, it may mask consumption inequality and the exploitation of poor consumers in the marketplace. As
the following section discusses, poor and low-income consumers
might be included in consumer society, but in a separate and unequal way.

12
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Exploitative Inclusion
While not flawed, poor and low-income consumers confront
challenges as a result of their economic insecurity, which make them
vulnerable to exploitation. Their consumer decisions are constrained
not just by limited income, but by stable income. Irregular pay makes
it difficult for less-affluent consumers to maintain predictable budgets (Pugh, 2009). Geography constrains the purchasing decisions of
some poor and low-income people who lack access to reliable transportation (Talukdar, 2008). Landlords, rent-to-own retailers, payday
lenders, check-cashing outlets, and pawnbrokers often take advantage of these constraints and exploit poor consumers by charging
them a “poverty premium” for goods and services (Caplovitz, 1963;
Caskey, 2005; Desmond, 2016; Fellowes, 2007). This premium includes both higher prices and often lower-quality goods and services. In the words of James Baldwin, it is “extremely expensive to be
poor” and businesses that are part of the “poverty industry” profit
from exploiting the difficulties that poor and low-income consumers
confront (Rivlin, 2010; Sturdivant, 1969, p. 1).
The Poverty Premium
Andreasen (1975, p. 26) argues that poor consumers suffer from
“sources of outrageous consumer exploitation.” One of the main
sources of exploitation is unscrupulous businesses that charge poor
consumers high prices for often low-quality products and fringe financial services. This so-called “poverty premium” is one way that
businesses justify their exploitation of poor consumers, claiming that
this premium is a form of compensation for the cost of shoplifting
and the higher business insurance rates they must pay to operate
their stores in low-income areas (Chung & Myers, 1999; Talukdar,
2008). Studies have found that poor consumers pay more for food,
housing, vehicles, and consumer durables than more-affluent consumers (Alwitt & Donley, 1996; Baradaran, 2015; Brookings Institute,
2006; Caplovitz, 1963; Desmond, 2016; Fellowes, 2007; Hill, 2008;
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). Due to limited options, some people
who reside in low-income areas are forced to pay, on average, 41
percent more for similar goods and services than those who live in
more-affluent areas (Hill, 2002, p. 214). Talukdar (2008) found that
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prices for everyday items are 10 to 15 percent higher in poor neighborhoods compared to more-affluent ones, though after controlling
for store size and competition, this poverty premium decreases to
between 2 and 5 percent. Those who rely on rent-to-own stores for
durable goods, like appliances, electronics, and furniture, also pay
a hefty premium—often up to twice as much—for the exact same
product (Fellowes, 2007; Jayakumar & Richards, 2017). Jayakumar
and Richards compared the prices of 39 products at the national
rent-to-own retailer, Rent-A-Center, and major mainstream retailers
in 48 states and the District of Columbia. They found that prices at
Rent-A-Center were higher for every product they analyzed, including $601 more for a Sony PlayStation Pro 4 console, $580 more for a
Dell 15.6-inch Inspiron laptop, and $931 more for an Amana top-load
washer and dryer. Unsurprisingly, Rent-A-Center charges higher interest rates on product leases in states that restrict excessive price
markups (Jayakumar & Richards, 2017).3
Predatory Lending: Home Mortgages,
Automobile Loans, and Payday Loans
Many poor consumers experience limited financial capability
as they lack financial literacy and access to mainstream financial
products and services (Caplan et al., 2018). The unbanked often pay
more for loans and other financial services; their economic insecurity and constrained financial capability situate them as vulnerable
targets for predatory lending practices, like subprime mortgages,
car-title pawns, and rent-to-own schemes (Baradaran, 2015; Brookings Institute, 2006; Caplan et al., 2018; Caskey, 2005; Hill, 2008;
Rivlin, 2010). Lending to poor consumers is risky because they are
more likely to miss payments and default on loans, which is why
many fringe banking services claim they need to charge a poverty
premium in the form of high prices, high interest rates, and non-refundable down payments, and by holding automobile titles as collateral. High-cost credit and premiums associated with household
residency are poverty premiums that are largely imposed on poor
consumers because of choice constraints (Corfe & Keohane, 2018).
Clearly, it is difficult to move one’s residency to avoid paying poverty premiums, especially if it likely means a lateral move to another low-income area.

14
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Given the option between no credit and credit with high and/
or adjustable interest rates, most consumers will choose the latter,
particularly if it provides the means to home ownership. This was
evident in the years leading up to the home mortgage crisis and
ensuing 2008 recession. Aggressive lending to “marginal borrowers” caused an “explosion” of household debt, which doubled to
reach $14 trillion between 2001 and 2007 (Mian & Sufi, 2014). Mian
and Sufi (2014, p. 76) found that between 2002 and 2005, mortgage
application denial rates dropped from 42 percent to less than 30
percent in low-income zip codes. The number of home mortgages
grew 30 percent in these zip codes compared to 11 percent in high
incomes ones. The growth of mortgages in these low-income areas
occurred at the same time that average income decreased, creating
a situation where “mortgage–credit growth and income growth
became negatively correlated” (Mian & Sufi, 2014, p. 76). The exploitative character of these mortgages was made evident when
lenders approved NINJA (no income, no job, no assets) mortgage
applicants, who were subject to subprime terms. When adjustable
rates increased, many victims of predatory mortgage lending had
no option but to default on their loans and face foreclosure. A large
number of these individuals were forced into an increasingly tight
rental market, where the lowest-earning households spent almost
half of their income on rent in 2014 (Desmond, 2016; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016).
In addition to home mortgages, poor and low-income consumers historically have paid a premium for automobiles and automobile loans. Lower-income households pay between $50 and $500
more in price for a vehicle and 2 more percentage points on auto
loans compared to more-affluent households (Brookings Institute,
2006, p. 35). Data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances
found that lower-income households paid an average APR of 9.2
percent on an auto loan, compared to 5.5 percent in higher income
households (Fellowes, 2007, p. 441). J.D. Byrider, the nation’s largest used-car franchise, uses software that automatically assesses a
consumer’s financial risk and prices its products and services accordingly—the higher the risk, the higher the down payment and
interest rates. While Byrider justifies this practice by arguing that it
is providing access to a product that is a necessity for many low-income consumers, critics contend that it exploits the unbanked
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(Grow & Epstein, 2007). Given that the poor pay more for vehicles, it is not surprising that they also pay more for auto insurance,
which is more expensive in lower-income areas than in higher-income ones. The average cost of auto insurance across 11 metro areas for low-income consumers was $831, while it was only $680 for
more-affluent consumers, in 2006 (Brookings Institute, 2006, p. 36).
Compared to affluent consumers, lower-income consumers
are more likely to use their car titles as collateral for short-term,
high-interest loans. Single-payment vehicle lending is basically a
way for consumers to pawn their cars for a one-time loan, which
they must pay back between two weeks or one month, depending
on the terms of their lender. The lender holds the title of their car
until they repay their loan and can repossess the car if the borrower
defaults. The average car title loan is $700 and the average APR is
300 percent. Only 12 percent of borrowers pay off their initial loan
in time; 20 percent of borrowers have their cars repossessed, while
the rest become indebted with additional loans (Consumer Finance
Protection Bureau, 2016). According to Pew Charitable Trusts
(2015), 2 million Americans use single-payment vehicle loans each
year, spending a total of $3 billion, including extra financial fees
and interest.
Perhaps the most exploited way that poor and low-income consumers find the means to participate in consumer society is by obtaining payday loans (Caskey, 2005; Mayer, 2003, 2010). Unlike a
traditional pawn that requires some type of collateral from the borrower, payday loans are unsecured and only require that a borrower verify employment income. Some payday lenders require that
borrowers also have a bank account that the lenders can access to
collect the principle loan, interest, and fees (Baradaran, 2015). The
typical payday borrower earns less than $40,000 per year, borrows
an average principle loan of $500 to pay for emergencies and basic
consumption needs, and pays an average annual percent rate of
400 percent for a two-week payday loan with $15 to $100 in fees
(Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, 2017; Soederberg, 2014, p.
141). Payday lenders profit substantially from the fees they impose
on borrowers, which amount to approximately $8.7 billion per year
(Wherry, 2015). Astonishingly, 80 percent of payday loans are followed by another loan and 50 percent are followed by an additional
10 payday loans, resulting in a cycle of debt due to fees and high
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interest rates (Baradaran, 2015, p. 2). The obvious exploitation of
payday loan borrowers has resulted in 14 states and the District of
Columbia banning all forms of payday loans, with an additional 9
states placing some restriction on them.
Undoubtedly, a poverty industry exists that treats poor and
low-income consumers as separate and unequal participants in
consumer society. Though consumption inequality may be less
than income inequality (Horwitz, 2015), the exploitation that lessaffluent consumers experience as a result of the many businesses
that profit from their economic insecurity and lack of access to
mainstream retailers and financial institutions should not be ignored. However, without the poverty industry and the premiums
they demand, many poor and low-income consumers would indeed be flawed because they would lack access to immediate cash
and credit, and the opportunity to potentially own homes, vehicles,
appliances, and furniture. Unlike many mainstream retailers and
financial institutions, the poverty industry at least recognizes lessaffluent individuals as “useful” consumers who occupy an important segment of the market. Consequently, the poverty industry acknowledges that poor and low-income consumers have needs and
wants just like more-affluent consumers and provides the means
for them to participate in consumer society.

Empowered Inclusion
Just because poor and low-income consumers possess limited
and unstable discretionary income and face geographic constraints
does not necessarily mean they are victims who lack agency and
choice. Even the poorest consumers “attempt to exert some control
within in their consumer world” rather than “passively accepting
their circumstances” (Hill 2002, p. 213). Some poor and low-income
consumers do not view themselves as necessarily exploited by the
poverty industry and knowingly pay a premium for access, speed,
convenience, and nondiscriminatory service (Alwitt & Donley,
1996; Hill et al., 1998; Servon, 2017). Poor and low-income consumers stress that access to otherwise unobtainable consumer goods
and speed of transaction are key reasons they patronize the rentto-own industry, and the majority report that they are satisfied
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with their experiences at rent-to-own retailers (Lacko et al., 2000).
Likewise, some less-affluent consumers prefer fringe check cashing
and payday loan businesses to mainstream financial institutions
because they are located conveniently in (or near) their neighborhoods, have extended hours, are open on weekends, and their employees do not judge or stigmatize them (Alvarez, 2013; Caskey,
2005; Silver-Greenberg, 2010). Paradoxically, many feel that these
establishments are more transparent than mainstream banks, with
the products they offer (and their prices) visibly posted on signs,
unlike overdraft penalties and other fees that are hidden in the paperwork at mainstream banks (Servon, 2017). Others realize that
their neighborhood corner store may charge them a poverty premium, but it also may offer them benefits, such as informal credit or
check cashing (Alwitt & Donley, 1996).
Although it is a struggle, many less-affluent consumers find
ways to empower their consumption choices and inclusion in consumer society, devising strategies to avoid being flawed consumers.
The primary way that they can exert the most control over their
purchasing power is when their discretionary income increases, such as receiving their annual EITC refund or an unexpected
windfall of money (Pugh, 2009; Sykes et al., 2015; Tach et al., 2019).
These pecuniary boosts empower poor and low-income consumers
to treat themselves and their families to desired goods as a form of
what Pugh (2009) refers to as symbolic indulgence. Other strategies include developing robust social capital, which they can use to
avoid the exploitative poverty industry and its premiums by outshopping and participating in rotating savings and credit associations (Alkon et al., 2013; Hill, 2008; Leipämaa-Leskinen et al., 2016;
MacKendrick, 2018; Servon, 2017). One additional way that poor
and low-income consumers avoid being flawed is by patronizing
businesses that attempt to include them in consumer society without exploiting them, such as national discount retailers like Family
Dollar and Walmart (Hamilton & Catterall, 2005). These stores offer
goods and services sans a poverty premium and are increasingly
located in (or offering delivery to) less-affluent urban and rural
communities, affording convenient competition to the exploitative
poverty industry.
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EITC and Windfall Money
Perhaps the most significant form of empowerment for poor and
low-income consumers in the United States is the earned income
tax credit (EITC), a means-tested refundable federal tax credit. The
EITC has been found to enhance both the discretionary purchasing
power and confidence of poor and low-income consumers (Duncan et al., 2007; Sykes et al., 2015). Distributed in an annual lump
sum, this refund money “encourages spending patterns that create
feelings of social inclusion and citizenship” (Sykes et al., 2015, pp.
243–244). Unlike other means-tested programs, the EITC is allocated through the Internal Revenue Service and there are no stipulations on how it can be spent, but filers must engage in wage work to
receive it. According to Sykes et al. (2015), this removes the stigma
and exclusion that accompany other means-tested programs, like
TANF and SNAP. EITC refund money provides low-income consumers the freedom of choice and autonomy to make decisions in
the marketplace. Duncan et al. (2007, pp. 86–87, as cited in Sykes et
al., 2015, p. 246) found that EITC recipients “generally took great
pride in being typical consumers—going to the mall or a fast-food
restaurant, buying new clothes instead of thrift store specials, buying furniture, or purchasing a reliable used car.”
Though Sykes et al. (2015) and Tach et al. (2019) found that most
EITC money is used to pay debts and invest in future consumption, 23 percent is used for current consumption and 11 percent
is reserved for “treats.” Parents commonly spent the treat part of
their refund to meet the consumer wants of their children, such as
purchasing brand-name athletic shoes, trips to amusement parks
and movie theaters, and dinners at TGI Fridays or Red Lobster
restaurants. Even though treats are a small portion of total EITC
spending, they provide “vital social–psychological rewards” of inclusion in consumer society (Sykes et al., 2015, p. 250).4 Similarly,
less-affluent consumers who experience a windfall of unexpected
money express feelings of empowerment and inclusion (Desmond
& Travis, 2018). Pugh (2009) discovered that low-income parents,
in particular, used such money as a form of “symbolic indulgence,”
purchasing brand-name clothes or vacations to Disney World for
their children. This enabled their children to gain access to consumer goods and experiences that conferred “dignity” and social
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belonging with their peers. Other research has also found that by
treating themselves to occasional non-necessities, such as a movie,
an expensive dinner, a new (instead of used) television, or even
bottled water, less-affluent consumers avoid feeling flawed or excluded from consumer society (Daniel, 2014; Leipämaa-Leskinen et
al., 2016). Temporary boosts in discretionary income offer the opportunity for poor and low-income consumers to act like more-affluent consumers by engaging in conspicuous consumption that
can help them mask their poverty, especially by purchasing new,
brand-name consumer goods (Caplovitz, 1963; Hamilton, 2009).
Importantly, it allows them to purchase consumer goods that they
can use to maintain social relationships and symbolize care (Chin,
2001; Kochuyt, 2004; Pugh, 2009; Sykes et al., 2015). This is significant because it helps less-affluent consumers build another form of
empowerment: social capital.
Social Capital
When economic capital is scarce, many poor and low-income
consumers rely on social capital to support their consumer needs,
including sharing resources within families and communities (Alkon et al., 2013; Chin, 2001; Desmond & Travis, 2018; Hill, 2008;
Kochuyt, 2004). In their study of survival strategies among the
urban poor, Desmond and Travis found a strong expectation of
mutual support, even among strangers. According to Hill (2008,
p. 82), poor consumers are more “dependent upon community
where sharing of possessions regularly occurs.” Kochuyt (2004, pp.
139, 151) describes the social capital of poor households as a moral
economy, where resources are redistributed according to need and
family bonds are reinforced, especially when parents self-sacrifice
to protect their children “from economic adversities.” Likewise,
Chin (2001) discovered how sharing within families shapes the
purchasing decisions of lower-income children, such as one young
boy in her study who decided to purchase a pair of walkie-talkies
so he could share this toy with his younger brother. Similarly, Alkon et al. (2013) found that less-affluent consumers who lived in
food deserts often share food, cooking, and eating with family and
friends. Interestingly, they also found that they use their social networks to overcome geographic obstacles, such as borrowing cars
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or carpooling to outshop for higher-quality, less-expensive food at
stores outside of their neighborhoods. The practice of outshopping
enables less-affluent consumers to actively avoid poverty premiums and facilitates “mastering” consumption (Leipämaa-Leskinen
et al., 2016, p. 267). Leipämaa-Leskinen et al. (2016) learned that
some less-affluent consumers felt empowerment from mastering
consumption, which they often performed within their families.
Creating careful budgets and disciplined shopping routines (especially for items on sale) helped these families exert deliberate
control over spending and made some feel like they were “more
discerning than the average consumer” (Leipämaa-Leskinen et al.,
2016, p. 267).
Social capital also helps some less-affluent consumers avoid the
exploitation of fringe financial services, like payday lenders, by arranging informal loans with family members or close friends that
act as private safety nets (Alvarez, 2013).5 Participating in rotating
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) can provide low-income
consumers the means to borrow money for a down payment on
a house, pay for wedding expenses, or to purchase a large-ticket
item, like an appliance.6 Members of a ROSCA pay a predetermined amount of money (or “hand”) for a set number of weeks (or
a “round”) to a “banker” that manages the association’s monetary
pool. Each week, one member receives his or her “drawer,” or round
of money from the pool. Members who have been part of a ROSCA
the longest often receive the priority drawers that occur in early
rounds, but some ROSCAs use a lottery or bidding system to determine the order of drawers (Servon, 2017, pp. 124–125). According
to Servon (2017, p. 125), “ROSCAs rely on social capital—the trust,
norms, and networks that operate within a community.” ROSCAs
tend to be relatively small (10 to 20 members) and group pressure
acts as an insurance policy that all members will contribute their
“hands” on time every week. While members of most ROSCAs
know each other from either working together, living in the same
neighborhood, attending the same place of worship, or belonging
to the same ethnic community, others operate through the social
capital of the banker, who screens members (Servon, 2017, p. 125).
An alternative to mainstream and fringe banks, ROSCAs can empower less-affluent consumers to master their consumer finances,
avoiding high interest rates and default or overdraft fees.
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Discount Retailers—and Amazon
Poor and low-income consumers also avoid being flawed by
patronizing businesses that attempt to include them in consumer
society without stigmatizing or exploiting them. National discount
retailers, including Walmart, Family Dollar, and Dollar General,
have intentionally acknowledged poor and low-income consumers as valued customers who desire quality brands at low prices.
Admittedly, these places of consumption may constitute a new
component of the poverty industry; however, given that they also
cater to more-affluent consumers, they do not exploit poor and
low-income consumers the same way the more traditional poverty
industry does. Less-affluent consumers do not pay a poverty premium at discount retailers and though the less-expensive goods on
offer may not be the highest quality, this planned obsolescence is
characteristic of consumerism in general. Indeed, discount retailers
provide less-affluent consumers a relatively normal shopping experience with product variety, the opportunity to express agency,
and perhaps even the possibility to daydream of future purchases,
even if price most often dictates choice. While this may not represent the typical understanding of empowerment, it does provide
poor and low-income consumers some self-determination in the
marketplace, to the extent that any consumer, regardless of income,
has autonomy.
Dollar General (2019) aims at “Serving Others” in mostly rural
and urban areas, where it operates over 15,000 stores. Marketing itself
as a small-sized neighborhood convenience store with merchandise
that consumers frequently purchase (such as snack food, healthcare
products, and cleaning supplies), Dollar General prides itself on saving its customers time and money. Most of the merchandise at Dollar General costs less than $10 and, like its name implies, 30 percent
of its offerings cost $1 or less. Though less-expensive, private-label
products are on the shelves, consumers also can find trusted national brands that are commonly available in stores that more-affluent
consumers frequent at a discount, and often on sale (Dollar General,
2019). Family Dollar (2019) also targets poor and low-income consumers in the 8,000 stores it operates in underserved rural and urban
communities, following a model similar to Dollar General by offering national and private-label brands at low prices. Advertising itself
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as a place that “makes shopping fun without stretching the family
budget,” Family Dollar, like Dollar General, treats less-affluent consumers in a “more socially responsible manner” by eliminating the
poverty premium and empowering them with more choice—and
more purchasing power—in the marketplace (Family Dollar, 2019).
The median household income of the average Dollar Store and Family Dollar shopper is $46,000, considerably less than the U.S. median
of $56,516, and almost 40 percent of Family Dollar shoppers make
less than $25,000 (PYMNTS, 2016).
Walmart’s power to include poor and low-income consumers
in consumer society surpasses Dollar General and Family Dollar in
scale and scope. Though Walmart operates fewer stores (just over
4,700) in the U.S. than Dollar General and Family Dollar, its massive size, strategic locations (90 percent of all Americans live within 15 miles of a Walmart store), vast product selection, and comparatively low prices help it achieve high volume sales (Fishman,
2006). Fishman found that Americans spend $35 million every hour
at Walmart stores and 93 percent of them shop at a Walmart store
at least once a year, spending on average $2,060 annually. Though
consumers of all income levels shop at Walmart, the median household income of most Walmart shoppers is slightly less than the U.S.
median household income per year—$53,125 per year compared to
$56,516 in 2015—and 27 percent of Walmart shoppers earn less than
$25,000 per year (PYMNTS, 2016). Eighteen percent of all SNAP
benefits are spent at Walmart each year, amounting to $13 billion in
2016 (LaMagna, 2018; Reich & Bearman, 2018).
In 2019, Walmart agreed to participate in a USDA pilot program
for SNAP recipients to order their groceries online for pickup or
delivery, the latter of which could help overcome the geographic constraints faced by those residing in food deserts. Walmart’s
mission to help its customers “Save Money. Live Better” extends
beyond products to include services such as pharmacies, vision
centers, hair salons, and wireless phone plans via T-Mobile (2019).
Walmart’s website shows the chain also offers financial services
such as check cashing ($4 fee for checks $1000 or less, $8 fee for
checks more than $1000), money transfers, prepaid debit cards, tax
preparation, bill payment, and store credit cards with no annual
fees at its MoneyCenter. Clearly, discount retailers profit from poor
and low-income consumers, and Reich and Bearman (2018) caution
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against viewing Walmart as the “Robin Hood of the poor” given
the low wages it pays its workers. However, discount retailers empower the choices available to less-affluent consumers, including
their employees, by offering a wide variety of higher-quality goods
and services at lower prices than the exploitative poverty industry.
In 2017, Amazon began to recognize the collective purchasing
power of poor and low-income consumers, offering its Prime membership for $5.99 per month to individuals on government assistance, and accepting SNAP payments for grocery orders (Cascade
Business News, 2017). It also started a financial program called Amazon Cash aimed at less-affluent consumers without debit or credit
cards—individuals take cash to a participating location and purchase Amazon Cash to use online (LaMagna, 2018). Amazon Prime
includes free delivery, which helps consumers with transportation
challenges, such as no access to a car or reliance on public transportation that makes it difficult to shop in bulk. Amazon Prime also
provides access to thousands of movies, television programs, and
musical compositions to stream, as well as digital books. Though
Amazon Prime initially targeted more-affluent consumers, the
company realized that if it wanted to grow, it needed to expand its
membership base (Cascade Business News, 2017). According to one
industry analyst interviewed by Cascade Business News, Amazon
is likely to continue to build loyalty with “underserved markets
that [are] getting totally ignored” by extending membership privileges to them (2017, para. 14). Given that poverty is temporary for
most individuals, empowering poor and low-income consumers in
the present may be a successful strategy to build brand loyalty for
the future, when the consumers may be more affluent.
Expanding Empowerment Opportunities
In sum, poor and low-income consumers can experience “empowered inclusion” in consumer society via the EITC and windfall cash, relying on social capital, and patronizing businesses like
Dollar General, Family Dollar, Walmart, and Amazon that compete
with the exploitative poverty industry. However, in the words of
the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (2013, p. 7), our society
needs to find additional ways for less-affluent consumers to “take
more control over their economic lives.” The Consumer Finance
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Protection Bureau recommends better access to financial services,
consumer information, and financial education. The Brookings
Institute (2006) makes similar recommendations and stresses that
regulations may be required to protect these consumers from the
exploitative practices of the poverty industry, especially payday
lenders. Innovations in financial technology, or “FinTech”—such
as mobile apps that help those who receive government-assistance
payment cards track spending, pay bills, and transfer money online from the cards to payment platforms with mainstream banking
services—can help empower poor and low-income consumers as
well (Berman & Yeh, 2017). Instead of relying on predatory financial services or those offered at for-profit retailers such as Walmart
and Amazon, local post offices could offer financial services, like
they do in many European countries (Baradaran, 2015). Currently,
38 percent of the nation’s 35,000 post offices are located in zip codes
without banks, so this could be a convenient alternative to payday
lenders (Stoesz, 2014). Mainstream banks could also do a better job
of including services that do not take advantage of less-affluent
consumers, such as offering small loans that can be repaid in installments limited to five percent of monthly income and improving transparency about overdraft fees and other obscure charges
(Servon, 2017; Wherry, 2015).
In addition to increasing wages (and decreasing poverty)7, the
implementation of a universal basic income (UBI) would be an important boost to the discretionary spending power of less-affluent
consumers. Hill (2018, p. 414) suggests that a UBI could ensure the
right of what he calls consumption adequacy, or “that all persons
should have unimpeded, lifetime access to goods and services that
meet basic needs within the context of their living environments.”
The UBI is a direct cash transfer from the government with no stipulations on what it can be used to purchase or where. Distributed annually in one lump sum or in monthly installments, it could
empower poor and low-income consumers to master consumption
better through constructing more predictable budgets, particularly
by earmarking anticipated money for “treats,” savings, or paying
off debt (similar to the EITC). A UBI would also enable less-affluent
households to smooth consumption throughout the year or over a
month. For example, Kueng’s research on payouts from the Alaska
Permanent Fund (APF)8 found that the lowest-income households
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used this money to smooth consumption over the year instead of
spending it all at once (Kwok, 2017). Likewise, a national UBI could
expand the empowerment opportunities of poor and low-income
consumers and reduce consumption inequality more generally so
they do not have to become heavily indebted to avoid being flawed.

Conclusion
Finding ways to increase the purchasing power of poor and
low-income consumers is necessary to provide them the means to
expand their participation in the marketplace and improve their
standard of living; however, they are not by definition flawed consumers. Even though less-affluent consumers face challenges in
the marketplace and are often exploited, they are not completely
excluded from participating in consumer society. Thus, they are
not, as Bauman suggests, “invalids earmarked for exclusion,” since
they have the ability to follow and fulfill “the precepts of consumer
culture” (2007, p. 56). Poor and low-income consumers are not so
much “failed” consumers who “cannot buy so…have no purpose”
(Lawson, 2009, p. 112), but a segment of the consumer market that
does buy, but with limited resources, and is worthy of social recognition from not just academic researchers but the financial industry
and more mainstream businesses as well.

Endnotes
1. Defined as those with household incomes less than or equal to 50 percent
of the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) estimate. These vary by
state, county, and metropolitan location. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
datasets/il/il06/BRIEFING-MATERIALs.pdf
2. The Consumer Expenditure Survey is the only national government
survey that collects data on income, expenditures, and certain demographic variables on U.S. consumers to capture economic wellbeing. It
reports expenditures and demographic data via five household pre-tax
income quintiles, but does not use the subjective terms “poor” or “rich”
to describe them. Pre-tax income includes SNAP, but excludes noncash
benefits and gifts (Crain & Wilson, 2017). The survey is conducted by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and collects household data using two
methods: an Interview Survey for major and recurring purchases (such
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as an automobile or utilities) and a Consumer Diary for minor and more
frequently purchased items, like food and household supplies (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2016).
3. Approximately 80 percent of rent-to-own customers make less than
$40,000 per year. Legally, the $8.5 billion annual rent-to-own industry in
the U.S. can bring criminal charges against customers who fail to return the
items they rent, which in the worst-case scenario can result in incarceration
(National Consumer Law Center, 2019).
4. Over $68.5 billion dollars was distributed to low-income workers via
the EITC for returns filed in 2016. The maximum EITC is only $519 per
year for single tax filers, but for those with one child it is $3,461, two children $5,716, and three children $6,431 (Falk & Crandall-Hollick, 2018).
5. Of course, as Alvarez (2013) points out, providing loans to family or
friends can be costly and cause financial strain. Norms of reciprocity associated with such informal loans may oblige an individual to lend money to a
sibling at the expense of their own consumer desires.
6. Servon (2017, p. 126) explains that some ROSCAs “exist to purchase certain consumer goods in a quantity great enough for each member to get the
item at a discount. If everyone needs a dishwasher, for instance, the leader
of the group will negotiate a price with a vendor for ten dishwashers, resulting in a discount for all members.”
7. Fortunately, before the pandemic, the poverty rate in the United States
declined from 14.8 percent in 2014 to 12.3 percent in 2017. During the
same time, median household income increased from $53,657 to $61,372
(DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2015; Fontenot et al., 2018). Between May 2018
and May 2019, the lowest paid workers (finally) started to experience an
increase of wages at just over 4 percent (Casselman, 2019).
8. The Alaska Permanent Fund is a state-owned fund that distributes a
yearly payment to every resident in Alaska from the state’s oil revenue.
It was established in the late 1970s and began distributing dividends to
Alaskan residents (including children) in 1982. The average annual payment fluctuates due to changes in oil prices and the stock market, but the
average dividend payment is between $1,000 and $2,000. It is distributed
every October.
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Serious scholarly inquiry regarding the role of social constructions and
narratives in sex offender management laws is relatively a new undertaking.
In the last two decades, a myriad of studies exploring the negative effects of
Sex Offender Registration and Notification (SORN) policies were added to
the literature, a trend that appears to be slowing down today. The purpose
of this paper is to recommend the integration of the narrative policy
framework (NPF) with Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) theory of social
construction of target populations in the analysis of SORN policies. The
author provides a critical review of SORN policies while deconstructing
the stories and messages embedded in their provisions. For the reader’s
convenience, this paper also includes brief descriptions of both the NPF
and Social Construction of Target Populations. The main argument of this
paper highlights the need to modify harmful and scientifically unsupported
social constructions in policy narratives in an effort to promote the
development of effective and humane policies.
Keywords: narrative policy framework, sex offender registration and
notification laws, sex offenders, social constructions, Adam Walsh Act,
Megan’s Law

Sexual offending is a serious crime that often results in severe
outcomes for both victims and perpetrators. Unfortunately, sexual
violence is not a rare occurrence in our society (Bonnar-Kidd, 2010);
in the United States, it is approximated that one in three women
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and one in four men have experienced some form of physical sexual
violence at some point in their lives. It is also estimated that one
in seven children experienced sexual abuse in 2019 alone (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). These numbers expose a
troubling social reality, which is that a shockingly large number of
individuals are committing these types of crimes.
When most people hear the words “sex offender,” they might
think only of sexual crimes committed against children, but sexual
offending can include a multitude of sexual (and pseudo-sexual)
acts ranging from urinating in public to rape against children and
adults, especially women, whom the literature indicates represent a
majority of victims of sexual assault (Bonnar-Kidd, 2010; Sample &
Bray, 2003). The convicted sex offender population encompasses not
only those who commit violent sexual crimes, but also individuals
with non-physical contact offenses (Aebi et al., 2012; Gudjonsson &
Sigurdsson, 2000). Persons may be labeled sex offenders, deemed
dangerous to society, and thus, required to withstand long-term
surveillance with little effort to define or distinguish the severity
of harm inflicted on the victim, the age of the victim, or the type of
offense (Logan, 2003).
Sex offender management policies are important to the extent
that they are in place to protect victims and keep communities
safe (Harris & Socia, 2014). However, their harshness may be partly
attributed to emotional reactivity and societal morals, as opposed
to a rational weighing of the benefits and costs of their specific
components (Tewksbury, 2012). The moral and political imperative
to double down on punishment can lead policy makers to dismiss,
intentionally or by oversight, scientific knowledge and empirical
evidence that might suggest alternative solutions to an undeniably
serious problem (Freeman & Sandler, 2010).
Under pressure from the federal government, all states have
adopted registration and notification laws that require jurisdictions
to meet a minimum of standards for the management of persons
who committed a sexual offense (e.g., Adam Walsh Act of 2006)
(Harris et al., 2010; Logan, 2003). Sex offender registration and
notification laws (SORN) were enacted with the explicit intention
of keeping communities safe from the threat posed by dangerous
sexual predators (Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010). These laws require
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individuals convicted of sexual offenses to provide authorities and
the community with personal information that is publicized on the
internet for anyone to find (Logan, 2003; Tewksbury & Jennings,
2010). There are variations in the application of these laws from
state to state (Freeman & Sandler, 2010). As a result of threatened
loss of federal monies, a few states have implemented policies that
treat persons who committed a sexual offense as criminals that
require constant monitoring; however, other states have resisted
these federal mandates, suggesting that for these states, the loss of
funding is a much better choice than compliance with these laws
(Freeman & Sandler, 2010; Williams et al., 2020).
In addition to the societal values and standards of morality
that have shaped the development of SORN policies, several other
notable factors have influenced decisions about how governments
should respond to sexual crimes and how they should manage those
who commit these crimes (Letourneau et al., 2010). One important
variable that has contributed to the evolution of SORN policies is
the stories told by policy actors about sex-related crimes. These
stories help to shape perceptions about persons who committed a
sexual offense as well as the policy solutions generated to manage
this population (Levenson & Cotter, 2005a; Tewksbury, 2012).
It is imperative that scholars who evaluate policies concerning
stigmatized groups employ theoretical frameworks that take into
account the crucial role of stories in the policy process (Bensel &
Sample, 2017; Schneider et al., 2014).
The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) proposes the use of
empirical methods to analyze the ways in which stories about
particular groups play a role in the development of policy, while
accounting for the interactions between individual, organizational,
and societal structures, and their influences on the establishment
of policies (Jones & McBeth, 2010). Despite increased attention in
recent years, post-structural approaches to policy examination,
including the NPF, have rarely been applied to the study of policies
surrounding socially stigmatized populations (McBeth & Lybecker,
2018; Merry, 2019; Shanahan et al., 2011). The literature widely
accepts the inherent role of stories and stereotypes in shaping social
perception of persons who committed a sexual offense (Bense &
Sample, 2017; Harris et al., 2010; Robbers, 2009), but studies that

36

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

explore the influence of these stories on policy, and more specifically,
how they are used to shape and justify sex offender management
laws, are virtually non-existent.
Integral to the NPF is the assumption that certain concepts and
realities are socially constructed (Smith & Larimer, 2017). The NPF
builds on this assumption by examining the relationships between
socially constructed “characters”—who are cast as heroes, villains,
and victims—engaged with one another in a particular setting and
plot (Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018). Social Construction of Target
Populations is another theory of policy analysis that argues that
the policy agenda is fundamentally shaped by shared assumptions
about specific social groups (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Social
Construction of Target Population is especially helpful in the study
of policies that pertain to “deviants,” a category proposed by this
theory that would include those who committed a sexual crime and
are thus labeled as sex offenders (Schneider et al., 2014).
This paper incorporates ideas proposed by the Social Construction of Target Populations framework to supplement and
enhance the evaluation of SORN laws through an NPF theoretical
lens. It will include a detailed review of the NPF, its historical
underpinnings, and most essential elements of the theory. The goal
of this analysis is to gauge the utility of NPF for deconstructing
SORN policies and to evaluate whether they are effective in fulfilling
their purported goal of protecting the community, particularly
children, from the real and perceived dangers of convicted sex
offenders (Sample & Bray, 2003; Zevitz et al., 2000). This paper further
examines the inevitable interactions between policy narratives and
the socially constructed assumptions surrounding this population.

Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification Laws
Although sex offender management laws have existed
since the 1930s, the proliferation of these laws across the United
States has been more recent (Cubellis et al., 2018; Logan, 2009).
From their inception, SORN policies were designed to enhance
community safety by providing the public and law enforcement
with information about the presence of sex offenders in their
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communities (Freeman & Sandler, 2010; Prescott & Rockoff, 2011).
Implementation of SORN policies varies from state to state, but
in general, these laws require jurisdictions to closely track all
convicted sex offenders residing in the community (Levenson et
al., 2007; Matson & Lieb, 1996). Not surprisingly, there have been
numerous controversies surrounding the implementation of SORN
laws, with some legal experts expressing concern about the extent
to which these policies violate individuals’ constitutional rights
(Levenson & Cotter, 2005b; Petrunik, 2003; Vásquez et al., 2008).
Scholars have reported findings that dispute the efficacy of these
laws with respect to their principal goals of improving public safety
and reducing the incidence of sexual crimes (Levenson et al., 2007;
Sample et al., 2011; Walker et al., 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). The
empirical evidence not only contradicts the effectiveness of these
policies; several studies indicate that SORN laws are also costly and
create obstacles to successful reintegration (Kernsmith et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, a large segment of the public insists that the sense
of safety they get from the existence of these laws justifies their
retention, or even expansion (Petrunik, 2003).
SORN laws require all convicted sex offenders to provide their
personal information to law enforcement and the public (Harris
et al., 2010). Depending on the state and jurisdiction, personal
information to be disclosed may include the individual’s name, the
address where they reside, a recent photo, employment information,
and details about their criminal offenses. Individuals’ personal
information is made public on the internet, granting access to anyone
in the community. Law enforcement uses convicted offenders’
personal information to track their movements, coordinate with
other law enforcement agencies, and investigate sex crimes.
Surveillance of persons who committed a sexual offense typically
includes unannounced house visits, limited and monitored internet
access, residence restrictions, and periodic in-person re-registration
(Harris & Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2010; Matson & Lieb, 1996).
Federal involvement in the management of persons who
committed a sexual offense began with the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of
1994, also known as the Jacob Wetterling Act (Freeman & Sandler,
2010). Jacob was eleven years old when he was abducted at gunpoint
on his way home from a video store. For decades, his family tirelessly
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searched for Jacob to no avail. Mrs. Wetterling made it her mission
to protect other families and communities from child abduction
and child sexual abuse. The Wetterling family lobbied to pass a
federal law that would require convicted sex offenders to register
with law enforcement and would allow police to release their
personal information to the public (Lewis, 1996). With the passage
of the Jacob Wetterling Act, the federal government began to put
pressure on states to establish registration systems for released sex
offenders (Freeman & Sander, 2010). If non-compliant, states risked
losing federal funding; all fifty states have since adopted some form
of sex offender registration policy (Logan, 2003).
Over the last 26 years, the federal government has accumulated
more authority over how states manage their sex offender
registration systems. Several amendments to the Jacob Wetterling
Act have strengthened the requirements put in place under the
original law (Harris et al., 2010; Wright, 2008). In 1996, seven-yearold Megan Kanka was sexually abused and murdered by a neighbor
who had two previous sexual assault convictions. Just a month after
Megan’s body was found, the New Jersey state legislature passed
the Sexual Offender Registration Act, commonly known as Megan’s
Law (Garfinkle, 2003). This amendment to the existing sex offender
registration law introduced community notification in addition
to registration with law enforcement (Levenson et al., 2007). Later
amendments to SORN policies included the Jacob Wetterling
Improvements Act of 1997, which expanded jurisdictions’ scope of
operation and revised terms of release, parole, and court-mandated
requirements. Then, in 2003, Congress authorized the Other Tools
to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act, creating a national
system combining information on convicted sex offenders from
registries around the country (Harris et al., 2010).
Most Americans are familiar with the Adam Walsh case. In
1981, Adam was abducted from a department store in Florida. Two
weeks later, police found Adam’s severed head; the rest of his body
has never been recovered. The case received national attention at
the time due to the horrific nature of the crime and the family’s
relentless efforts to identify Adam’s killer (Walsh & Schindehette,
1998). Despite being an older case, Adam Walsh’s story has
continued to garner public interest and has taken an important role
in contemporary legal discourse.
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The latest amendment to SORN, the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act, also known as the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act (Adam Walsh Act), was signed into law
in 2006 by then-president George W. Bush (Prescott, 2010). The act
introduced even stricter requirements by expanding the criteria
for sex offender registration, extending the terms and conditions
to tribal jurisdictions, and including foreign convictions. These
modifications further extended SORN laws to include adolescents
fourteen and older who were convicted of certain offenses (Harris
et al., 2010). Retroactive conditions mandated that persons who
committed a sexual offense who had previously completed their
sentences and were subsequently convicted of any new crime,
including non-sexual crimes and misdemeanors, must comply
with registration and community notification requirements (Harris
& Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2010). Other changes included longer
registration periods, more frequent updates, and new methods of
community notification (Levenson et al., 2007). One of the most
compelling revisions, however, was a multitier classification system
that places individuals into one of three categories based solely on
their conviction (Harris & Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2010).
Several of the new terms and conditions instituted under the
Adam Walsh Act have presented significant barriers for states
(Cubellis et al., 2018). Half of the states already using a multitier
system relied on conviction offense and number of prior criminal
offenses to determine sex offender classification; the other half
prioritized empirically-based risk assessments to distinguish
among convicted individuals’ recidivism risk (Matson & Lieb,
1996). Officials in states previously using risk assessments have
expressed concerns over community safety, claiming that the new
law relies on non-scientific conditions to determine level of risk.
Conviction-based states have also reported concerns regarding
unnecessary expansion and the inclusion of minors (Harris &
Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2010). Finally, a number of states have faced
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the added terms and
conditions of SORN laws (Handler, 2011; Levenson et al., 2007).
Several studies have examined key factors affecting the passage,
implementation, and maintenance of sex offender management
laws in the United States from a social constructionist perspective
(Kernsmith et al., 2016; Quinn et al., 2004; Sample et al., 2011; Sample
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& Kadleck, 2008; Williams et al., 2020). None of these studies,
however, consider the role of narratives—events linked in sequence,
across time, and according to a plot—in shaping these policies. This
paper proposes a policy evaluation strategy that uses narrative
tools to deconstruct policies around sexual offending in order to
better understand their motivations and effects.

The Narrative Policy Framework
The Narrative Policy Framework seeks to explain the role
of narratives in the policy process through the employment
of empirical methods (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, et al., 2018).
Furthermore, the NPF posits that stories embedded in policy are
used by policymakers as tools for manipulating public opinion,
promoting favored policy agendas, and, as a result, enhancing their
own political power (Smith & Larimer, 2017). While the NPF is a
relatively new approach, it is quickly advancing in its methodology
and application in a variety of policy contexts pertaining to different
phenomena and populations (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, et al., 2018;
Smith & Larimer, 2017).
Because the NPF is not a one-size-fits-all approach, it is not
always the most appropriate choice for evaluating a given policy.
The research project must align with core assumptions proposed
by the theory (Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018). First, the NPF
posits that important aspects of the policy being studied should
be explained as socially constructed (Lybecker et al., 2015). In the
case of SORN laws, persons who committed a sexual offense are
court-mandated to provide personal information that is published
on the internet and to notify community members when they move
into a neighborhood (Prescott & Rockoff, 2011). These standards
are in place based on the widely-accepted characterization of these
individuals as dangerous and cunning, posing a constant threat to
children (Zevitz et al., 2000). The narratives attributed to the label
“sex offender” that inform SORN laws are indisputably socially
constructed given that there is no empirical evidence suggesting
that all persons convicted of a sexual crime pose the same level
of danger; in fact, research has revealed that a majority of persons
who committed a sexual offense do not re-offend after conviction
(Carpenter, 2014).
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Second, the NPF assumes that there always is variation
within the process of understanding specific social constructions
(Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018). This expected variation may
be slight in the case of persons who committed a sexual offense,
because the social construction is relatively stable, as it is firmly
tied to durable moral and ideological frameworks. Third, the NPF
requires that all narrative policies have specific and identifiable
structures, which should include characters, a setting, a plot, and a
moral of the story (Smith & Larimer, 2017). Certainly, sex offenderspecific policies and the debates around them contain all these
elements of narratives.
The Narrative Arc in Sex Offender Laws
Defining the narrative components of a policy is crucial in all
research grounded in the NPF in order to effectively assess the
social impact of policy narratives on public perceptions and on
the political fortunes of policymakers and politicians (Shanahan,
Jones, McBeth, et al., 2018; Shanahan et al., 2011). In NPF analysis,
each element of these narratives must be identified and thoroughly
deconstructed, and all narratives must have at least one character
(Smith & Larimer, 2017). In the narrative about SORN laws,
individuals convicted of having committed a sexual offense, the
central characters upon whom the policy burdens are placed,
are invariably cast as the villains of the story. The policymakers
and politicians who fight sexual violence and crime by imposing
harsh punishments and stringent surveillance measures naturally
take for themselves the mantle of the story’s heroes. Advocates
against child sexual abuse are also typically perceived as heroes,
while those who experienced victimization, their families, and the
community are mostly treated as the victims of the story.
Another important narrative element outlined by the NPF is the
setting, which in this context refers to the circumstance surrounding
a policy agenda and the context in which policy-specific conflicts take
place (Crow et al., 2017). Central to SORN laws is the role allocated to
communities and community members. The notification component
of the policy requires individuals who have been convicted of a
sexual crime to inform community members of their presence in
the neighborhood with the expectation that neighbors will then be
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empowered to serve as watchdogs and collective guardians of the
community’s children. Standards and procedures for notification
vary from state to state, with some states even encouraging the use of
a third party, such as a notification delivery company, to assist in the
process (Levenson & Cotter, 2005a).
The NPF further defines the plot of the policy narrative as the
storyline comprising social narratives about the actors, the problem,
causes of the problem, and political intervention (Shanahan, Jones, &
McBeth, 2018). A plot or storyline can be socially constructed through
the dissemination of specific information designed to increase
public fear and elicit powerful emotional responses in society at
large (Lybecker et al., 2015). Such is the case with the stories and
messages about persons who committed a sexual offense that have
proliferated in the policy debates surrounding the Jacob Wetterling
Act and Megan’s Law (Garfinkle, 2003; Levenson & Cotter, 2005a).
Both of these highly publicized stories featured shocking accounts
of child sexual abuse, the murder of children, and the desecration
of their corpses (Handler, 2011). These frightening story elements
highlight the vileness of the acts and promote a characterization
of all individuals convicted of a sexual offense as evil, and thus
deserving of long-term punishment and surveillance, regardless of
the nature of their specific crime.
In the policy development narrative, policy solutions are usually
presented as a response to the supposed moral of the story (Shanahan,
Jones, McBeth, et al., 2018). The appropriate punishments and
consequences for those who commit sexual crimes against children
have been debated for decades, resulting in the passage of several laws
that build successively on their predecessors, such as in the case of
the Adam Walsh Act of 2006, which was enacted despite the presence
of numerous existing laws that addressed the issue of sexual crimes
against children (e.g. Jacob Wetterling Act of 1994 and Megan’s Law
of 1996) (Harris et al., 2010). The solutions to the phenomenon of child
sexual abuse, however, have spectacularly failed to integrate scientific
and empirical knowledge, creating loopholes that affect not only
those convicted of sexual offenses, but also the families of victims and
communities (Freeman & Sandler, 2010).
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Levels of Analysis: Sex Offender Laws,
the Individual, and the Community
The NPF postulates that narratives operate at different levels of
analysis—i.e., micro, meso, and macro—which all interact with
each other (Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018). The micro level of
analysis pertains to individuals at the center of the policy, who may
be targeted to receive either burdens (persons who committed a
sexual offense) or benefits (members of the community). A microlevel analysis of SORN laws might focus on how messages and
stereotypes about persons who committed a sexual offense have
the power to influence policy decisions, and vice versa (Jones &
McBeth, 2010). Consistent with the Social Construction of Target
Populations framework, proponents of the NPF argue that persons
who committed a sexual offense are socially conceptualized as
deviant, and are widely viewed as deserving of punishment and
long-term consequences, which is clearly identified in existing
policies to manage this population (Schneider & Ingram, 1993;
Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, et al., 2018; Tewksbury, 2012).
The meso level of analysis is concerned with how policy actors
construct narratives to influence the policy process (Smith &
Larimer, 2017). In their advocacy efforts for policies pertaining to
the management of persons who committed a sexual offense, policy
actors have historically attached the names of children who were
sexually abused and murdered to policies (Handler, 2011). This
often successful tactic emphasizes the brutality of specific crimes
to convince the public that all individuals convicted of a sexual
crime deserve equally harsh punishment despite the fact that less
than 3% of all child sexual abuse cases present such characteristics
(Tewksbury et al., 2012).
Communities have been quick to react in support of harsh new
policies, regardless of scientific knowledge to the contrary. Shortly
after its passage, the Jacob Wetterling Act of 1994 was deemed
insufficient to address the problem of child sexual abuse, obliging
policymakers and politicians to advocate for even tougher laws in
response to new, highly publicized cases of child sexual abuse and
murder (Harris et al., 2010). Specifically for Republicans, whose
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“tough-on-crime” stance has been central to their political identity,
it was likely seen as important to promote these laws in order to
maintain this identity and meet the expectations of their voters
(Wright, 2008).
Lastly, the macro level of analysis focuses on the narratives
embedded in culture and society as a whole. Research at the macro
level attempts to understand how change or stability in macro policy
narratives shapes policy realities (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, et al.,
2018). Because this level of analysis is most appropriate in longitudinal
evaluations of policy, the cultural narratives and changes within
SORN laws can best be understood by exploring the interactions
among narrative elements at the micro and meso levels.

Understanding Social Constructions
and Narratives in Policy Analysis
As previously stated, evaluating public policy from a narrative
framework allows for a deeper understanding of the role of stories
in shaping political and legal realities (Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth,
2018). In the specific area of sex offender policy, the popular view
that all individuals convicted of a sexual offense pose a great and
imminent danger of sexually reoffending has been established
by policymakers through policies that perpetuate this narrative
(Stevenson et al., 2013). The successful distribution of such a harmful
narrative can only be possible if the group at the center of the
narrative is widely perceived in singular terms (Bensel & Sample,
2017; Merry, 2019). Although most individuals convicted of a sexual
offense are male, research highlights the existence of a relatively
small, but significant, group of female offenders (Peter, 2009;
Wijkman et al., 2010). The social construction of women convicted
of a sexual offense is different from that of men, where women are
perceived as particularly unnatural, lacking the nurturing qualities
expected of them (Hayes & Carpenter, 2013).
As a prerequisite for using the NPF to evaluate SORN laws,
researchers must provide evidence that persons who committed a
sexual offense can be understood as having a socially constructed
identity (Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018). Schneider and Ingram
(1993) proposed a theory of policy analysis that explains the role
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of social construction in the political process. Their theory of
Social Construction of Target Populations proposes that social
constructions play a crucial role in shaping public policy and
policymakers’ decisions (Schneider et al., 2014). Existing social
constructions may become entrenched in policies, which then
become powerful messages that are disseminated to the public.
This self-reinforcing process is highly effective in influencing
public opinion and motivating citizens to participate in the political
process in ways that benefit those with power and burden specific
target groups (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).
Social constructions intersect with policymakers’ political
motives in several key ways in the development of policy. Elected
officials court voters by proposing and enacting policies that they
believe will assist them in the maintenance of their own political
power (Schroedel & Jordan, 1998). To that end, they may take
advantage of existing social constructions about particular groups
to promote policies that grant benefits or impose burdens on those
groups according to their perceived merit (Schneider & Ingram,
1993). Policymakers thus anticipate citizens’ reactions to proposed
policies based on widely shared cultural and social beliefs about
those targeted groups (Schroedel & Jordan, 1998). In this way, the
consolidation of power and the perpetuation of social constructions
are both part of a premeditated strategy to serve elected officials’
personal and political self-interest (Schneider & Ingram, 1993;
Schroedel & Jordan, 1998).
According to the theory, targeted groups fall into one of four
basic categories based on their respective social constructions.
Advantaged groups tend to hold substantial social and political
power and are positively socially constructed (e.g., police, veterans,
the elderly). Contenders are also powerful and well-connected, but
are associated with negative social constructions (e.g., big banks,
lobbying interests, unions). Dependents are politically weak, but
are associated with positive social constructions (e.g., mothers,
children, persons with disabilities). The final group, deviants, are
both politically weak and negatively socially constructed (Pierce et
al., 2014; Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider et al., 2014). Due to
their criminal status and widespread public contempt, individuals
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convicted of a sexual crime are summarily allocated to the deviant
group category and subjected to severe social burdens (Gavin, 2005;
Grover & Soothill, 1995).

Contesting Social Constructions
to Influence Policy Change
Despite their notable flaws, existing sex offender management
laws do serve the public interest in some important ways. Sexual
assault and other sex crimes demand serious attention and
responsible intervention, including significant punishments for
those who commit these crimes. However, contemporary sex
offender management laws do not address this problem effectively,
due in part to their overreliance on fear tactics and singular
social constructions (Ehrhardt Mustaine et al., 2015; Freeman &
Sandler, 2010; Stevenson et al., 2013). Moreover, recent research
has shown how SORN policies have been designed with a narrow
understanding of the problem and limited scientific support
(Cubellis et al., 2018; Levenson et al., 2007).
Research has demonstrated the negative effect that SORN
policies can have on individuals’ mental health, including
increased stress, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, and
suicidal ideation (Cubellis et al., 2008; Levenson et al., 2007). Far
from being a problem that affects only persons who committed a
sexual offense, these negative outcomes have been linked with a
higher risk of recidivism (Levenson & Cotter, 2005a). In practical
terms, that means they may be at least partially responsible for
creating new victims of sexual crimes. In a study of the social and
psychological processes around community reintegration, persons
who committed a sexual offense reported believing that social
isolation and other barriers to reintegration increased their risk of
sexually reoffending (Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). Another study that
examined long-term consequences of sex offender management
policies for adolescents convicted of these crimes concluded that
labeling associated with registration increased several risk factors
previously found to be significantly correlated with higher rates of
recidivism (Hayes, 1997). The literature consistently suggests that
the strict requirements imposed by SORN laws may accomplish the

Narratives
Offender
Management Laws
Contesting in
theSex
Flawed
Consumer

47

opposite of their stated intentions (Freeman & Sandler, 2010). Rather
than keeping communities safe, SORN laws may be inducing a false
sense of security while exacerbating the actual risk to the public
(Levenson & Cotter, 2005a; Logan, 2003).
This contradictory (and perhaps counterintuitive) outcome can
be explained by the social construction of persons who committed
a sexual offense and the often misleading narratives promoted by
policymakers through poorly informed and reactionary policies.
An evaluation of SORN using a narrative framework informed by
the Social Construction of Target Populations theory exposes the
storylines pushed mainly by politicians to convince the voting public
that they are the real heroes in this drama (Schneider & Ingram,
1993; Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018). By keeping the focus on the
negative social constructions about persons who committed a sexual
offense, politicians can secure their positions of power in the political
arena and smear opponents of these policies with the taint of these
constructions as well (Link & Oldendick, 1996).
From the start, SORN laws have tended to lump all individuals
convicted of a sexual offense into the same target group with little
regard for the type or severity of their crimes (Gavin, 2005; Robbers,
2009). This has the effect of characterizing the entire group based on
the handful of sensational stories that receive the most attention. A
tiny percentage of those convicted of sexual crimes are responsible
for acts like those that led to the passage of SORN laws, exemplified
by cases such as the rapes and murders of Jacob Wetterling, Megan
Kanka, and Adam Walsh (Carpenter, 2014; Garfinkle, 2003). These
highly publicized cases support a compelling narrative about
the urgency of harsh sex offender management laws, even as the
scientific literature describes an altogether different reality that the
public rarely sees (Carpenter, 2014; Harris & Socia, 2014). Studies
show that cases combining sexual assault and homicide happen
rather infrequently and are perpetrated by a minority accounting
for less than 3% of all convicted sex offenders (Firestone et al., 1998;
Tewksbury et al., 2012). While the existence of these dangerous
few surely calls for some level of monitoring, the present degree of
surveillance and social ostracism may be not only unnecessary and
unhelpful; it might also have dire consequences for families and
communities who are lulled into a false security. The same could
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be said of the impact on lower-risk convicted individuals who are
caught up in the plot of this story (Carpenter, 2014).
The recent expansion of SORN laws has created serious collateral
consequences for several groups that arguably do not deserve the
punishment. One such group, adolescents who committed a sexual
offense, comprises about one-third of the entire population of
individuals convicted of a sexual crime (Campbell et al., 2020; Jones,
2015), yet most of adolescents’ sexual offenses are of a less severe
nature and the literature shows a recidivism rate of approximately
5% among this subset (Nisbet et al., 2004). Nonetheless, these youth
are often mandated to register as “sex offenders,” and some states
even require community notification (Comartin et al., 2010; Harris
et al., 2016). Such provisions can impede social development and
complicate the process of rehabilitation (Hiller, 1998); they can also
prove devastating for the families of these youth and those they
victimized, who are often one and the same (Harris et al., 2016;
Jones, 2015). Because of the cultural bias in favor of youth, it may be
possible to educate the public about adolescents who commit sexual
crimes and the science that shows that, for most of these young
people, treatment can effectively prevent future offenses (Kim et
al., 2016). If a popular majority can be persuaded that adolescents
who sexually offend do not deserve to be automatically categorized
as deviant, then sex offender management policies should exempt
them from harsh long-term punishments and provide them with
adequate resources for successful rehabilitation.
SORN laws often place impossible obstacles on adults who
are convicted of sexual crimes, too, which prevent them from
successfully reintegrating into society. Such impediments commonly
include strict and unreasonable residence restrictions, limited access
to employment and resulting financial hardship, and loss of public
support services (Harris et al., 2018). A quarter of all states have
established housing restrictions forbidding registered individuals
from living in close proximity to schools, parks, bus stops, and
daycare facilities. The distance requirement ranges from within
500 feet in some states to within 2,000 feet in others (Levenson &
Cotter, 2005b). The Justice Department’s Office of Sex Offender
Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking
issued a statement on housing restrictions advising that “residence
restrictions may actually increase offender risk by undermining
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offender stability and the ability of the offender to obtain housing,
work, and family support. There is nothing to suggest this policy
should be used at this time” (Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2015). Most
participants in a study exploring the impact of residence restrictions
on registered individuals’ experiences of social reintegration reported
significant levels of isolation, financial stress, and emotional and
psychological instability (Levenson & Cotter, 2005a). With abundant
research pointing to a link between these collateral consequences
and the resulting increased risk of recidivism (Bensel & Sample, 2017;
Cubellis et al., 2018; Harris et al., 2018; Harris et al., 2016; Levenson
et al., 2007; Prescott & Rockoff, 2011; Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010), it
would clearly benefit everyone for the socially constructed image of
“sex offenders” to be politically and socially contested, in light of the
best scientific knowledge available.
The potential policy benefits of updating the social construction
of persons who committed a sexual offense are clear and numerous.
First, these individuals could be more accurately classified and their
level of risk determined using careful assessments completed by
experts and guided by the latest empirical research on recidivism
factors. Second, if treated more fairly and humanely, individuals
convicted of a sexual crime may feel more inclined to trust
professionals, to willingly participate in treatment, and to volunteer
to take part in research. This in turn would foster the development
of even greater knowledge of the causes of sexual offending and
the most effective ways to support all who are affected. The social
construction of these individuals as deviants and monsters stands
in the way of a more sophisticated understanding of the problem,
which could support nuanced, sensitive, and effective policies for
the management and rehabilitation of persons who committed a
sexual offense.

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to gauge the utility of the
Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), an innovative theoretical
approach to evaluating policy. The NPF proposes that narratives
embedded in policy are used by politicians in order to sway public
opinion and enhance their own political power. Inherent to the
NPF is the assumption that stories of particular groups are socially
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constructed. For this reason, this paper has suggested integrating
the NPF with the Social Construction of Target Populations theory
to explain the process by which policymakers take advantage of
existing social constructions to promote policies that grant benefits
or impose burdens on target groups according to their perceived
merit. This paper has critically examined Sex Offender Registration
and Notification (SORN) laws to point out how social constructions
of persons who committed a sexual offense, who are considered
socially deviant, are used to justify increasingly harsh policies in
spite of empirical evidence that might suggest different strategies
to address the problem of sexual abuse.
Future research that applies a narrative framework to the
study of sex offender management laws should include a detailed
investigation of legal debates and proceedings around the passage
of these laws. This type of research should pay close attention to
language used to reinforce inaccurate and harmful stereotypes
about this group. Continuing to explore the compatibility of NPF
with other socially aware theoretical approaches can enhance
the study of policies and policymaking that affect stigmatized
populations.
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Family Preservation Strategies:
Regendering Labor in Mixed-Status
Marriage After Co-Deportation
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Harsh U.S. deportation policies disproportionately target Latin American
immigrant working-class men and subsequently divide families. The unique
experiences of co-deported, mixed-status couples are missing from the deportation literature—that is, U.S. citizens, primarily women, who live outside
of the United States with their deported Latin American immigrant spouses
(what we call co-deportation) rather than living separately. Using hegemonic masculinity, this research qualitatively analyzes the experiences of eleven
mixed-status couples internationally co-deported. Findings suggest couples’
gender dynamics shift paid and unpaid labor to sustain family life living as
co-deportees. Co-deported couples are a testament to how adaptable heterosexual gender dynamics can be, but they also demonstrate the deep entrenchment of hegemonic gender. This research provides implications for social
workers advocating for transnational co-deported families.
Keywords: mixed-status marriage, gender dynamics, hegemonic masculinity, deportation
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U.S. citizens’ foreign-born spouses have priority immigration
status; however, punitive deportation policies during the last several decades have made it difficult for citizens with undocumented spouses to adjust their legal statuses (Schueths, 2012). Between
1996 and 2016, the U.S. government deported nearly 6 million immigrants with a record number of 435,000 deportations in 2014
(Chishti et al., 2017; Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2016). Since the
mid-1990s, ninety percent of deportees, mostly men, originate from
Mexico and Central America (Golash-Boza, 2015).
Media stories more than academic research have documented
how U.S. citizens sometimes live outside of the United States with
their deported immigrant spouses rather than live separately, a situation we refer to as co-deportation throughout this paper. Headlines such as “American citizens, in love and in exile, are waiting
for immigration reform” (Margolis, 2013), “Banned from America:
How U.S. immigration policy has forced some American citizens
into exile” (Ferriss, 2014), and “Choosing ‘exile’ over break-up, U.S.
citizens follow ‘banned’ spouses abroad” (Viñas, 2013) illustrate the
reality about how some mixed-status marriages (i.e., U.S. citizens
married to non-citizen spouses) manage harsh deportation policies.
Only a few studies have examined immigrants’ lives after they
have been deported from the United States (Brotherton & Barrios,
2009; Cardoso et al., 2016; Golash-Boza, 2014). Even less is written on
how the deportation of a spouse results in some U.S. citizens living
abroad (what we will refer to from here on as living as a co-deportee) with their deported spouse and how this rearranges gender
dynamics. Most scholars who study changing gender expectations
in the global context focus on transnational parenthood (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 2006; Parreñas, 2005). Missing from this migration discussion are the unique experiences of U.S. citizens, primarily women, who are co-deported with their Latin-American spouses
and how gender dynamics change life after co-deportation.
Beyond legal status, couples have multiple mixed statuses,
such as race, sexuality, nationality, and social class. Therefore, this
work fills a gap in the family, gender, and deportation literature
by focusing on the experiences of diverse families (López, 2015).
Specifically, though, we focus on how race, class, sexuality, and citizenship collide with gender to both constrain and aid the available strategies mixed-status couples used to keep their spouses and
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families together post-deportation. In-depth qualitative interviews
were conducted with 18 participants, representing 11 heterosexual
mixed-status couples, co-deported. This analysis expands the theorizing of gender and immigration by exploring how deportation
reorganizes gender performances for heterosexual mixed-status
couples, including U.S. citizens.

U.S. Migration to Latin America
Due to limited research on co-deported, mixed-status couples,
assessing the literature on U.S. migrants to Latin America is a helpful place to start. International mobility tends to privilege U.S. citizens migrating south, who are mostly white and often are referred
to as expatriates or lifestyle migrants; alternately, Latin Americans
migrating north are primarily brown and are typically known as
immigrants or migrants (Croucher, 2009; Hayes, 2015). According
to the U.S Department of State (2017), approximately one million
U.S. citizens currently live in Mexico. Research on U.S. migrants to
Latin American countries, although a relatively small group, find
these individuals are generally “retirees, younger adventure-seekers, and some pursuing economic opportunity in a global marketplace” (Croucher, 2012, p. 2). Although U.S. citizen migrants tend
to be more affluent than the citizens in their receiving countries,
they may not be as well-off as citizens living in the United States.
Economic insecurity in the north has pushed some U.S. citizens to
move from wealthier nations to less prosperous nations because
they are interested in maintaining their pre-retirement lifestyle
with lower-cost property taxes and healthcare (Hayes, 2015).
Our research documents the distinct ways that some U.S. citizens, primarily white women, are being co-deported south with
their Latin American-born husbands. Although mixed-status couples may not have the same degree of privilege and perception
of choice as “lifestyle migrants,” previous research suggests that
co-deported couples have higher levels of education and income
than mixed-status couples forced to live in two different countries.
Schueths (2019) conducted qualitative interviews with mixed-status couples separated from one another and found that having a
deported Latin American husband removed from the home and no
longer providing financially led some U.S. citizen women with low
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levels of socioeconomic status to depend on public welfare for their
family’s livelihood when they had not had to previously. Many
women who remain in the United States support their husbands
after deportation with remittances and money for their legal fees
(Lewis, 2013).
After removal, deportees tend to have a difficult time finding
steady employment in their Latin American country of citizenship
(García & De Oliveira, 2011); subsequently, deported individuals,
usually working-class men, have difficulty finding jobs with a living wage in their country of birth. For these men, their inability to
support their families and their dependence on their partners often
lead to gender stigma. Golash-Boza (2014) interviewed Jamaicans
who were deported from the United States and found the men were
ashamed that they had to rely on remittances from family to survive.
Globally, men with fewer resources and low rates of education
are more likely to be left out of the labor market, which can be an
emotional challenge (Kabeer, 2007). Research suggests that unemployed working-class men have difficulty maintaining their selfworth without work (Legerski & Cornwall, 2010). Beyond poverty,
the greatest stigma comes from the inability to fulfill important
gender roles, notably that of provider. Our research contributes to
the understanding of how gender dynamics change for mixed-status couples, particularly with co-deported Latin American husbands and their U.S. citizen wives.

Changing Gender Dynamics
Ideas of gender, masculinity, femininity, and the dynamics
within heterosexual couples are being challenged all the time. Traditional masculinity placed men as the head of household, protector, provider, and primary breadwinner (Lee & Lee, 2018); however,
within heterosexual couples, men have become more involved in
family domestic labor in the United States, including parenting (Bianchi et al., 2000). Despite men doing more non-traditional work,
research suggests that couples’ labor negotiations (i.e., childcare,
paid and unpaid employment) tend to be swayed by conventional
gender expectations (Dush et al., 2018; Gibbons & Luna, 2015). Cultural standards related to breadwinning as true masculinity and
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caregiving as proper femininity are deeply ingrained in U.S. society and worldwide.
Although conventional gender labor divisions continue as a
norm for many couples, researchers have documented shifts toward
egalitarian gender practices in both the United States and Latin
American countries. Changes in the global economy, specifically the
feminization of labor, have resulted in a growing number of women
in the paid labor market and a growing number of men struggling to
find employment (Hoang & Yeoh, 2011). Taking a global perspective,
Kabeer (2007) found that an increasing number of husbands have
approved of sharing job market responsibilities with their wives,
while others have resisted this arrangement by refusing domestic
and childcare duties and, in some cases, leaving their families. Furthermore, women and men in migrant households have been found
to share in the decision–making process and chores (Baca Zinn &
Wells, 2000). Covre-Sussai et al. (2014) measured decision–making
in seven Latin American countries and found that gender equality
has increased. Similar to the United States, Latin American women
with higher socioeconomic status tend to be in more equal partnerships than their lower socioeconomic status peers. These changing
dynamics may regender labor within the family and, in some cases,
may produce stay-at-home fathers.
Families with a working mother and a stay-at-home father are
gradually becoming more common in the U.S. but are still an understudied phenomenon (Lee & Lee, 2018). Longitudinal studies
have found that spouses with egalitarian gender beliefs, wives with
higher education levels compared to their husbands, and high unemployment rates are more likely to produce a stay-at-home father
(Kramer et al., 2015; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). Stay-at-home fathers
tend to be part of middle-class families. Longitudinal findings also
showed that in the past, stay-at-home fathers were almost exclusively men who were unable to work and who would prefer to be participating in the labor market. Now, men either identify as being unable to work or as a voluntary caregiver, with a substantial increase
in men who identify as caregivers. However, stay-at-home father
families tend to be created because of financial problems and labor
market challenges for men with low education and skills (Chesley,
2011; Kramer & Kramer, 2016). Chesley’s (2011) qualitative work with
economically advantaged white couples suggests that stay-at-home
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fathers learned to appreciate their position, even if participating in
unpaid labor was not the original goal. Chelsey (2011) notes, “This
shift in family arrangements can promote change toward greater
gender equality even in couples that initially hold entrenched, gendered beliefs” (p. 1655).

Hegemonic Masculinity
Hegemonic masculinity allows researchers to analyze the gender dynamics of co-deported, mixed-status couples. Connell (1987,
1995) articulated hegemonic masculinity, and it was later reformulated by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005). At its core, this framework is relational and “legitimates unequal gender relations among
men and women, masculinity and femininity” and demonstrates
the “plurality of masculinities and of a hierarchy among hegemonic
masculinity and emphasized femininity as well as nonhegemonic
masculinity” (Messerschmidt, 2018, pp. 46–47). Multiple forms of
masculinity exist along a gradient, with some forms providing more
power than others (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). For example,
nonhegemonic or marginalized masculinities carry less power and
include men of color from low socioeconomic backgrounds, including deported working-class Latinx immigrants. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, p. 120) point out that power is not absolute and “at
times may actually shift in relation to different axes of power and
powerlessness.” They also suggest that gender is fluid and that gender performances often differ by context and can be found locally,
regionally, and globally, whether living in the United States or Latin American countries.
The machismo stereotype, an exaggerated masculinity, is often
associated with men in Latin American culture. However, supporting the tenets of hegemonic masculinity, Gutmann (2007) argues
that the machismo stereotype fails to encapsulate the diversity of
masculinities he found in his qualitative interviews with Mexican
men. Relatedly, Montes (2013, p. 474) explains,
As a global process, international migration strains regional
and local gender orders, resulting in changes in local patterns of
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masculinity and femininity. How these gender orders change depends on particular regional and cultural characteristics, along
with the intersection of other power structures such as class and
race.

One form of masculinity, often viewed as progressive, is caring
masculinity (Elliott, 2016), which is focused on expectations of nurturing. Caring masculinity does not represent a departure from traditional hegemonic masculinity, but rather an expansion of it (Hunter
et al., 2017). Caring masculinity allows men to embrace stereotypically feminine qualities without disregarding the ideal masculinity
established within hegemonic masculinity. Hunter et al. (2017, p. 13)
point out that “the norms and expectations of fathers are evolving,
and that they are no longer required to adhere strictly to traditional,
provider expectations of fathering, even if they are still expected to
enact particular hegemonic forms of masculinity.” Thus, extending
hegemonic masculinity to include a caring masculinity helps better
understand co-deported, mixed-status couples’ experiences.
However, whether couples conform with or challenge hegemonic masculinity, it is important to note that they must engage with it
(Ridgeway, 2011). As Gutmann (2007, p. 14) put it, even when “the
beliefs and practices of ordinary men do not accord neatly with this
monochromatic image” of machismo, “ordinary men and women are
themselves often acutely aware of and influenced in one way or another by the dominant, often ‘traditional’ stereotypes about men.”
One of the ways that men who embody a caring masculinity
continue to reinforce hegemonic masculinity is through what scholars call compensatory manhood acts (Ezzell, 2012; Rogers, 2020). As
Ezzell (2012, p. 191) explains, compensatory masculinity acts are
used by men to “signify a masculine self and that arise as part of
a refusal or inability to enact the hegemonic masculine ideal.” Deported, unemployed Latin American men face tremendous gender
stigma, and are no longer able to adhere to traditional masculinity
(Golash-Boza, 2014; Kabeer, 2007; Legerski & Cornwall, 2010). These
men, even those who would best be described as having adopted a
caring masculinity, find that they are unable to live up to the ideal
type of manhood set by hegemonic masculinity.
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Present Study
To our knowledge, there is no available research that directly
examines the strategies co-deported, mixed-status couples employ
to maintain their families after deportation. This analysis expands
the theorizing on gender and deportation by exploring lived experiences of 11 mixed-status couples co-deported. Importantly, the
strategies mixed-status couples employ to maintain their families
post-deportation impact how the spouses negotiate the division of
household duties and paid labor.

Methods
This research is part of a larger study focused on mixed-status
families collected from 2013 to 2014 and approved by the Institutional Review Board at a large, southern, regional university. The
focus of this article is on the shifting gender boundaries of co-deported, heterosexual, mixed-status couples. Invitations to participate in this study were disseminated in both Spanish and English
and were emailed to multiple immigration reform advocacy groups
and social service organizations asking them to share the invitation
with their members via email and their social media channels. Additional couples were recruited through snowball sampling.
Gender-neutral language was used in all recruitment communications to recruit a diverse sample. However, like past research
on mixed-status couples (Schueths, 2012, 2014), women, especially
white citizens, chose to participate in this study far more than their
undocumented male partners did. Given that this is a challenging
population to access, participants may not be representative of the
larger population. To be eligible, individuals had to be at least 18
years of age and meet one of the following eligibility criteria: (1) be
an undocumented/formerly undocumented immigrant Latinx who
had lived in the United States for at least one year and who was
partnered or married to a U.S. citizen for at least one year, or (2)
be a U.S. citizen and have been partnered with an undocumented immigrant Latinx or formerly undocumented immigrant Latinx
for at least one year. Participants were also eligible for the study
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if they were currently living outside of the United States due to
deportation if they met one of the leading research criteria. Our
goal was to interview both members of the couple; however, not all
of the male partners participated.
The data for this study come from in-depth, semi-structured
interviews, including a demographic survey, with at least one member from each of the 11 couples (18 individuals were interviewed: 11
women and 7 men). These eleven couples were co-deported to Guatemala, Canada, or Mexico, with some living on the Mexican side of
the Mexico–U.S. border. Interviews were conducted using English
or Spanish using an interpreter, and were conducted by telephone.
Most immigrant participants requested their interview be conducted in English as they had previously been living in the U.S.
for multiple years and were comfortable communicating in English.
The interviews averaged 90 minutes in length and participants
were asked open-ended questions regarding their experience in a
mixed-status relationship. They were asked to describe their relationship, and how they cope with immigration stress. Interviews
were audio–recorded and transcribed verbatim. Pseudonyms are
used to protect participants’ identities. At the time of the study,
couples had resided (before deportation) in one of 16 states, representing all U.S. regions.
Data analysis was guided by the following question: How do
co-deported, mixed-status couples negotiate the division of labor
post-deportation, and how do these dynamics vary by social status? Analysis was done using an inductive coding approach that
focused on building larger themes and descriptions emerging from
the raw data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Interviews were analyzed
shortly after they were conducted and the codes that were developed from each round of analysis were then reapplied to later interviews as they came in. Data analysis was an iterative process in
which data was reintegrated and reanalyzed several times as new
codes were identified.
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Participant Profile
Eleven co-deported, mixed-status couples were interviewed.
Ten of the couples included a U.S. citizen wife married to an undocumented Latinx husband, and one couple included a U.S. citizen
Latinx husband married to an undocumented Latinx wife. At the
time of the interviews, nine couples lived in Mexico, one couple
lived in Guatemala, and one couple lived in Canada. The majority
of couples were comprised of white, U.S. citizen women, partnered
with undocumented Latinx men. The couples, on average, had
been married for five years and had been together for eight. Most
women had at least a bachelor’s degree and the men had at least a
high school diploma. The median yearly income for couples was
between $25,000 to $49,999 U.S. dollars.
Undocumented Latin American spouses were banned from the
United States because of immigration infractions, such as unlawful presence, multiple entries, or deportations. Six undocumented
spouses were deported; two of these were flown by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to their country of origin, and four departed voluntarily rather than face a formal order of removal. Five
undocumented spouses “self-deported;” however, four had re-entered their country of origin to adjust their legal status, assuming
their absence would be temporary, but were unexpectedly denied
at the consulate. Simply returning to their country of origin triggered a 10-year bar from the United States for these spouses. All
four couples reported they would not have left the country if they
had known how difficult it would be to return. The fifth individual
ended up relocating to Canada, which was neither his nor his wife’s
country of origin.

Gender Within the Context of Co-Deportation
Before deportation from the United States, the men had all contributed financially to their families through employment, even
without legal status. Similarly, all of the women living in the United
States, the majority U.S. citizens, were working for pay. Post-deportation, social class—in the form of professional education, savings, or
business enterprises—appeared to buffer the impacts of deportation.
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U.S. citizen women tended to have more education, resources, and
professional skills than their Latin American-born husbands, thereby providing greater opportunities for women’s employment abroad
compared to men. The men living in their country of origin had few
job prospects, making it difficult to contribute financially to the family. Better-educated, professional women were subsisting abroad,
and their husbands were also doing better than those deported with
more limited income and opportunities for employment.
Eight of the ten U.S. women citizens worked, most of them
full-time, after co-deportation, in education or health and social
services-related professions. The one U.S. citizen man co-deported also worked full-time in construction. Five of the U.S. citizens
(four women and one man) maintained employment in the United
States by either living near the Mexico– U.S. border or by working
virtually. Three U.S. citizen women were not working; two were
living off of substantial savings, one including Veterans Benefits,
hoping their residences in Mexico would be temporary; and one
was actively searching for employment but earning a small income
by renting out her home in the U.S. while co-deported.
With most U.S. citizen women working abroad, noncitizen men
were more likely to be responsible for domestic labor in the home,
including childcare (most had children living in the home), except
for one husband who purchased a business using the money he
earned while living in the United States. The latter is the only couple that reported conventional gender dynamics during co-deportation, even though the wife, Tracey, a white woman with an advanced degree, worked online part-time teaching. Tracey indicated
that she would prefer a more egalitarian relationship but that she
had learned to live with patriarchal gender practices to preserve
her family.
If work were available for the Latin American-born spouses, it
tended to be long hours with few days off and for extremely low
pay by U.S. standards. Some families said it would be more cost
effective for their family to have the husbands stay at home and
take care of domestic duties. Victor, who is currently not employed
outside the home and is living off of his wife’s U.S. Veterans Benefits, discussed the challenge of living off a low-wage job in Mexico. He explained, “Life it is very difficult here, everything is very
expensive and what you make, it is not enough to survive.” His
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wife, Bonnie, described the standard decision-making process for
couples with a stay-at-home husband:  
A typical wage here is 400 to 1,000 pesos a week, so you’re talking
like $30 to $80 a week to have somebody gone out of the house 40
to 60 hours a week. To me, it’s not worth it. I’m here to be with my
husband.

Similarly, Heidi, who works in the United States in social services, reported their particular border community is not entirely
safe due to high crime rates. She feels comfortable making the hour
commute to her U.S. job where she makes “like 100 times more”
than he would make in Mexico. “It wouldn’t make any sense for
[my husband Mateo] to be working and making no money, and
we’d never see each other, and it would be more dangerous, and
for, like, maybe $80 a week. Maybe.” Mateo did not complete high
school and worked painting houses when he lived in the United
States; if he could find work in Mexico, it would be in manufacturing, with few safety regulations and the frequent threat of violence
from criminal gangs. Heidi discusses corruption in their area: “The
police don’t do anyone a damn bit of good. It’s just not very safe.”

Defying Stereotypes While Maintaining Masculinity
Like most co-deported couples, lack of viable employment opportunities for men living in Latin America rearranged gender dynamics. However, even with these shifts, married couples still are attentive to and frame their family life within the context of traditional
gender responsibilities. Kellie and Tristan’s situation illustrated how
this process works. Kellie has a graduate degree; this enabled her to
find a full-time teaching job, making her the breadwinner of the family. With only some high school education, Tristan had fewer chances
for employment, but is one of the most fortunate participants; he got
a part-time job in the service sector during hours his wife is not working. Subsequently, his socioeconomic status has led to him to take on
the majority of unpaid household labor. Kellie is keenly aware that
her family is defying gender expectations when she describes her
husband, Tristan as the “housewife.”
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We have like reverse gender roles because right now, [Tristan] is
staying home with the kids while I go to work during the week, and
he cooks and cleans and raises the kids. When the kids cry, they
want their da-da. They don’t want their mama. So that’s kind of odd,
especially for Mexico, which is such, like a machista country.

Tristan agreed: “We are a little bit different than other couples.
I am the one, I do the cooking, and I like to clean the house, too…I
am the one that spends time with the [children] and do activities
with them.” Tristan went on to discuss the contradiction he saw
between his lived experience and what he thought Mexican society
expected of him:
The man is the one who is supposed to be working all the time
and women staying home raising the kids. So now I’m doing her
job…So [Kellie] is the one who’s working now and so she’s the
man of the house.

Although Tristan viewed domestic labor as women’s work,
when he mentioned the crime rate in their city, it was clear he still
regarded himself as the protector of the home: “I believe as a head
of household you worry about what may happen to your children
and their security. Plus, I feel more responsible because they are
here because of me.” Tristan blames himself for their co-deportation; thus, he is now both a caregiver and a defender.
Like Tristan, Jen’s husband Christian did most of the domestic
labor. Similar to other couples we spoke to, she did not perceive
their family arrangement as typical for Latin America. Jen recounted the reaction from her colleagues as an example: “People are always shocked at work, because I work mostly with women, that
my husband does so much. I’m like, ‘Yeah, he does more than I do
in the house.’” Similarly, Christian pointed out, “I’m not a typical
Macho Mexicano.” He continued:
I want to be honest—I think I do more housework than her. Like I
really like to have my house clean…And so because I’m working
less hours than her, so I think it’s just the right thing to do. I’m
more in the house.  
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The men in Christian’s family are very traditional and have
made personal remarks about how much childcare and housework
he does: “And my dad, he says I’m a mandilón, which is a word
in Mexico that they use for guys that help their wife.” Gutmann’s
(2007) older Mexican male participants created a dichotomy of
men as macho, someone who provides for his family, or mandilón,
someone who is controlled by women. Christian is emasculated
when his family mocks him for being dominated by his wife. The
men in his family equate egalitarianism with authority. Vera, who
works full time, reported that her husband, Sal, also does not fit the
stereotype:
He’s very opposite of what I think people generally think a
Mexican man is as far as the machismo, the general stereotype
about Mexican men. He doesn’t really fall into them. So, he’s very
much—since we’ve been here in Mexico, he’s been the domestic
one; he takes care of the home and I’ve been the one working. So,
we’ve kind of switched roles, but he does it.

The men had mixed feelings about the ways in which gender
was restructured. Ricardo, who is currently not working because of
his lower socioeconomic status, had always worked outside of the
home in the United States, sometimes more than one job so that he
could send money back to his family. “I’m mad sometimes because
sometimes I wish to support [my wife] and support my mom, and
now this—it’s like I can’t do nothing…when I’m by myself in that
house, sometimes I’m crying. Makes me so sad sometimes.” His
wife, Ellie explained, “With no job, he can’t really support himself,
much less support, you know, me or the rest of his family.” Now
that Ricardo is no longer the provider, it has also been hard on his
extended family; for nearly 20 years Ricardo sent them remittances.
Through Ellie’s full-time professional employment, they are able to
help some, but not to the degree he was used to.
Similarly, Vera’s husband has low socioeconomic status, and she
reported that not being employed outside the home has been “very
embarrassing” for her husband Sal. She went on to say that “it’s
very looked down on here for the woman to be working and the
man not. People don’t understand our situation.” Feeling rebuked
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by his community, Vera said her husband, “doesn’t like to go out.”
Ricardo’s isolation is a strategy to maintain hegemonic masculinity.
Mateo also experienced gender stigma. “It was a hard transition,” Mateo said about moving back to Mexico and having lower
socioeconomic status. “Because I’ve always made the money in my
family, my group. And it’s hard because she’s [wife] had the power.” Heidi, Mateo’s wife, quickly added, “That’s making it sound a
lot easier than it really was.” Heidi reported that Mateo “was on
suicide watch for the first year” after the transition: “He felt like
he was in jail, he was scared to go outside, he hated it.” From her
perspective, “it was very difficult [for Mateo] to adjust to me making the money.” However, she considered herself lucky to be able to
earn an income for the family: “You’ve got to do what you’ve got to
do. But it’s been rough on him.” Mateo’s stoicism allows him to talk
about the emotional realities without revealing his vulnerability.
However, not all the men were uncomfortable with the shifting
gender dynamics within their relationship. For instance, Tristan,
who works on the weekends at a restaurant while his wife works as
a full-time teacher, said,
I like it. I’m with my kids all the time like playing with them,
teaching them a lot of stuff. I love it. I like that. I like the feeling
like I pick up [Kellie] from work and just like a warm meal on the
table – like all this stuff. Dinner’s ready; trying to make sure that
the table’s clean so that she feels comfortable when she gets home
from like a really long day.

Tristan had not heard many negative comments from family
about being “the woman of the house”; however, his wife Kellie interjected, “Not to your face anyway.” While Tristan reported liking
taking care of the family, he guarded his masculinity and responded, “Maybe not to my face but they won’t say nothing to me, no,
because they know I’d beat their ass.”

Co-Deportee’s Relative Privilege
Despite the hardships of living abroad, co-deported couples maintained some level of socioeconomic privilege as compared to couples
who were forced to separate. The majority of co-deported couples
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would not describe themselves as financially advantaged, as they too
experienced economic hardships common to many middle-income
families. However, these couples could afford to relocate to another country, whereas some of the divided couples in an earlier study
(Schueths, 2019) were not even able to visit, or infrequently visited,
because the U.S. citizen spouse was unable to afford the travel.
Dolly and Delano’s situation illustrated just how difficult
co-deportation can be when both members of the couple have lower socioeconomic status. Delano had some high school and Dolly
had a GED. Although the family was working class in the United
States, Dolly was able to stay at home and care for their children
while Delano, then undocumented, worked full-time. They were
even able to purchase a home. After living in Mexico for quite a
while, neither could find a job. The only income they had was from
renting out their home in the U.S. Several months after speaking
with Dolly, she contacted us and said she was now living back in
their U.S. state-of-origin with her extended family, working to support her husband and children in Mexico. She desperately wanted
to be with them but had no choice but to return to work in the United States. Dolly and Delano’s case highlighted that social class, in
addition to gender, race, and citizenship, could create a barrier to a
decent-paying job.
Contrary to Dolly and Delano, Annette and Cesar were transnationally divided when we first talked with them; however, they
are now living together abroad. Annette was able to use her education and resources to move herself and the children abroad and
reunite with Cesar after living apart for one year. Cesar, who is unemployed, reported, “In Latin America the man is the one who is
the breadwinner, the one who go hunting, the one who go get the
food and the meat and the woman is the one that care for the family
and everything in the house and everything and the kids.” At the
same time, Cesar recognized, “I got blessed to have a wife that is
educated, you know, and she’s a teacher so she always had a job and
so she, we can say a breadwinner.”

Discussion
Harsh U.S. deportation policies disproportionately target Latin
American immigrant working-class men and subsequently divide
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families, even when their partners are U.S. citizens. However, some
of these U.S. citizen spouses chose to live outside of the United
States with their deported Latinx spouses in co-deportation. Indepth interviews were conducted with eleven co-deported heterosexual couples (18 individuals: 11 women and seven men) with multiple mixed statuses, including gender, race, nationality, sexuality,
legal status, and socioeconomic status. Findings suggest couples’
gender dynamics shift paid and unpaid labor to sustain family life
while living as co-deportees.
The co-deported couples’ experiences with hegemonic masculinity are complicated and they varied by the multiple and intersectional social statuses they hold. That said, our findings make clear
that the division of labor within our co-deported couples was most
often influenced by each partner’s social class status. We found that
the partner who held the highest socioeconomic status within the
couple, regardless of gender, became the default breadwinner. In
nearly all cases but one, U.S. citizenship provided an additional degree of social privilege, affording resources and opportunities to
maintain families and financially support their partners and children. This finding is similar to the research on the division of labor
within U.S. heterosexual couples (Chesley, 2011; Kramer & Kramer,
2016), suggesting that co-deported couples live within similar social
structures, but typically with fewer resources and opportunities.
Specific to our study, U.S. citizen women—who are mostly white,
college educated, earn higher incomes relative to other participants,
and have access to resources—could leverage their social status to
remain with their partners abroad and provide for their families as
the primary wage earners. Crossing the transnational divide forced
the undocumented Latinx half of these partnerships to experience
a loss of status, specifically in terms of social class. The U.S. citizen
partners with high socioeconomic status found their statuses were
transferable and at times even elevated outside the United States.
Deported individuals, primarily men, who had all worked while
living in the United States, now took responsibility for unpaid, domestic labor in the home, including childcare. Thus, unemployed
or underemployed, deported Latinx men face new marginalized
masculinities and decreasing power while their co-deported, U.S.
citizen wives with high socioeconomic status gain relational power
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005), but still endure hegemonic mas-
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culinity even as breadwinners. Most of the Latinx men living in
co-deportation longed to return to the provider role. Even men who
expressed a preference for caring masculinity used compensatory
manhood behaviors to endorse the hegemonic masculine ideal (Ezzell, 2012) taken from them through the trauma of deportation.
The division of labor between men and women provides us a
window into the gendered dynamics within their partnerships. Furthermore, how the women and men feel about how they spend their
time reveals their beliefs about what society expects of men, women, and heterosexual families. Evidence of the participants’ commitment to the traditional hegemonic gender roles can also be seen in
how the co-deported partners discussed their situations; hegemonic
gender informed many family decisions the couples made. Several
participants commented that they had switched or reversed gender
roles with their partners. One spouse referred to her husband as a
“housewife,” and said he was doing “her job.” Another participant
described his wife as “the man of the house,” now that she was the
primary breadwinner. Switching gender roles was a worthwhile
sacrifice, as the purpose of co-deportation was to keep the couples
physically together. As one wife said, “I’m here to be with my husband.” Deported husbands also tended to blame themselves for their
families’ co-deportations. Perhaps this made the rearranged gender
dynamics more digestible. Despite defying the traditional gender
role expectations, many participants did not see themselves as gender innovators, but instead saw themselves as situationally induced
gender role non-conformists. The co-deported couples in our study
demonstrate both the adaptability of heterosexual gender dynamics
and the hegemonic power of masculinity.
Consistent with Golash-Boza (2014) and Lewis (2013), the deported men in our study experienced gender stigma attached to
their new caretaking roles. Co-deported participants reported
that their friends, coworkers, and the community in general found
the reversed gender dynamics of their relationship remarkable. In
co-deportation, the men experienced social sanction from their
peers through ridicule or name–calling for failing to fully conform
to the hegemonic ideal of masculinity. The men in our study reported crying, feeling embarrassed, and feeling unable to show their
faces in public. One breadwinning wife shared the gender stigma
felt by her husband and reported he was “on suicide watch for the
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first year” after co-deportation. The deported men experienced
gender contradictions, “enacting femininity while simultaneously
rejecting it” (Messerschmidt, 2018, p. 83).
Our findings also revealed that the deported men used at least
two compensatory manhood techniques to neutralize gender stigma (Ezzell, 2012; Rogers, 2020), including isolation and appeals to
their physical prowess. We found multiple examples of men isolating
themselves from their community to avoid social sanction. For example, one participant, who said he loved being a more active parent
and taking on a greater share of the domestic labor, said he had not
experienced any sanctioning from his friends and family. However,
his wife added, “not to your face anyway.” He countered, “They won’t
say nothing to me, no, because they know I’d beat their ass.” To compensate for the sting from losing his economic power, he and others
appeal to their physical power. In a similar vein, after acknowledging
he was no longer the provider for his family, he redirected the discussion to the high local crime rate, asserted he was the protector of the
family, and referred to himself as “head of household.”
Implications for Practice
Social workers have historically played a critical role in supporting immigrant families and must continue this legacy by increasing
advocacy for racialized immigrants with low socioeconomic status
and their families, who are swept up in the deportation regimes.
Unfortunately, few undocumented Latinx immigrants living in the
United States report having contact with a social worker (Hanna &
Ortega, 2016), making it likely that even fewer deportees have had
contact with a social worker. We agree with Ayón (2014, p. 13), who
argues that social workers can play a significant role in helping immigrant families when it comes to “navigating systems of care, coping with discrimination, and oppressive environments, strengthening ties among community members, and advocating for policy
change.” We concur with Hanna and Ortega (2016), who argue that
social workers need to gain more education on how anti-immigrant
policy, “due to racist laws, discriminatory procedures, and acts of
prejudice” (p. 47), harms not only Latinx immigrants, but also their
U.S. citizen family members. Danso (2016) conducted a meta-review
and found that migration studies have been neglected in most
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social work programs and must be included in the social work core
curriculum. Another way to promote the institutionalization of migration studies in U.S. social work education may be adding it to
one of the National Association of Social Work (NASW)’s 16 specialty areas. Similarly, we recommend the NASW include antiracism,
which is currently missing, in the Code of Ethics.
Institutionalizing migration studies in social work education
will have benefits for the co-deported couples in this study. Couples in this study and others (Schueths, 2012, 2014, 2019) who voluntarily left the United States in hopes of adjusting a barred spouse’s
legal status reported that if they had known how long and difficult the process would be to return as a family, they would have
opted for continuing to risk living in the United States. Although
the co-deported couples were resilient and able to, at times, regender the distribution of labor, some of the deported men were distressed and may benefit from clinical social work services. Future
research should examine the mental health outcomes of co-deported, mixed-status families, especially for deported men with little
access to mental health services.
Additionally, some U.S. citizen spouses and children work and
attend school in the United States; they may have a listed address
in one or both countries. Social workers on the U.S. side of the Mexico–U.S. border can support transnational spouses and children
by providing a thorough, culturally sensitive, biopsychosocial assessment. It may be assumed that these individuals only live in the
United States or only live in Mexico and because of the stigma of
deportation, some families may not feel comfortable sharing that
their parent or spouse has been deported. Some U.S. citizens may
be eligible for services and need assistance negotiating both public
and private social service systems. Social workers can fill a missing
role in both community practice and clinical practice by providing
co-deported families education and information to help them make
informed decisions. If families are better prepared to manage the
consequences and challenges of co-deportation, they will be more
likely to thrive.

Conclusion

Ultimately, co-deported couples reorganized gender dynamics as
a family preservation strategy, but still remained within the confines
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of traditional hegemonic gender roles. U.S. citizenship clearly provides benefits unavailable to undocumented immigrants on their
own. However, spouses with citizenship, even when combined with
higher education and income, are still unable to use these statuses
to their full advantage; they cannot snap their fingers and magically
transport their families back to the United States. The intersection of
social class, citizenship, and gender provided the greatest benefits to
the couples, at the very least, to physically maintain their partnership, even if abroad. But what kind of privilege is it to be forced to
choose between your country and your spouse?
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This study analyzes how happiness is built in Mexico in a context of concentrated poverty. The study uses a mixed-methods approach and incorporates
two techniques of data analysis. The first analysis employs an ordinal logistic model with data from the Self-Report Well-being Survey (N=44,518),
while the second draws upon semi-structured interviews in four Mexican
states (N=247). The results show that six important categories influence
the level of happiness in Mexico: (1) emotional life; (2) self-perception of
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and religious affiliation, or both; (4) having the freedom to decide and act in
life (autonomy); (5) poverty; and (6) perceived attainment of basic material
needs.
Keywords: happiness, health, family, mixed methods, Mexico

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare • March 2021 • Volume XLVIII • Number 1

82

The
Social Construction
of Happiness
Contesting
the Flawed Consumer

83

Happiness is a product of the balance between good and bad experiences in life, and it can vary by culture and society (Bojanowska & Zalewska, 2016; Cieslik, 2015; Joshanloo, 2013). Along with life
satisfaction, happiness is seen as a subjective indicator of wellbeing
(Griffin, 2007; Neira et al., 2018).
Happiness has been a subject of importance in recent years due
to issues such as growing inequality (Hardoon, 2017), the focus on
understanding and promoting people’s wellbeing (Weimann et al.,
2015), the complexity of human relations and their contextual and
relative effects (Schneider, 2016), and other factors that threaten
welfare (Bauman, 2006). Indeed, happiness and wellbeing are composites of individual and collective elements, which are built from
perceptions, experiences, beliefs, and norms (Diener et al., 1995).
However, the study of happiness has not been a priority in public
policy agendas of low-resource countries (Guillen-Royo et al., 2013;
Simon & Bennett, 2009).
In the case of Mexico, the government has established “happiness” as one of its guiding axes, pointing out that the role of the government is to create the conditions for people to be able to build their
happiness (López, 2020). However, according to available data, the
country’s social conditions are adverse: the richest 1% of the population holds 21% of the country’s total wealth (Campos et al., 2014),
41.9% of the population lives in poverty, and 7.4% lives in extreme
poverty (CONEVAL, 2019). Moreover, 57.3% of the population has
no access to social security1, 20.4% experiences food insecurity2, and
19.8% does not have basic services in the home3 (CONEVAL, 2019).
In spite of this, 46.7% of the Mexican population reports being
happy (BIARE, 2014). Worldwide, Mexico is classified as the 24th
happiest country of the 156 countries ranked, and ranks as the second happiest country in Latin America (Helliwell et al., 2018). To
understand this apparent contradiction, we need to analyze the importance of social conditions that explain happiness as a subjective
dimension of wellbeing.
Investigating the mechanisms and variables associated with
happiness, especially in resource-constrained environments such
as Mexico, may highlight social, health, civic, and economic factors
that potentially influence happiness. Therefore, context is important
in understanding the happiness, wellbeing, and life satisfaction of
people living in poverty (Cummins, 2000; Zhou & Xie, 2016). Using
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this perspective will contribute to highlighting the conditions that
mitigate the experience of living in highly unequal heterogeneous
societies (Neira et al., 2018; Schneider, 2016) and pointing at the benefits of happiness for social welfare (Vera-Villaroel et al., 2012). It
also will help to promote evidence-based actions that guide the development of appropriate policies and programs for the construction of happiness, which is one of the purposes of the Mexican government (López, 2020).
To contribute to the discussion, this study aims to analyze how
the concept of happiness is socially constructed in Mexico. The
study is based on the extant literature; however, it not only considers that material factors (income, health, housing, or rest) generate happiness (Bjørnskov & Ming-Chang, 2015; Reyes-García et
al., 2016), but also explores other individual, familial, and collective
components, and proposes a multifaceted vision of happiness. For
this reason, the study hypothesizes that happiness is a social construction based on individual, family, and economic components of
households.

Literature Review
Evidence indicates that people generally associate the experience of happiness with health, regardless of gender and age (Bojanowska & Zalewska, 2016; Fave et al., 2013; Layard, 2005; Lu &
Gilmour, 2004; Moyano & Ramos, 2007). Moreover, previous studies relate happiness to autonomy (Collet-Sabé & Tort, 2013), and personal freedom is viewed as a vital component of this relationship
(Layard, 2005). Similarly, previous research (Moyano & Ramos,
2007; Sarracino, 2013) suggests that freedom of choice and control
are positively related to happiness in both resource-constrained
and affluent countries; however, this relationship tends to be stronger in countries of the global north.
Some studies also show there is a relationship between emotional factors (e.g., contact with family and close relationships) and
happiness (Griffin, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2016). Furthermore, strong
ties to friends, neighbors, and the workplace are associated with
happiness (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004). Different investigations
have indicated that, for adults, the negative effects of family life
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tend to be cushioned by extra-familial associations (Nguyen et al.,
2016; Zhu et al., 2013).
Religiosity and religious affiliation have also been found to
have positive associations with happiness (Koenig, 2012). Specifically, evidence suggests that religious beliefs and social networks
may be associated with happiness (Helliwell, 2003; Strawbridge et
al., 2001; Van Cappellen et al., 2016).
On the other hand, there is inconclusive evidence regarding the
relationship between happiness and income in environments with
high levels of inequality (Schneider, 2016). In fact, while some studies report a relationship between income and happiness (Cummins,
2000; Luhmann et al., 2011; Mahadea & Ramroop, 2015; Powdthavee, 2010; Tay & Diener, 2011), others observe no clear connection
(Mentzakis & Moro, 2009; Rojas, 2014). This literature suggests that
income may not be a key determinant of happiness.
Income depends largely on access to economic goods and availability of relational goods (Rojas, 2009), personal experience, and
personal socioeconomic standing (Schneider, 2016; Zhou & Xie,
2016). Income also is a function of a fair working environment (Mahadea & Ramroop, 2015) and enables healthier and more fulfilled
lives (Weimann et al., 2015). Evidence suggests that individuals on
the lower end of the income continuum generally report lower levels
of happiness (Devoto et al., 2012; Lucas & Schimmack, 2009; Mentzakis & Moro, 2009; Tay & Diener, 2011). This finding indicates personal income could be a key factor in experiences of life satisfaction
and happiness. Specifically, assets and material possessions, both
indirect measures of income, may more properly capture people’s
experiences of financial hardship, providing robust evidence of the
connection between material wellbeing and happiness (Bjørnskov
& Ming-Chang, 2015; Deaton, 2015; Reyes-García et al., 2016), even
when the individual is living under material adversity (Mentzakis
& Moro, 2009; Rodríguez-Fernández & Goñi-Grandmontagne, 2011).
Regarding poverty and social deprivation, Strotmann and Volkert’s (2018) work shows inverse correlations between deprivation as
measured by the Multidimensional Poverty Index and happiness,
both at the individual and household levels. However, only some
of the dimensions of poverty (schooling, health, standard of living,
and homeownership) were found to negatively affect happiness,
while others (lack of electricity, sanitation, access to clean water,
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and fuel for cooking) did not. These distinctions could be attributed
to the different degrees of importance individuals assign to problems (Brown et al., 2011).
In this regard, and following this study’s argument, self-perception of poverty has been found to have a significant effect on
happiness. Living in the context of a high standard of living tends
to have a positive effect on happiness (Shifa & Leibbrandt, 2018). On
the other hand, high inequality contexts lead individuals to identify themselves as less happy (Tran et al., 2018).
Overall, evidence suggests an association between happiness
and indicators such as health, freedom, family, and poverty (e.g.,
income/social deprivation). The extant literature reflects this complexity, where factors such as individual, family, and economic conditions of households combine to influence happiness.

Materials and Methods
Research Design
Consistent with previous studies of happiness utilizing a
mixed-methods approach (Fang et al., 2016; Hagler et al., 2016), this
study was organized in two phases (i.e., an explanatory sequential design), each of which depended upon the other. First, we performed an ordinal logistic regression analysis with data from the
Self-Reported Well-being Survey (BIARE, 2014) to determine the
effect of individual, family, and economic aspects of households on
the probability of being happy. Results from this analysis informed
the qualitative stage, where we performed semi-structured interviews to delve into the components that generate happiness. Data
were analyzed using aspects of the sociodemographic and contextual characteristics of the interviewees. The Iberoamericana University ethics committee approved the research project.
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Quantitative Study
The Survey and Variables
The Self-Reported Well-being Survey (BIARE) was designed
and statistically validated by the National Institute of Geography,
Statistics, and Informatics. The survey follows the recommendations of the OECD in Measuring Subjective Well-Being, thereby ensuring comparability with other member countries.
For this study, we employed the 2014 BIARE survey, which includes representative data at both the national and state level. The
2014 BIARE collected responses from 44,518 households across the
country. The sample was stratified by socioeconomic levels (low,
medium-low, medium-high, and high) and was carried out in three
stages: (a) random selection of the Primary Sampling Units (PSU) in
each stratum; (b) random selection of homes within the PSU; and
(c) selection of a person inside the dwelling. Respondents were 18
years and older; they lived in one of 32 federal states, including both
urban and rural areas (INEGI, 2015).
The questionnaire had two sections. The first one focused on
subjective wellbeing, and the second looked at key events in people’s lives, their traits, and their interactions with the social environment. Table 1 displays the variables used in the current study.
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Table 1. Variables Selected for the Econometric Model.
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Procedures and Data Analysis
The study used ordinal logistic regression that estimates happiness, an ordinal-type dependent variable, with twelve explanatory
variables (see Table 1), through the equation

1n Oi = α + β1Χ1 = β2Χ2 + ... + βpΧp ,

(1)

where
are the explanatory variables and
are the odd ratios
between happiness levels (Agresti, 2014).
To evaluate the overall goodness of model fit, the likelihood
ratio statistic, LR, was used, where the statistic with large values
(small p value) indicates that at least one of the regression variables
is important to explain the dependent variable (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; McCullagh, 1980). In our model, LR = 14240.48 with p
value = 0.0000 corresponding to a chi-squared distribution with 53
degrees of freedom. We also used the Pearson’s chi-squared test
(Hosmer et al., 1997): under the null hypothesis of adequate fit, the
statistic has a chi-squared distribution, so larger values of the statistic (significant p values) indicate lack of fit. The model’s goodness
of fit is displayed in Table 2.
Table 2. Model’s Goodness of Fit.
		

Chi-squared

Deviance
Pearson		

220772.48
86215.43

Gl		
235453		
235483		

Source: Authors’ calculations from data.

Sig.
1.0
1.0
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The significance of each independent variable is analyzed using
Wald test,
(2)
where SE(β1) is the standard error of the coefficient estimated, β1.
Under the null hypothesis that βi = =0, the ZWald follows a standard
normal distribution; therefore, high values in Equation 2 indicate
that coefficient βi is not zero (Agresti, 2014).

Qualitative Study
Sample
Data for this section of the study were obtained from research
conducted in four states that were selected for their different levels
of social wellbeing: Mexico City (very high), Tamaulipas (high), the
State of Mexico (middle), and Oaxaca (low) (Martínez-Martínez et al.,
2016). To maximize the heterogeneity of the sample, the selection of
municipalities within each state was based on the type of residence
(rural or urban), population size, and the index of human development of the municipality (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el
Desarrollo, 2019). In total, we chose 71 municipalities: 16 in Mexico
City, 6 in Tamaulipas, 31 in the State of Mexico, and 18 in Oaxaca.
Study participants were selected using a snowball sampling
technique. We conducted a total of 247 in-depth interviews: 78 in
Mexico City, 44 in Tamaulipas, 53 in the State of Mexico, and 72
in Oaxaca. To choose the interviewees, variables such as socioeconomic level, educational level, age, and gender were considered to
guarantee heterogeneous profiles.
Data Analyses Procedures
Participants were asked the following questions about happiness: Are you happy? Why? What makes you feel happy? How often
do you feel happy? On average, the interview took one hour to be
completed. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, recorded with
the participant’s consent, and then transcribed for analysis. The information was captured in the NVivo qualitative software. For this
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study, we used a narrative analysis approach, which allowed us to
identify saturated categories, as well as emerging trends. Results
were translated into English, with attention given to preserving the
voices and expressions of the respondents.

Results
Quantitative Results
The main sociodemographic characteristics and the six dimensions of poverty due to social deprivation by levels of happiness are
presented in Table 3.
Results of the explanatory variables were statistically significant based on the test (see Table 4). All results were reported in
comparison to the baseline level (level 0). Accordingly, the study
results indicate that the odds of being in the greater happiness category were 9.909 times higher for persons that completely agree
with the idea that her/his most important material needs are covered when compared to those that completely disagreed. Similarly,
persons with a level 10 perception of their standard of living were
3.32 times more likely to report greater happiness. In turn, persons
with a level between 6 and 9 were two times more likely to report
greater happiness than those in the baseline category. Furthermore,
the odds of being happier were 1.409 times higher for individuals
who had been healthy during the last 12 months. Those who reported engaging in some type of physical activity were 1.122 times more
likely to report greater happiness than those who did not engage in
such activities.
Persons with levels of emotional life satisfaction 10, 9, and 8
were respectively 6.34, 3.88, and 3.01 times more likely to be in the
greater happiness category than those with lower levels of emotional life satisfaction. Furthermore, the odds of being happier were
1.121 times higher for people who were in contact with their friends
compared those who were not. Respondents with freedom of choice
were 1.292 times more likely to be happy than those without it.
Additionally, the odds of being in the higher happiness category were 2.353, 1.742, and 1.462 times higher for people with reported
levels of freedom of 10, 9, and 8, respectively (when compared to

Table 3. Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Sample.
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Table 4. Regression Coefficients in Terms of Odds Ratios.
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people with a zero level of freedom). When compared to people
at the baseline, those reporting levels of satisfaction of 10, 9, and
8 with their daily activities (work, household chores, studies, and
others) were respectively 2.808, 2.197, and 2.009 times more likely
to report greater happiness. People practicing a religion were 1.184
times more likely to be happy than those not practicing a religion.
Results also indicated the marginal effect of income on happiness: people were just as likely to be happy as unhappy with high
or low levels of incomes. In other words, experiences of happiness
and unhappiness were present, regardless of people’s levels of income. Furthermore, people who did not report poverty due to some
form of social deprivation were 1.064 times more likely to be happy
than those with one or more sources of social deprivation.

Qualitative Evidence
The sample for the interviews comprised 247 respondents, 51%
of whom were women. The age among women ranged from 17 to
87 years of age, with a mean age of 44 years; the mean age for males
was 45 years (age ranged from 22–87 years of age). Table 5 shows the
mean age and educational level by state. In the next sections, we will
describe factors influencing the social construction of happiness.
Health
The evidence indicates that health was one of the key factors in
a respondent’s perception of happiness. Data suggest that, for most
respondents, happiness was linked to their self-reported health,
as well as extended to the perception of the health of their family
members and loved ones. For example, a 43-year-old woman said,
“The main thing for me is my health, ‘cause if you’re healthy…okay,
you’re very happy, because you can work wherever you want, you
can go where you want, you can do what you want.” A 45-year-old
woman responded, “Even though we have needs, I feel happy, I
have my kids. They are all healthy, they’re complete, they can walk,
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Table 5. Characteristics of Interviewees.
States		
Average
		Age

Level of Studies

Mexico City
43.08		
				
				

Elementary 7.7%, Junior High 19.2%,
High School 29.5%, University 32.1%,
Grad School (master’s or doctorate) 11.5%

Tamaulipas
45.98		
				
				
		
State of 		
45.96		
Mexico				
				

Elementary 11.4%, Junior High 22.8%,
High School 20.5%, University 31.7%,
Grad School (master’s or doctorate) 13.6%

Oaxaca		
44.90		
				
				

Elementary 34.7%, Junior High 20.9%,
High School 19.4%, University 23.6%,
Grad School (master’s or doctorate) 1.4%

Elementary 24.5%, Junior High 15.1%,
High School 24.5%, University 30.2%,
Grad School (master’s or doctorate) 5.7%

Source: Data from the interviewees, adapted by authors.

they have everything that God has been able to give them, and
that’s more than enough.”
Family
Having a family was an important element of happiness for unmarried individuals who had friends and life partners. Generally,
respondents saw these relationships as relevant for their participation in social and recreational life. For instance, a 28-year-old man
said, “You’re happy because you have a family, you have work, and
we have lots of friends and companions, and I should tell you that
that’s where we do a lot of things.” A 57-year-old woman responded, “Well, being able to have a family, my original and my nuclear
family, where I feel that we’re a team and that we love and trust
each other…having friendships that are truly unconditional.”
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Autonomy
Autonomy and happiness emerged as themes throughout the
interviews. These suggest that freedom of choice and behavior influence happiness. People’s satisfaction with daily activities (e.g.,
work, study, and exercise) is associated with happiness. For example, a 39-year-old woman stated, “Yes, I feel happy because, I’ve
done everything I’ve wanted. I’ve set goals and I’ve reached them
and that makes me feel good.” A 55-year-old man said, “I feel happy, I have the job I want, the career I want, the family I want.”
Religiosity and Religious Affiliation
Study participants reported that church attendance and other
religious practices made them feel connected to God. This gave
them a sense of happiness. For instance, a 43-year-old woman said,
“Now that I go to church, I feel happy, at peace.” A 56-year-old
woman shared,
I’m happy mainly because I trust in God and I know that through
Him, lots of things I felt were healed…but we learned to be strong
and to move forward and love life, and to love our neighbors and
we came to be truly happy…so I consider myself a happy person
thanks to Him.

Income and Perception of Ability to Meet Basic Material Needs
Findings suggest that respondents did not perceive income as
the most relevant factor affecting their happiness, regardless of the
level of welfare assistance the state provided. Rather, happiness
was defined by the ability to meet material needs, including food,
health, and household expenses (electricity, water, gas). For instance,
a 61-year-old man stated, “I’m happy because with effort, sacrifice,
work, I’ve acquired things…mainly a home so that my family can
have that security.” A 43-year-old woman shared, “So long as there
are no economic problems, personal expenses, then everything is
fine. I can say that I’m happy, but if for example a family member is
sick, we have to figure out what to do.”
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Discussion
This study set out to examine how the concept of happiness
is socially constructed in Mexico. The identified components that
contribute to happiness include individual, family, and economic
components of households. The individual component is made up
of aspects such as self-perception of health, religiosity and religious
affiliation, and autonomy. The second component, family, integrates aspects such as having family and friends, and that they are
in good health. The third component includes the ability to satisfy
the main material needs of the home, such as food, health expenses,
and household expenses (e.g., electricity, water, gas). It is important
to note that happiness is not the result of one of these components,
but of the interaction of all.
More specifically, findings from this study suggest that self-reported health, positive perceptions of one’s health, and the health
of household members and loved ones were associated with happiness. Other research studies have reported similar results (Deeming, 2013; Neira et al., 2018). In the context of Mexico, it means
self-reported health and health of loved ones are important in influencing one’s happiness. Happiness may be associated with freedom
from unplanned expenses that are related to medical care, especially for people in poverty. In the Mexican context, several studies
have shown that there is a lack of medicines and medical personnel
in public health institutions (Garrido-Latorre et al., 2008; Hernández-Ibarra & Mercado-Martínez, 2013). Therefore, some people in
poverty have to pay for private medical services, which can lead
to debt (Martínez-Martínez & Rodriguez-Brito, 2020). This in turn,
can affect their perception of happiness.
The evidence also indicated that spending time with family,
partners, and friends was positively related to happiness. This evidence is in line with previous research (Bojanowska & Zalewska,
2016; Castellanos, 2013). Results may be explained by the frequent
interactions and fraternal bonds among these relationships. In
Mexico, these bonds are central and may lead to mutual support
networks that foster the exchange of favors and material goods.
This contributes to the construction of social capital.
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Having freedom of choice and greater freedom to act (autonomy) is generally linked to happiness. To Sen (2000), the development of abilities is connected to the capacity to exercise freedom.
However, crime is an issue that impacts freedom. In Mexico, 78.9%
of people feel insecure in their state and 70.5% feel insecure in their
neighborhood (INEGI, 2019). Public insecurity can restrict the freedom to decide and act. As a result, the development of capacities
may be affected, endangering both happiness and wellbeing.
As observed in previous studies (see Helliwell, 2003; Van Cappellen et al., 2016), findings suggest an association between perceptions of happiness and religious affiliation and religiosity. Indeed,
respondents reported perceptions of happiness when they experienced a connection to God. Happiness could be a function of the
social and community networks formed from regular participation
in religious activities or by the overall spiritual encounter. Also, religion could play a functional role in people’s lives, helping them to
cope with life’s adversities.
We wish to highlight the marginal contribution of income to
happiness. Indeed, this is not an odd finding. Studies on income
inequality and subjective wellbeing (i.e., life satisfaction and happiness) are inconclusive (Schneider, 2016). The level of income, while
important for explaining the capacity to satisfy material needs,
may not be linked to happiness (Cummins, 2000; Schneider, 2016).
This effect is identified as “the ceiling effect” (Cummins, 2000), in
which income no longer has an influence on happiness. It could
also be that the power of income in explaining happiness may be
determined by other individual and contextual factors, such as age
(Chang-Ming, 2011).
It could be that, in Mexico, when the household basic material
needs are met (e.g., food, education, and household expenditures),
income may not be a factor in explaining happiness. This possibility may largely explain why Mexico is the second happiest country
in Latin America (Helliwell et al., 2018), even though 41.9% of the
population lives in poverty and 7.4% lives in extreme poverty (CONEVAL, 2019).
This study found several components of social deprivation to
be associated with unhappiness. Among them are (a) educational
delay, (b) lack of access to health services, (c) lack of access to social
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security, (d) substandard housing, (e) lack of basic housing services,
and (f) lack of access to food (see Table 3). These findings are similar
to those of Strotmann and Volkert (2018); their study emphasized
that public policies must be formulated and social programs developed to create the conditions for people to build their happiness.
Such policies would help the government meet one of its guiding
principles regarding happiness (López, 2020).

Conclusions
Happiness, as a social construct, is built from the interaction
of household conditions and individual and family components.
Some of these factors were considered more important by the interviewees and had greater weight in our statistical model. For this
reason, it is very important to identify what variables influence the
social construction of happiness.
The significance of identifying such variables firstly includes
identifying the domains in which interventions and improved policies are needed to promote happiness. The promotion of happiness
is one of the goals of the Mexican government (López, 2020), and
health policies that effectively promote access and quality healthcare can be crucial for building happiness, especially post-Covid-19.
As for material and income needs, social support programs may
help people in poverty meet critical needs (e.g., food or household
expenses such as electricity, water, and gas).
Secondly, our results point to the central role that spirituality
and religiosity play regarding happiness in Mexico. Religious or
spiritual institutions may be a supporting mechanism for reducing
unhappiness. Factors such as familial networks, friends, the capacity for growth, autonomy, and freedom may be key determinants of
happiness.
The mixed-methods approach in the study allows for the interpretation of quantitative findings, adds methodological strength,
and supports robust complementarity. However, some methodological limitations should be noted. First, the qualitative aspect of
the study included a heterogeneous sample selected by state characteristics. However, as is the case with all qualitative research,
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respondents’ perceptions reflect their contextual realities and experiences. Second, the cross-sectional nature of the study does not
allow us to establish cause and effect relationships. Despite these
limitations, the current study has merit and provides an alternative
understanding of factors that influence the perception of happiness
in Mexico in a context of poverty and inequality.

Endnotes
1. Social security reflects access to medical services, disability insurance, and maternity leave as a work benefit, and to have access to a pension or retirement system that may or may not be contribution-based (CONEVAL, 2010).
2. To measure food insecurity, we used the Mexican Food Security Scale
(EMSA in Spanish), which assesses aspects such as worry about a lack
of food, changes in food quality and quantity, and experiencing hunger
(CONEVAL, 2010).
3. Basic household services include electricity, sewage, access to water,
and a chimney when wood or coal is used for cooking (CONEVAL, 2010).
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Based on primary and secondary sources and interviews with Arab social
workers employed in welfare bureaus during the time under review, the
article describes the development of Palestinian social work in Israel in its
formative years (1968–1982). The primary finding is that this development
took place under a “policy of contempt” towards the Palestinian community’s needs. The authorities acknowledged these needs but perpetuated a
discriminatory allocation of resources in meeting them compared to Jewish
Israelis and disregarded the society’s narrative by maintaining a dual welfare system: one for the country’s Jewish citizens and a lesser one for their
Arab compatriots.
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Citizenship confers equality of status on members of the state
(Marshal, 1963), which implies that it should universally apply to
all its members whatever distributive standards the state adopts
(Macedo, 1990). Citizenship is also a primary base for these members’ claims on the state’s economic resources (Barry, 1990, p. 4;
King & Waldron, 1988). These relationships, however, are challenged in ethnic states, which are established with the express purpose to pursue the ends of a specific ethnic group. Such is the case
of Israel, often referred to as the Jewish State, in relations with her
Palestinian citizens (Samooha, 2002). As Israel’s first Prime Minister expressed it, it is a state of “Jewish soil, Jewish labor…Jewish
economy, Jewish agriculture, Jewish industry, Jewish sea” (Lustick,
1980, p. 8). Against this background, this article traces the development of social work in Israel’s Palestinian society during the years
1968–1982; at the peak of this time period, Palestinian society comprised 17% of the country’s population (Central Bureau of Statistics,
1985, p. 32), and the overwhelming majority of these citizens lived
in single-ethnicity villages, cities, and towns. This article begins
with a methodological note, followed by a brief description of the
welfare-related developments during the period under study. The
next sections outline the context in which Palestinian social work
in Israel evolved and its history up to 1968. Finally, the findings
present profiles of the Israeli Palestinian social workers in 1976 and
1981, as well as the main attributes of their work environment that
hindered their professionalization and those that assisted it.

Methodology
In tracing Palestinian social work’s professionalization in Israel from 1968 through 1982 in secondary sources, one encounters
a documentary void, as only a handful of papers were published
on this subject and during this period in professional journals (see
Literary Infrastructure below). Consequently, this paper is based
mainly on primary and secondary sources. The former consist of
documents found in the Israel State Archives, the National Library
of Israel, and the library of the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
& Social Welfare at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. However,
it is doubtful that these sources portray the full picture because we
were denied access to relevant files pertaining to “social work in the
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Arab sector” and “minorities” in the Ministry of Welfare, reflecting historian Raz’s (in Aderet, 2018) observation that it is easier to
write on Israel’s nuclear policy than on her policy towards her Arab
citizens. Therefore, to complement the material, semi-structured
interviews were conducted with 12 Arab social workers who were
employed in social welfare bureaus and in the Ministry of Welfare
at the time in order to supplement what we learned from the written documents and enhance our understanding of their contents.
The interviews were analyzed in three stages (Perakyal & Ruusuvuori, 2011). First they were read to get a general picture of the respondents’ recollections of their work and the conditions in which
it was undertaken. Then the material was crosschecked and finally
assembled into relevant categories. Eight of the interviewees were
field workers, two were welfare bureau directors, and two were
Ministry of Welfare supervisors, all of whom were assured anonymity. Eight were male, eight were urbanites, five were Muslim,
five were Christian, and two were Druze. This composition largely
reflected Palestinian social workers’ backgrounds and professional
positions during the period under review.

1968–1982
The years 1968 to 1982 were defining for Palestinian social work
in Israel. In 1968, the final military-regime restrictions that had
been in force on most of the country’s Arab citizens since the proclamation of the State in 1948 were lifted (Kabha, 2014). This lifting of
restrictions enabled Arabs to enroll for the first time in social work
studies in programs beyond the constricted, government-run versions. Shortly after, the relative economic prosperity that followed
the Six Day War in 1967 enabled the country to embark on establishing a more universal welfare state (Zeira, 2018). In the social security sphere, disability and unemployment benefits were added,
as well as laws that ensured alimony maintenance, and employee rights in case of bankruptcy and corporate liquidation (Doron
and Kramer, 1991). Doron and Kramer documented that, at the
community level, a large-scale neighborhood rehabilitation project
was launched; in the medical arena, regional specialist physicians’
clinics were added; and in the education system, socioeconomic integration was stepped up, early childhood day care centers were
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established, and secondary education became compulsory and by
and large free of charge. Finally, at the end of the period selected for
study, in 1982, a guaranteed social assistance law was passed that
shifted the responsibility for the financially needy from the local
authority social welfare bureaus to the National Insurance Institute, thus enabling social workers to concentrate to a greater extent
on their professional duties (Weiss, 2004). All of these steps had far
reaching implications for social work, as a welfare state creates the
profession’s frame of reference, sets many of its roles, determines
the resources at its disposal, and influences its members’ prestige
(Doron, 1989).

The Context in Which Palestinian
Social Work in Israel Evolved
Like most life sectors in Israel’s Palestinian society, social work
developed under three discriminatory government practices: (a)
significant underfunding and infrastructure provision compared
to its Jewish counterpart; (b) disregard of the community’s distinctive narrative; and (c) exclusion from policy planning and decision
making forums (Ghanem & Mustafa, 2009).
In addressing Arab society’s demands to rectify these wrongs,
the government employed three strategies over the years, which Jabareen and Agbaria (2010) labeled as non-recognition, two-penny
recognition, and a policy of contempt. They defined these terms as
follows: Non-recognition ignored, rejected, procrastinated on ameliorating, or disdained the demands of Arab society. Two-penny recognition delegitimized, belittled, or treated the demands as nuisances that could be sustained. Finally, the policy of contempt recognized
the difficulties but offered inadequate or only sporadic solutions to
mitigate them. The working hypothesis in this article is that the state
agencies relevant to social work—foremost the Ministry of Welfare—
used one or more of these strategies to preserve a dual welfare system: one for the country’s Jewish citizens and a poorer one for their
Palestinian compatriots (Rosenhek & Shalev, 2000).
The dual system was justified by a discourse of differences between the two communities (Fraser, 2004; Ram & Berkovitch, 2006).
This discourse was underpinned not by a multicultural worldview,
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but by an orientation, according to Rabinowitz (1998), that regarded
the Palestinians in Israel as “non-progressive others” or “primitive
aliens” (pp. 139–140). In effect, the state positioned Palestinians as,
at best, eternal candidates for rehabilitative reform. This positioning was based on the prevalent Israeli orientalist anthropological
assumption of the day that Palestinians’ socioeconomic marginality was internally rooted (i.e., that their disadvantaged position was
inherent to their “culture”) (Kimmerling, 1992; Nakhleh, 1977; Rosenhek, 1995).

Background: Palestinian Social Work
in Israel, 1948–1968
Social work in Mandatory Palestine was formally established
in 1931 by and for the country’s Jewish residents. With the establishment of Israel in 1948, social work rapidly expanded to assist in
the absorption of the multitude of new immigrants who doubled
the population by the end of 1951. Welfare services for the country’s Arab population under the British Mandate barely existed and
were limited to the urban areas, where only a small number of Arabs resided.
Social work’s developments in Israel’s Arab society after the
British Mandate followed the three aforementioned strategies adopted by the state. From 1948 until 1952 the government virtually
ignored Arab society’s welfare needs, passing the responsibility to
international aid organizations such as UNICEF and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) (Mahajne,
2019). Beginning in 1953 and until 1957, the two-penny recognition
strategy was implemented. The Ministry of Welfare established a
separate department for “minorities”, which had an extremely low
budget and hardly any workers. These welfare bureaus mainly employed unqualified workers whose major task was to assist internal
refugees from the Nakbah (Arabic for “catastrophe”, describing the
eviction of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes during the establishment of Israel) in their new places of residence, primarily by
urging the men to take on any temporary, blue collar employment
on offer. Later these workers strove to encourage Palestinian society to assume responsibility for itself, independent of government
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assistance, using mainly community work praxes. They did not offer casework and consequently refrained from caring for individuals or families in need, such as the elderly, persons with disabilities,
or the bereaved, in the name of preserving traditional Arab family
cohesion. Concurrently, probation officers (who in Israel must hold
a social work degree) supervised Arab offenders less for criminal
than for political offences, such as grazing their herds on lands that
had been confiscated from them or participating in public rallies
(Mahajne, 2019).
The next phase, 1958 to 1968, marked when the strategy of
contempt was employed. The Ministry of Welfare’s minorities department was formally dismantled and replaced by two parallel
institutions: one for Jews and a second, more restricted, and inferior institution for Arabs, which relied mainly on community work
praxes. Likewise, the Arab probation officers of the day continued
to supervise mainly those who committed civil disobediences, such
as Palestinian refugees who attempted to return to their homes (and
were labeled “infiltrators”). Towards the end of the decade, however, Arab social workers also began implementing a number of preventive interventions, such as family planning, educating households on how to avoid electric appliance accidents, and educating
households on how to improve their sanitation and hygiene. In addition, several female social workers were employed in youth clubs
“to liberate women from male domination” (Cohen Arzi, 1963).
At the end of 1968, 5% of the country’s social workers were
Arab, which translated to one social worker per 9,000 Arab citizens, as compared to one social worker per 3,000 Jewish citizens.
However, only half of these social workers were professionally
qualified. The remaining half had studied in an Arab-only Ministry of Welfare training institute, where none of the courses provided alternatives to the traditional family solidarity paradigm and all
sidestepped the political, social, and economic contexts that created most of the community’s difficulties. Consequently, these social
workers primarily served as agents of the establishment to control
and monitor the Arab population.
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Findings
From 1968 until 1982, social work in Israel generally functioned
under severe labor constraints. Few students chose the profession,
and those who made a career of it quickly burned out, so turnover
was rapid. The Ministry of Welfare attributed the shortage to social
work being predominantly a female-held profession and to Arab
women preferring teaching as more appropriate to their parental
and marital status (Ministry of Welfare, 1974). The Israeli Association of Social Workers identified additional reasons. It underlined
several obstacles to the field. Those interested in the field had to
meet exacting university admittance requirements, received insufficient preparation for field work during their training, would go on
to receive low wages as workers in the field, and faced the risk of
experiencing violence from displeased service recipients.
Additionally, social workers were held in low public and professional esteem, had little or no professional advancement to aspire to, and would be confronted with the mundane drudge of
meeting fundamental material needs of service recipients instead
of being able to attend to their social and psychological needs
(ISA-SocialWelfare-SocialWelfare-000sbg9; ISA-SocialWelfare-SocialWelfare-000sbfu). Paradoxically, the shortage of social workers
was less severe in the welfare bureaus, where social work held primary sway, than in educational and medical settings, where it was
an auxiliary profession. One fact, however, was not contested: the
shortage in labor adversely affected the profession’s development
(Berlin et al., 1973; Dotan, 1974; Rosenfeld, 1975).
Various bodies, including parliamentary (Knesset) committees and local authorities, attempted to improve the situation, but
none addressed the core issue: the especially insufficient number
of qualified Arab social workers. In 1971, Member of Knesset Emil
Habibi (of political party Rakah—the New Communist List) moved
that the Ministry of Welfare must equally support all needy citizens, no matter their ethnic affiliation (Minister of Welfare review
of his office’s activity, 1971), but the motion was rejected so that,
in effect, the policy of exclusion continued. For example, a list of
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local authorities due to receive government funding to improve
their welfare bureaus’ physical conditions failed to include any
Arab locality (ISA-SocialWelfare-SocialWelfare-000sbfu). Likewise,
not a single Arab locality was included in the 1978 countrywide
neighborhood rehabilitation project, in spite of the Child and Youth
Services’ national supervisor in the Ministry of Welfare warning
that this exclusion failed to meet the justified needs of Israel’s Arab
population and, moreover, was unjust (ISA-LaborSocialAffairs-DirectorGeneral-000y8bk).
Neither did representatives of the Jewish social workers, who
dominated the Israeli Association of Social Workers, pay heed to
their Arab colleagues when promoting a policy of professional
qualification (ISA-SocialWelfare-SocialWelfare-000sbg9). In 1976
the Association submitted to the Knesset a host of suggestions to resolve the shortage in social workers, including incentives for those
who worked in a list of socioeconomically-deprived local authorities. However, the list failed to include any Arab towns or villages.
The Ministry of Welfare adopted the Association’s suggestion to the
letter (including incentives such as exemptions from tuition fees,
raises in rank that entailed wage hikes, standing loans for housing,
relocation or subsidized rent, access to a savings plan, tax credits,
and reimbursements for child care), but these were applied only in
Jewish locations (ISA-SocialWelfare-SocialWelfare-000mnzo).

Arab Social Workers—A Profile
Until the early 1980s, almost all Arab social workers were employed in local authority welfare bureaus akin to their Jewish counterparts and a few were employed in probation services (Elad &
Weiner, 1995; Spiro et al., 1998). We review the former at two points
in time: 1976, a year before the welfare bureaus underwent a reform (mainly to transfer the role of assessment for material benefits
from social workers to special eligibility officers), and 1981, when
the responsibility for social assistance benefits was assigned to the
National Insurance Institute. Data on the subject prior to the mid1970s is only available regarding the 10 largest Arab local authorities (Ministry of Welfare, 1972). As such, data for the smaller, more
numerous Arab authorities cannot be presented.
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Table 1. Arab Social Worker Posts in Local Authority Welfare
Bureaus, 1976.*

Source: Ministry of Welfare, 1976

The data in Table 1 testify to the severe labor shortages in the
Arab welfare bureaus (exemplified by vacant posts and unqualified
workers), especially given the Ministry of Welfare’s definition at the
time of “qualified” as including students on fieldwork placement.
All told, only a third of the bureaus’ social workers in 1976 were
professionally qualified.
The scarcity in qualified Arab social workers at the time was
partly attributable to governmental policy. In 1978, the Ministry of
Welfare sought to increase the number of social work posts by 398,
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but only 44 of these posts were in the Arab welfare bureaus (which
translates to half their proportion of the population that year)
(ISA-LaborSocialAffairs-LaborSocialAffairs-000hicp). The composition of the requested posts was also noteworthy. Of the 44 posts
requested, 31 were designated for community and day care centers
(none of which were requested for the Jewish bureaus) and a staggering 10 for street gangs (in comparison to two for the Jewish sector). We mention this because street gangs never existed in Israel,
and this designation of 10 workers served to profile Arab youth as
criminals. Only for girls at-risk was the number higher for Arab (3)
as compared to Jewish (2) bureaus.
An unpublished survey by the Israeli Association of Social
Workers from 1977 attested to the gross inequality between the
Jewish and Arab societies (Eshel, 1977; Geva, 1977). In Jewish society, half a post to a full post was allocated for every thousand
citizens compared to 0.004–0.1 posts for every thousand citizens in
Arab society. Hence, for example, Arab Umm al-Fahm, with a population of 16,000, was allocated two social workers, while Jewish
Beit Shemesh, with a population of 11,000, had 25 social workers.
Likewise, Arab Baqa al-Gharbiyye’s 8,000 residents were allocated
only half a position and Arab Shfaram’s 13,000 residents less than a
full post.
In most Arab local authorities, besides a welfare bureau director,
social workers were employed, in descending order, in community
work, family support, and buds of child and youth care. Consequently, most individual interventions were carried out by the director,
who was also often the bureau’s sole employee. The data of the period was not sorted by gender, but the interviews revealed that most of
workers were urban Christian women, mainly because their movements were less restricted than Muslim women under the military
regime, so they could more easily attend professional courses.
In 1978, the Ministry of Welfare persuaded Arab mayors to establish clustered welfare bureaus to jointly serve a number of local authorities, arguing that separate bureaus consumed too large
a portion of their annual government allocations (Abu-Backer,
2001). The move was advanced in spite of contravening the Welfare
Services Act of 1958 that obliged each local authority to establish
a welfare bureau; further, this change was not suggested to any
Jewish local authorities. The Follow-Up Committee on Welfare for
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the Arab Population, an advocacy body established to improve the
social services in Palestinian Israeli society, explained the move as
a political step to divest Israel’s Arabs of their ability to develop
their localities (Abu-Backer, 2001, p. 12). In contrast, the Ministry of
Welfare claimed that it was merely a bureaucratic move to ease its
supervisors’ access to the Arab bureaus, which were often located
on unpaved roads (Abu-Backer, 2001, p. 17).
In order to meet the Ministry’s requirements, three of the four
clustered bureaus that were established were located in Jewish cities,
forcing their clients to travel long distances, usually by taxi due to
the lack of public transport in the Arab localities (Abu-Backer, 2001,
p. 14). The move also alienated the social workers from the villages under their jurisdiction as they visited them, at best, only once a
week. Equally problematic were these social workers’ terms of employment. Previously, all social workers in the welfare bureaus were
employed by their local authorities, which enabled them a certain
amount of discretion in carrying out their duties. In contrast, in the
clustered bureaus, they were employed by the Ministry of Welfare,
and thus had to obtain its authorization for all their interventions.
Consequently, they were not allowed to deviate from the (meager)
budgets at their disposal; what they could do, how many people they
could serve, who would receive assistance, and when it could be provided were all determined by the Ministry’s regional offices.
Table 2 illustrates the continued shortage in Arab social workers. Five years after the previous survey, which was administered
in 1976, most were already professionally qualified (at least according to the definition of “qualified” at the time as including social
work students on fieldwork placement).
A labor shortage memorandum of the day by the Israeli Association of Social Workers reported mostly what Arab social workers did not do and consequently could not provide: family support,
youth work (except in Nazareth), school social work, assistance
to girls at risk (a single worker), community work, rehabilitation
(except in the National Insurance Institute), support for the intellectually challenged (apart from three institutions and a sheltered
employment center), support for mental health, support for the elderly, and institutional care (available at the time only in Jewish
facilities) (ISA-moch-moch-000iu2e). The memorandum also noted
that out of the 250 social workers who, according to regulations,

Table 2. Arab Social Worker Posts in Local Authority Welfare Bureaus, 1981.
120
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Development
Palestinian
Social Work in Israel
Contesting theofFlawed
Consumer

121

should have been commissioned to care for 150,000 Arab primary
school children of the day, only two posts were allocated, and that
only a single social worker assisted the entire 40,000 strong Bedouin population in the south of the country. Moreover, based on the
available data on Arab students and graduates of social work, it was
predicted that, in forthcoming years, the reserve of professional labor would not suffice to fill even the meager number of posts that
were already allocated to the Arab welfare bureaus.
We learned from the interviews that after the period of urban
Christian dominance in the Arab social worker force, an influx of
rural Muslim workers joined the occupation (except in the south of
the country). This development affected professional interventions
for the better. A case in point was an urban, Christian, female social
worker who was told by the head (mukhtar) of a predominantly
Muslim village that although she may be Arab, because she was
an urbanite, her customs differed from the villagers’—particularly those that stemmed from their religious differences—and so she
could not fully assist her clients as desired (Habibi-Shlawit, 1972).
It should be pointed out that at this time multicultural social work
competencies (Bar-On, 1998), especially cross-religious ones, were
yet to be introduced in Israel.
Until the end of 1981, four possible reasons explained the scarcity
of Palestinian Israeli social workers. First were personal preferences:
social work attracted Arab youth to a far lesser extent than Middle
East studies, law, and medical subjects (Shtendel, 1973). Second, university admission requirements for social work studies were extremely steep, and included an entrance barrier of needing to be 21 years
of age. This barrier affected Jewish students less, given that most of
them underwent military service prior to entering university (Jaffe,
1977). Low wages were the third reason that explained the scarcity
of Palestinian Israeli social workers, coupled with prohibitively large
caseloads and dilapidated working environments (Kadman, 1973). In
the Arab town Tamra, for example, the welfare bureau consisted of
a single room devoid of heating or cooling (Habibi-Shlawit, 1972). Finally, the predominant task of Palestinian Israeli social workers was
to offer material support, as almost all of their clients lived in poverty. While this is a central social work role, it was regarded at the time
as merely administrative work and was consequently regarded by
most practitioners as “non-professional” practice. Also, the provision
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of material support often exposed social workers to verbal and sometimes physical abuse from displeased clients. All of these factors
served to discourage the next generation from wanting to enter the
social work profession.

State Bias Regarding Developments
in Palestinian Social Work
In all its activities, the government sent a clear message that
Israel’s Arab citizens had civil and economic rights, but that those
rights were not on par with those of Jewish citizens. A typical example of the period was comparing the social services they received
not to their Jewish compatriots but to their brethren in neighboring
Arab states (Prime Minister’s Office, 1969). In the Ministry of Welfare, the person in charge of community work in the minorities sector went even a step further, arguing that the gaps between Arab
and Jewish citizens would take years, if not generations, to bridge
(Gabriel, 1967). Moreover, she hinted that addressing these gaps
came second to bridging the Jewish public’s own internal ethnic
gaps and differences.

Literary Infrastructure
Throughout the years under review, merely eight papers on
Arab citizens were published in Israel’s two journals devoted to social work and social welfare (Saad [Welfare], renamed Society and
Welfare in 1977, and Social Security). Five of these papers were penned
by Jewish office holders in the social welfare establishment (Avitsour, 1978; Cohen, 1973; Shtendel, 1973, 1975; Shurka & Katz, 1978),
and three were authored by Arab social workers (Habibi-Shlawit,
1972; Rizk, 1973, 1977).
Shtendel (1973, 1975), former Deputy Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, attributed transformations in Israel’s Palestinian community to increasingly individually provided social services, such as old age benefits that could now be obtained directly
from the National Insurance Institute, which reduced reliance on
the extended family and the elders’ mediating role vis-à-vis the
state. His primary focus, however, was on changes in the status of
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Palestinian women, which he attributed to Israeli legislation such
as compulsory education, although it often caused family tensions
and clashed with Arab tradition.
Cohen (1973), who coordinated the Ministry of Welfare with
the Prime Minister’s Office, wrote on a family planning initiative
aimed at adolescent Muslim girls, which was accompanied mainly
by anecdotes, such as the girls’ refusal to contribute to the costs
of a fieldtrip because their families paid enough in taxes, or that a
beauty care course they attended was required first and foremost
by the Prime Minister of the day, Golda Meir. The article ended
with close to an entire page devoted to the girls’ esteem for their
Jewish instructor and Jewish peers in general as role models due to
the greater freedom they enjoyed.
Avitsour (1978), director of the Ministry of Welfare’s Special
Task Division, argued that Arab citizens were attempting to economically, socially, and culturally adapt to Israeli society (and to a
certain extent to its political system), but refused to relinquish their
distinct ethnic identity. Consequently, like their Jewish counterparts, they did not seek to mix. Moreover, their splintered identity
as citizens of Israel, Palestinian nationals and pan-Arabists, impeded their assimilation into Israeli society from the start.
Shurka and Katz’s (1978) was the only academic publication on
Palestinian assimilation to Israeli society. They examined how different variables affected Jewish and Palestinian teenagers’ attitudes
to people with physical disabilities, such as how injuries were sustained (military service, workplace, or road accident) and the person’s personal responsibility for the injury. The paper overflows
with stereotypes such as the negative attitude of Palestinians to
people with disabilities, explicated by exaggerated generalizations
of their fatalistic worldviews and the presence of handicaps being a
sign of God’s wrath to sin or the result of an evil eye.
Habibi-Shlawit (1972) presented an anthropological, biographical story about a widow and her children burdened by presumed
hardships in Arab culture, including austere schooling, forced polygamous marriages to protect the family name, and the general
helplessness of women in light of male domination. Relieving these
troubles, she maintained, was the Ministry of Welfare’s responsibility, which was represented by a social worker who placed two
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daughters in a boarding school, relocated two orphans closer to
their relatives’ abode, and promised to financially assist them. In
contrast, Rizk (1973, 1977), a social work supervisor, wrote on the
incongruences between the Ministry’s “Western” social work orientations and Arab society, including, among others, the idea that
placing a child outside the extended household humiliates the family and degrades its position in the community.

Impediments to the Professionalization
of Social Work in Palestinian Israeli Society
At least nine attributes of Palestinian social work in Israel hindered its professional development between 1968 and 1982: (a) an
underqualified labor force; (b) low pay; (c) dilapidated work environments; (d) prohibitively heavy caseloads; (e) the failure of the
1977 reform; (f) incompatibilities between “Western” social work
and Israel’s Palestinian society; (g) the sense of being a minority; (h)
no representation in policy planning and decision making bodies;
and (i) a general lack of social services in the Arab localities. These
issues will be explored individually below.
An Underqualified Labor Force
The scarcity of professionally-qualified social workers compelled the welfare bureaus to employ unqualified workers, which
diminished both the profession’s self-image and its public image.
Moreover, according to our interviewees, this was also an outcome
of the domination of central posts in the Ministry of Welfare by
members of the National Religious Party at the time. These Party members handed out jobs to their supporters, but few potential
social work students identified with the members, and some even
refused to work with them.
Low Pay
Social work wages in Israel had always been low. However, for
Arabs they were even lower than for their Jewish counterparts,
because their local authorities could not afford any of the fringe
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benefits most of the Jewish local authorities provided, such as
overtime pay, hazard pay, or travel expenses. Consequently, many
Arab social workers had to supplement their income elsewhere, frequently in an entirely different field, since most Arab welfare bureaus lacked full-time posts.
Dilapidated Work Environments
Few public employees worked in such shabby offices as those of
the Palestinian Israeli social workers. They were often moved from
one rented building to another that lacked proper plumbing and
basic infrastructures. These spaces were often bare of office equipment and offered inadequate space in which to meet service users. Further, there were shortages in the most basic considerations
for personal safety, such as doors that could be closed or guarded
(Ministry of Welfare, 1975; Straus, 1975a).
Prohibitively Heavy Caseloads
Until 1977, when social workers were relieved of assessing potential beneficiaries for social assistance, most of their work lay in this
sphere and in the provision of other material goods. This work was
hindered by the constant introduction of new legislation. These difficulties bedeviled Jewish social workers as well, but were more acutely
felt in the Arab bureaus due to the scarcity of labor (Straus, 1975b).
Failure of the 1977 Reform
The reform, which sought to reduce the welfare bureaus’ administrative functions while bolstering their professional ones, created few changes in the Arab bureaus. In fact, it never delivered its
intended results: (a) separation of material support from social care;
(b) establishment of new priorities for target populations; (c) increased accessibility by outreaching other services; (d) adoption of
holistic and evidence-based praxes; and (e) upgrading the physical
work environment (Korazim et al., 1988). The authors who uncovered these discrepancies did not detail the reasons for the failure,
but it is likely that the significantly small size of the Arab bureaus
played a role.
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Incompatibilities Between “Western”
Social Work and Israel’s Palestinian Society
Most Ministry of Welfare directives, particularly those regarding individual interventions, failed to take account of the singularity
of Palestinian society (Rizk, 1973). Unemployed adults, for example,
were compelled to use their extended families as safety nets prior to
receiving formal assistance. Insensitivity also occurred in gendered
working relations, such as house visits being made to single, opposite-sex applicants, or examinations of sexual relations and the labor
divisions between husband and wife. Likewise, at the community
level, the government sought to replace the elders who handled intra-family murders (wasita [containment] and sulha [reconciliation])
with therapeutic intervention for the victims’ families, rather than
working within the community to address its difficulties.
Sense of Being a Minority
During the period under review, there were seldom more than
two or three Palestinian Israeli social work students per academic
year in the four schools of social work in Israel at that time (Dar,
1972), and they used to feel alienated by the language, the novelty of academia, and often the content of the studies. As one of our
interviewees recalled, solitude crushed him as there was only one
other Arab at his school, but that person was in a different year of
her studies. Moreover, much of the teaching material did not match
his reality, particularly as his fieldwork supervisor pressed him to
adopt Freudian paradigms. Alienation of this sort also persisted in
post-graduate settings, such as continuing education programs or
professional social work bodies where Arab social workers, and especially the probation officers among them, were hardly represented.
No Representation in Policy Planning and Decision Making Bodies
Throughout the period, not a single Palestinian Israeli served
on the Ministry of Welfare’s senior management team, nor carried
a senior administrative role in it. Likewise, of the 129 members on
the most important, social welfare-related government committee
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of the period, the Prime Minister’s Committee for Children and
Youth in Distress, only one was Arab (Bar-On, 1994).
General Lack of Social Services in the Arab Localities
Not only welfare bureaus but other social services were relatively scarce in most of the Arab localities, which made it extremely
difficult to provide adequate solutions for the needy. For example,
as late as 1989, out of the country’s 1,000 children’s day care centers,
only eight served Arab children (in addition to three for both Arab
and Jewish children); out of the 1,039 children in day foster care,
only 25 were Arab; and of 778 children who attended afternoon
socio-educational clubs, only three were Arab (Bar-On, 1994).

Advances in the Professionalization
of Palestinian Social Work
While the general picture of Palestinian social work in Israel
over the period was grim, three changes assisted its development:
(a) organization and management, (b) a new model of practice, and
(c) legislation.
Organization and Management
In the late 1960s, the Ministry of Welfare introduced a centralized, computerized payment system for most of the welfare
bureaus’ expenditures; this system relieved the smaller bureaus
(which dominated in the Arab local authorities) of much of their
administrative load (Ministry of Welfare, 1969). A decade later, a
separate department in the Ministry was established to deal with
all material aid, thus enabling social workers to concentrate more
on the interventions they were employed to perform (Brick, 1982;
Doron & Yanay, 1988).
A second beneficial organizational change was the introduction
of more detailed Ministry of Welfare administrative regulations.
Although not legally binding, and therefore not guaranteeing a
minimal level of uniformity, these regulations provided the Arab

128

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

welfare bureaus leverage to demand funding for the services they
delivered and the means of delivery they utilized.
New Model of Praxis
During the 1970s, family-based praxis became the basic mode of
operation in the welfare bureaus (Kurtz, 1975), which suited the Palestinian bureaus in particular, as Arab society revolves around the
family. In practice, however, the interviewed participants revealed
that the focus of interventions still usually remained on individual
family members, rather than the family as a whole.
Legislation
The final beneficial change was a series of enactments on the
care, protection, and correction of youth; adoption; and support
for the intellectually challenged and people in residential care.
This legislation not only identified social work’s objectives in these
spheres, but also provided clearer understandings of how to implement them (Salzberger & Schnitt, 1973). According to our interviewees, this change transformed social work by enabling it to move
from a predominantly reactive to a more proactive profession.

Conclusion
Palestinian social work in Israel developed in the shadow of an
ethnic state ideology that gave preference to its Jewish citizens over
its Arab citizens, for although the Declaration of the Establishment
of the State offers all her citizens “complete equality of social and
political rights…without distinction of creed, race, or sex,” it purposefully refrained from including nationality (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, para. 12). Consequently, during the period under
review, the profession suffered from inequality in the allocation of
government budgets, posts, and infrastructures; the absence of the
Palestinian narrative from training and social support programs;
and the exclusion of Palestinian representatives from decision and
policy making forums. Although the government acknowledged
the needs of the community, it did little to adequately address them.

Development
Palestinian
Social Work in Israel
Contesting theofFlawed
Consumer

129

In implementing the State’s ideology, the Ministry of Welfare
ran a dual welfare system—one for the country’s Jewish citizens and
a lesser one for their Palestinian counterparts—which it sustained
with a de-familiarization discourse that presumed inherent cultural
differences instead of a discourse of equality. Put another way, it justified exclusion by creating services that were purportedly compatible with the “(lesser) cultural features” of a particular population.
Palestinian social workers served under this exclusionary policy as agents of social control in lieu of adequate government spending on their community. Besides handing out modest support to
the financially needy, they were expected to disseminate a doctrine that the underprivileged were responsible for their condition.
Hence, for example, Palestinian unemployment was regarded and
treated as an individual’s shirked responsibility rather than being
acknowledged as the result of larger issues rooted in power structures that offered far fewer employment opportunities to Arabs.
Likewise, Arab social workers were often compelled to act against
the values of their clients’ family structures, such as by fulfilling
legal demands to remove children from dysfunctional homes, or
by probation officers having to monitor not only criminal but also
political offenders.
These difficulties notwithstanding, certain changes for the better occurred between 1968 and 1982. In particular, a larger number
of qualified Arab personnel entered the profession, and the almost
exclusive community work praxis that labeled Arabs as “different”
or even as “alien” gave way to a greater focus being placed on the
diverse needs of the family. Also, initial efforts in the rehabilitation and support of children and youth began following Ministry
of Welfare reforms due to new (universal) legislation.
In addition, Arab social workers, especially those more senior,
gained confidence and know-how through practice, and gradually became more outspoken on incompatibilities between “Western” social work interventions and traditional Palestinian society.
Contrary to Jaffe’s (1969) claim that the three tiers of Israel’s social
welfare establishment—the local authority welfare bureaus, the
training institutions, and the Israeli Association of Social Workers—failed to prepare social workers to serve social change, Israeli Palestinian social workers began to question their professional
identities and call for changes in their workplace realities.
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Epilogue
Almost forty years have passed since the last year covered by
this study. In that time, the most significant development in Palestinian social work in Israel has been a dramatic rise in the number
of academically-trained practitioners, including those with MSA
and doctoral degrees. Indeed, this trend is likely to continue, given
that the number of Arabs currently studying social work in Israel
far outweighs their proportion in the general population. The major consequence of this development has been that it has enabled
significant expansions of Arab welfare bureaus to provide the full
breadth of social work services.
Notwithstanding, three major constraints still impede Palestinian social work in the country. One is the continued underfunding
of Arab welfare bureaus when compared to Jewish welfare bureaus.
For example, as recently as 2016, the average Ministry of Welfare expenditure per client in Arab welfare bureaus was NIS3,387 in contrast to NIS7,318 in Jewish localities—i.e., a 54% difference (Gal et al.,
2017). Secondly, although multicultural social work is slowly being
absorbed in Israel, it has excluded Israel’s Arab population. Thus,
whereas the country’s schools of social work and the Ministry of
Welfare have run courses on ultra-Orthodox and Ethiopian Jews,
none have been devoted to the country’s Arab population. Finally, it
is doubtful if these constraints can be lifted due to the exclusion of
Arabs in policy decision making. Thus, in spite of the Arab welfare
bureau managers registering as a nongovernmental organization
in 2003, the Ministry of Welfare still refuses to recognize it and its
legitimacy. In an ethnic state such as Israel that identifies itself as
the Jewish State rather than the state of all its citizens, this situation
of inequality seems likely to continue.
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In a rural Midwestern community sample (n=273), large proportions of
Somalis and Whites ranked overall health as “Very good” (57% and 50%,
respectively), while Hispanics (42%) considered it “Good”. Across all
groups, most are either “Happy” or “Very happy” with their jobs—64%,
91%, 83%—or their families—85%, 93%, 91.6%—with reference to Hispanics, Somalis, and Whites, respectively. When asked, “In the past 30 days,
how often did you feel hopeless?”, 83% of Somalis and two-thirds (67%) of
Whites responded, “None of the time”, while half (50%) of Hispanics indicated the same. Overall, Hispanics appeared to be less healthy, happy, and
hopeful than their White and Somali counterparts.
Keywords: rural immigration, social determinants of health, happiness, hope

Nebraska is experiencing notable demographic shifts, particularly in rural towns where minority-majority populations have
seemingly changed the face of rural life in ways that reflect complex
economic, political, social, and cultural interactions. Although some
research has focused on the health and wellbeing of immigrants and
refugees in the U.S., we have much to learn about these populations
in new rural destinations. Using survey data collected from participants living in a rural Midwestern town, we begin to understand the
factors that contribute to health for a community sample consisting
largely of foreign-born Hispanic and Somali individuals.
One important predictor of physical and mental health and
overall wellbeing is hope (Gallagher & Lopez, 2009). Hope, as defined by the late scholar Shane Lopez, is the belief that the future
will be better than the present, along with the belief that you have
the power to make it so (UMNSCH, 2013). According to Lopez,
peoples’ hopes and dreams boil down to three things: (a) a good
job, something that engages and feeds people’s passions; (b) a happy
family that lives close to them and is part of their everyday lives;
and (c) a great life, which includes a sense of purpose in meaningful
work; social connectedness with others; financial security, but not
necessarily wealth; physical wellbeing, including access to healthcare; and community wellbeing in a place that gives them love and
support, but that also enables people to give back (University of
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Nebraska Rural Futures Institute, 2015, p. 15). Many of these aforementioned indicators are also largely recognized as social determinants of health (SDOH), the conditions in the environments in
which people live, work, and spend time that affect health, broadly
conceived (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2019).
The purpose of this exploratory study is to examine trends and
patterns in perceptions of hope and related SDOH variables using Lopez’s aforementioned framework (UMNSCH, 2013). Hence,
these data provide a more holistic view of the current state of, and
possible contributors to, health and wellbeing in vulnerable, rural
populations. More importantly, it urges us to take a step back and
reflect on which questions we should be asking about health and
wellbeing in immigrant and refugee communities, particularly
when they reside within the same small community.

Literature Review
Twenty years ago, a review of health and health care problems of rural minority populations—focusing primarily on African
American and Hispanic populations—found too few articles using
common empirical methods to conduct a meta-analysis of the literature (Mueller et al., 1999). The authors noted at the time that none
of the reviewed studies gave any attention to the causal structure
and processes that contribute to the frequently observed health disadvantages that persons of color in the U.S. often experience. Since
then, our understanding of how a variety of factors influence health
outcomes and levels of inequity in those outcomes among vulnerable populations has drastically improved, particularly in the past
decade. These social determinants of health (SDOH) are the complex, integrated, and overlapping social structures and economic
systems that are responsible for most health inequities and include
the social environment, physical environment, health services, and
structural and societal factors (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Furthermore, SDOH are shaped by the inequitable
distribution of money, power, and resources throughout local communities, nations, and the world (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008). More recently, our understanding of health
disparities demonstrates that it is not one factor that has driven the
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inequities in healthcare and health status, but multiple intersecting
determinants, driven in large part by law and policy (Dawes, 2018).
Health and Hope
Although hope is understudied within SDOH research, hope and
hopelessness have been shown to be key determinants of physical
and mental health, subjective wellbeing, and quality of life (Campbell, 1987; Davis, 2005; Gallagher & Lopez, 2009; Landeen et al., 2000;
Patel & Kleinman, 2003; Snyder, 2002). Few empirical studies have
explored hope and hopelessness among immigrant and refugee
groups. In one study of 10 newly-arrived refugee and immigrant
children in Canada, Yohani and Larsen (2009) observed that hope
had two distinct but intertwined aspects. The first, embodied hope,
was described by participants as innate and inalienable (e.g., “present in the heart,” “never goes away”) (p. 252). The second, hope-engendering resources, referred to the interdependent nature of hope,
or how external sources (e.g., social support) can enhance hope. Research conducted with refugees in Australia revealed pre-migration,
transit, and post-migration experiences, such as loss of loved ones,
mandatory detention of asylum seekers, and isolation, are associated
with experiences of hopelessness (Khawaja et al., 2008; Mares et al.,
2002; Steel et al., 2006). Social support, religious beliefs, and focusing
on future aspirations (hope) have been identified as important coping strategies (Khawaja et al., 2008).
Health and Happiness
Health and happiness are generally believed to go together, and
empirical evidence has been summarized elsewhere making the
case that their influences can be bidirectional (Argyle, 1997). That
is, happiness can affect health, and, conversely, health can affect
happiness, although the relationship between health and happiness
is stronger when self-reported measures of health are used (Argyle,
1997). The study of health and happiness is relatively new among
economists, having observed that health correlates more strongly
with happiness than any other variable, including income, in countries throughout the world (Graham, 2008). Moreover, we have less
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understanding of the health–happiness relationship among the
very poor both in the U.S. and beyond (Graham, 2008). A central
point to remember is that happiness influences health, and a range
of other factors influence health (e.g., work or job satisfaction, social relationships), in part, by enhancing happiness. Although it has
been noted that ethnic minority groups are generally less happy
than those belonging to the majority (Argyle, 1997), much remains
to be explored, particularly among immigrants and refugees.
Health, Community Belongingness, and Equitable Opportunities
Health inequity in the U.S. is related to a legacy of explicit and
implicit discriminatory actions and policies from governments,
businesses, and the larger society (Davis et al., 2005). For example,
researchers have identified sources of vulnerabilities experienced
by immigrants and even proposed options for addressing such vulnerabilities, such as policies related to living wages and safe jobs
(Derose et al., 2007). Gravlee (2009) described how race and racism contribute to health disparities, and encouraged researchers to
refocus attention from a misguided belief that genetic differences
explain racial disparities to a model that recognizes the complex
sociocultural and environmental influences on health. Gravlee also
stated researchers need to consider the cumulative effects of these
disparities across the life span. More recently, scholars have called
for inclusion of work (occupation) in health equity research, as it
has not been explored in most health equity research in the U.S. and
is needed to advance health equity (Ahonen et al., 2018).
Further, research has yet to give attention to aspects of work
life, such as employer support and investment in retaining its workforce, which is demonstrated by offering adequate pay, healthcare
coverage, and training opportunities, all of which arguably foster a
sense of community belongingness in immigrant and refugee populations. Evidence suggests that a sense of belongingness in its various forms (general vs. specific) may also offer protection against
depression. In a study using data from the Canadian Community
Health Survey, a stronger sense of community belongingness predicted less depression severity and shorter duration of depression
(Fowler et al., 2013). Similarly, in a study of mostly university graduates in white-collar administrative or professional roles, general
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belongingness and workplace belongingness appear to have strong
additive effects on depressive symptoms, together accounting for
45% of the variance (Cockshaw et al., 2013).
Thus, the current study takes a comprehensive look at one rapidly-changing Midwestern community that is experiencing an influx of immigrant and refugee populations that are changing the
dynamics of small rural communities. Exploring SDOH, as well as
hope, health, and happiness, in this context offers a unique perspective. Additionally, this study was a collaborative response to
our rural community stakeholders, who identified a need to assess
and understand the SDOH and rural public wellbeing of their town
in a climate of shrinking community infrastructures, consolidated
funding, and steep demographic shifts in Nebraska.

Methods
Sampling
A total of 325 survey participants were recruited in the early fall
of 2017 using respondent driven sampling (RDS). RDS is generally
considered a methodology for recruiting “hard-to-reach” populations for social research, and has been shown to provide a useful
and near-representative sample of the community (Dombrowski et
al., 2013; Gile & Handcock, 2010; Heckathorn, 2002). RDS is a chain
referral recruitment method wherein initial participants (called
seeds) are given coupons to recruit other eligible people into the
study. As new participants come in with prior coupons and complete a survey, they are then given a set of coupons to give to others.
In this way, recruitment spreads across social network ties in a local
community. Participants were given $20 for completing the survey
and an additional $10 for each of their referral coupons that resulted in a completed interview with a new participant.
RDS offers several majors advantages as a recruitment method.
First, it provides anonymity for those who decide not to return with
a coupon, because the researcher remains unaware of them, even
when they refuse to participate. Second, participants are recruited by those whom they already know and not by the researchers.
This means that a potential participant can hear about the interview
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process and the legitimacy of the researchers from someone who
has already gone through the process and is ideally someone whom
they trust. The aspects of trust and anonymity were considered to
be particularly important for the project, given that data collection
was projected to be a challenge in light of an untimely post-presidential-election outcome and heightened U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity in the region.

Data Collection
The 140-item questionnaire was largely a compiled adaptation
of several existing surveys and was delivered to residents using
audio computer-assisted self-interview (ACASI) software at designated community organizations. The ACASI interface walked
participants step-by-step through survey questions and answer
choices, provided audio of the text if needed, and inputted their
selections via a screen. This method provides both confidentiality
for responses and support for a participant’s preferred language:
English, Spanish, or Somali. The staff included seven interviewers,
four of whom were community health workers (CHWs) who spoke
English and either Spanish or Somali. All participants provided informed consent prior to completing the survey interview.

Measures
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Participants were asked their age, sex, birthplace, and several
questions related to household, including income, number of members contributing to household income, and composition.
Health, Happiness, and Hopelessness
General health was measured with two items: “How would you
rate your overall health?” and “How would you rate your physical fitness?” Participants were asked to rate the item on a 5-point
Likert scale (1 = Excellent; 2 = Very good; 3 = Good; 4 = Fair; 5 = Poor).
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General wellbeing was captured with three items: “How would you
rate your current anxiety?”, “How would you rate your happiness?”,
and “How would you rate your current sadness?” Participants rated
each item on a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = Very happy; 2 = Happy; 3
= Somewhat happy; 4 = A little happy; 5 = Not at all happy). Similar
questions and Likert responses were posed that centered on participants’ rating of their happiness with job, with family, and your family’s
happiness. Hopelessness was measured with the item “In the past 30
days, how often did you feel hopeless?”, using a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = None of the time; 2 = A little of the time; 3 = Some of the time; 4 =
Most of the time; 5 = All the time).
Community Belongingness and Characteristics
Eleven items were used to assess participants’ beliefs and attitudes concerning the community. For example, “I feel I’m part of
the (Blinded) community” and “Participating in the (Blinded) community is a positive thing for me” were posed as binary responses
(yes/no). An additional three items allowed for a range in responses. For example, “I expect to be a part of (Blinded) for a long time”
and “I feel hopeful about the future of (Blinded)” used Likert scale
responses (1 = Completely; 2 = Mostly; 3 = Somewhat; 4 = Not at all).
Equitable Opportunities
Six items related to financial worries were used as proxy measures of equitable opportunities: “How worried are you right now
about…” not being able to pay or having enough money to pay for
things such as the medical cost of a serious illness or accident; a
child’s college; normal monthly bills; housing costs; minimum payment on credit cards; or not being able to pay your bills and support your family if someone close to you is deported or detained
by ICE. Participants responded using a 4-point Likert scale (1= Not
worried at all; 2 = Not too worried; 3 = Moderately worried; 4 =
Very worried). Twenty-five items related to work injuries, safety
training, and employee wellness were also used as proxies for equitable opportunities. Nineteen of these questions focus on a subset
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of participants who were injured on the job to explore participants’
experiences with worker’s compensation, support, medical costs,
and pain.

Analysis
Participants who self-identified as belonging to more than one
ethnic group were excluded from analysis, resulting in a sample of
273 participants representing three ethnic groups: Hispanic, Somali, and White. Demographic characteristics, as well as self-reported indicators regarding general health and wellbeing, happiness
and hope, community belongingness and attitudes, and financial
health and work-related injuries, including experiences with ongoing pain, were examined across ethnic groups using Pearson’s chisquare tests for categorical variables or Fischer’s exact test if a cell
size was less than five. Means and standard deviations were calculated for normally distributed variables and ANOVA (Analysis of
variance) tests were conducted for comparisons between groups.
All analyses were conducted using R version 3.4.4.

Results
Table 1 depicts a side-by-side comparison of the study population characteristics. Participants were largely Hispanic (n=204,
74.7%) or Somali (n=57, 20.9%), and most individuals were foreign-born (n=199, 73.4%). Although Whites only comprised 4.4% of
the sample (n=12), the CHWs who helped recruit and get the word
out about the study informed the project manager that this group
specifically moved to this particular town seeking healthcare. So,
although it is fair to acknowledge this is not a representative sample of Whites, it does depict a noteworthy group, which is that of
a vulnerable, White, minority ethnic group in a town that experienced “White flight” in recent history. By comparison, it is estimated that 62.2% of the town is Hispanic, 10.8% is Black or African,
and 26.4% is White (non-Hispanic), while 36.2% are estimated to be
foreign-born (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). There were significant differences in gender, birthplace, household composition, and income
across ethnic groups. Females represented 68.6%, 5.3%, and 75% of
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the Hispanic, Somali, and White samples, respectively. A majority
of monthly household incomes were in the lowest income brackets
for all groups, ranging from $0–$1,750 (59% of Hispanic, 93% of Somali, and 58% of White households), and were likely representative
of the most vulnerable households, considering median household
income in this town is $49,881 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). The number of household members contributing to income ranged from 1
to 6, with Hispanic households representing the greatest variation
in number of contributing members, where nearly 19% of Hispanic households had 3 or more contributing members, compared to
1.7% and 8.3% of Somali and White households, respectively.
Health, Happiness, and Hopelessness
Results of self-reported health and happiness (Table 2) yielded significant differences across ethnic groups for all items when
examining individual Likert-type responses. However, there are
noteworthy similarities and trends across groups when response
categories are conceptually dichotomized or grouped.
First, regarding subjective overall health, the largest proportion of
Somalis and Whites ranked it as “Very good” (57% and 50%, respectively), while the largest proportion of Hispanics (42%) considered
it “Good.” Hispanics displayed a larger variation of responses compared to the other two groups, with a notable portion (over 20%) of
individuals rating their health as “Fair” (18.5%) or “Poor” (3.4%). A
similar pattern for distribution of responses is apparent for self-rated physical fitness. Similarly, rating one’s happiness resulted in greater
variation of responses in Hispanics, most notably in the lower-rank
responses, where 25% of Hispanics collectively selected “Somewhat
happy,” “A little happy,” or “Not at all happy,” compared to 3.5%
of Somalis and no (0%) Whites. However, a vast majority of respondents (75% for Hispanic, 96% for Somali, 100% for White) rated their
happiness high (“Very happy” or “Happy”). Current sadness largely
mirrored responses for self-reported happiness; however, Somalis
were an exception, with 18% rating themselves as currently “Very
sad” or “Sad,” while none (0%) ranked themselves low on happiness
(i.e., “Not at all happy” or “A little happy”).
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A majority of respondents across all groups claim to be either
“Happy” or “Very happy” with their jobs: 64% of Hispanics, 91% of
Somalis, and 83% of Whites. Still, a greater variation of responses
is seen in Hispanics. Even larger majorities for all groups indicate
being either “Very happy” or “Happy” with their families: 85%, 93%,
and 91.6% of Hispanics, Somalis, and Whites, respectively.
Finally, the question “In the past 30 days, how often did you
feel hopeless?” indicates a majority of Somalis (83%) and approximately two-thirds (67%) of Whites responded “None of the time”,
while only half (50%) of Hispanics indicated the same. Conversely,
10.3% of Somalis, 16.4% of Hispanics and one third (33%) of Whites
indicated they felt hopeless either “Some of the time”, “Most of the
time”, or “All of the time”.
Community Belongingness
Table 3 depicts respondent sentiments about the Midwestern
community. The overall trend indicates a majority of ethnic groups
have positive feelings about their town and their sense of belongingness. For example, 89% of Hispanics, 91% of Whites, and 75% of
Somalis chose “Yes” in response to the question, “I feel I’m part of
the (Blinded) community”. Also evident is the consistently larger
minority of Somalis who do not feel a sense of belonging or connection with the (Blinded) community. For example, well over onethird (36%) of Somalis, compared to 25.4% of Hispanics or 9% of
Whites, chose “No” in response to “I feel a bond with other ethnic/racial groups in (Blinded)”. Perhaps the most telling difference
across groups is the distribution of responses to “I expect to be a
part of (Blinded) for a long time”, where 84.6% of Hispanics and
75% of Whites indicated “Completely” or “Mostly”, whereas just
over one-third (35.8%) of Somalis indicated such. Similarly, Somalis felt less hopeful about the future of this town, where the majority
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(61%) responded either “Somewhat” or “Not at all” to that question, compared to 19% of Hispanics and 0% of Whites.
Equitable Opportunities
Regarding financial health (Table 4), a majority (56%–75%) of
respondents across all ethnic groups indicate they are “Moderately worried” or “Very worried” about basic living expenses, including normal monthly bills, housing costs, or making minimum
payments on credit cards. For example, 61% of Hispanics, 64% of
Somalis, and 75% of Whites are “Moderately worried” or “Very
worried” about having enough to pay normal monthly bills. Similarly, a majority (60%–77%) of respondents across all ethnic groups
indicate they are “Moderately worried” or “Very worried” about
future incidental expenses, such as having enough money to pay
for their child’s college, or not being able to pay the medical cost of
a serious illness or accident.
Although not as common as concerns about financial health, the
frequency of reported work-related injuries is noteworthy (Table 4).
Specifically, 35% of Hispanics, 19% of Somalis, and 25% of Whites
in this sample have been injured on the job. A large majority of
these injuries occurred in this Midwestern town (86.3% Hispanic,
66.7% Somali, 66.7% White) in the last five years (79.2% Hispanic,
75% Somali, 33.3% White).
Although most respondents reported the injury to their employer (n=72, 90.3% Hispanic; n=11, 63.6% Somali; n=2, 100%
White), some were afraid to tell their employer (n=66, 31.8% Hispanic; n=7, 71.4% Somali; n=3, 33.3% White). Of those afraid to tell
their employer, some indicated fear of losing their job (n=19, 84.2%
Hispanic; n=6, 33.3% Somali; n=1, 0% White). For those who sought
medical attention for their workplace injury, there was a range of
reported medical coverage as well as out-of-pocket expense. For
example, 24.5% of Hispanics (n=49), 50% of Somalis (n=8), and 50%
of Whites (n=2) reported their employer covered none (0%) of the
medical costs. Of those with work-related injuries, 50.7% of Hispanics (n=71), 33.3% of Somalis (n=12), and 100% of Whites (n=3)
report suffering pain as a result. Of those respondents who suffer
from pain, most report working increases their pain (n=38, 81.6%
Hispanic; n=4, 100% Somali; n=2, 50% White).
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Table 4 (continued)
Work Injuries

What percentage of medical
costs did your employer or
their insurance pay?			
0%			
12
24.5%
1%–25%			
2
4.1%
26%–50%		
6
12.2%
51%–75%		
2
4.1%
76%–99%		
7
14.3%
100%			
20
40.8%

4
1
1
0
0
2

50%
12.5%
12.5%
0%
0%
25%

1
0
0
0
0
1

What percentage of medical
costs did you pay?						
0%			
19
38%
1
12.5%
0
1%–25%			
6
12%
2
25%
1
26%–50%		
6
12%
2
25%
0
51%–75%		
3
6%
1
12.5%
0
76%–99%		
3
6%
0
0%
0
100%			
13
26%
2
25%
1

50%
0%
0%
0%
0%
50%

0.2678
0.571
0.8697
0.8096
0.4447
0.6607

0%
50%
0%
0%
0%
50%

0.2173
0.2343
0.5151
0.7349
0.7292
0.7484
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There also were large discrepancies in provision of safety training across groups, where only 22% of Somalis received it compared
to 76.3% of Hispanics and 90.9% of Whites. Of those who reported
having had training on safety protocols, a majority received it in
their mother language: 83.3% of Hispanics, 92.3% of Somalis, and
100% of Whites. Statistically significant differences were also noted
for the item “Does your employer provide you an opportunity to
increase your physical fitness?”, where 63% of Hispanics, 27.6% of
Somalis, and 75% of Whites responded “Yes”.

Discussion
Our study examined trends in perceived health, happiness,
hope, and related determinants of health (e.g., community belongingness and equitable opportunities) in a minority-majority, rural,
Midwestern U.S. meatpacking town.
In this rural community sample of largely foreign-born immigrants and refugees, a majority of participants reported high levels
of happiness despite the fact that most households reported very
low incomes and relatively high levels of financial worries. Subjective economic situation is highly relevant for happiness, though
this is not true for income alone (Haller & Hadler, 2006). Further,
Haller and Hadler suggest that the objective level of income can
be rather low without affecting happiness negatively if it enables a
person or family the mastering of life. With this premise in mind,
it is possible to conceive that relative to previous circumstances,
individuals may view their income situation as an improvement
compared to their experiences in their home country, which in turn
may encourage one to remain hopeful for the future. As Haller and
Hadler so eloquently stated, “happiness of the mountain peak depends also on the duration and difficulty of the climb as well as on
our knowledge of its height” (2006, p. 176).
Though affluence may have some influence on happiness, there
are also non-material social and cultural factors which can lead to
high levels of happiness (Haller & Hadler, 2006). For example, women, who made up a majority of our study sample, have been shown
to be significantly happier than men despite the fact they have less
freedom in choosing their ways of life (Haller & Hadler, 2004). In
addition, Haller and Hadler conclude that persons embedded into
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close relationships, including those who are married or those with
children, are significantly happier than those who find themselves
outside of such relations or in a state which constitutes a loss in
this regard, such as divorce or unemployment. This aligns with our
findings that even larger majorities of participants across all ethnic
groups reported high levels of happiness with their families, and,
to a lesser degree, with their jobs. This suggests that community life
in this rural Midwestern town has positive attributes that support
immigrant and refugee families living here, although, for some,
there may be some aspects of community life contributing to less
favorable perceptions about health and hope. The relationships between such perceptions and various aspects of community life (i.e.,
SDOH) should be further explored in future research.
Subjective health and feelings of freedom in life also have been
shown to have strong effects on happiness (Haller & Hadler, 2006).
Poorer health or sickness can be conceived as restricting this feeling
of freedom in life. In our sample, subjective overall health was not
ranked as favorably as happiness for all groups. Global self-rated
health using a single item has been shown to be a robust predictor
of mortality, where a person with “poor” self-rated health has been
estimated to have a two-fold higher mortality risk compared with
persons with “excellent” self-rated health (DeSalvo et al., 2006;
Idler & Benyamini, 1997). We found a greater variation of subjective
health rankings among Hispanics, and a general tendency for this
group to rank their overall health lower than Somalis and Whites
did. The finding that one in five Hispanics rated their health as either “Fair” or “Poor,” and that the largest proportion of Hispanics
ranked themselves one ranking below the largest proportions for
Somalis and Whites, is cause for concern and inquiry. A clue to understanding this trend may be related to our findings on perceived
hope and related determinants of health.
Regarding hope, there were generally more feelings of hopelessness in the past 30 days among Hispanics and Whites compared to
Somalis. Conversely, Somalis felt less hopeful about the future of
this town as compared to Hispanics and Whites. These contradictory findings around hope may in part be explained by some of the
findings related to social connectedness, work injury, and pain. One
explanation for greater hopelessness among Hispanics and Whites
may be the higher frequency of reported work injuries and ongoing
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pain in these two ethnic groups compared to Somalis. Relatedly, a
study on migrant farmworkers in Nebraska found that stress and depression were positively associated with occupational injury (Ramos
et al., 2016). Interestingly, Somalis were less hopeful about the future
of the community than Hispanics and Whites, which may be a reflection of how the majority of Somalis indicated they do not expect
to be a part of this community for the long term. Lack of workplace
support, as indicated by reports of low employer provision of safety
training and opportunities to improve physical fitness among Somalis, may also be contributing to their sentiments about their town.
Future research should explore the relationship between feelings
of hope for a given community and an individual’s commitment to
stay, particularly in rural communities where surefire ways of encouraging growth and vitality are desperately needed.
All things considered, perhaps the most prominent finding
was that Hispanics appeared to be less healthy, happy, and hopeful than their White and Somali counterparts. One might speculate
that Hispanics in this sample have been in the country longer, are
more acculturated, and consequently are more aware of the political, social, and economic realities and experiences of immigrants
and refugees of color (i.e., immigrant paradox). It is also likely that
those with families and whose families are close in proximity, intact, and without the threat of detainment or deportation looming
are more likely to rate their happiness, health, and hopes higher
than those who live with the reality of such a threat. Layered with
other determinants, such as a low-skill, hard work life, or one that
is associated with high injury rates and/or living with pain, it seems
prudent to pinpoint how these and other determinant interactions
might provide better clues to understanding quality of life and feelings of hopelessness.
More broadly, our findings offer a glimmer of hope for helping
to improve the lives of immigrant and refugee populations. Our
findings depict a relatively happy and resilient group of people, despite the fact that well over half are surviving on the lowest income
bracket of less than $1,751/month (59% of Hispanic, 93% of Somali,
and 58% of White households sampled). In our sample, high ratings for happiness with family and (to a lesser degree) job may be
two clues worthy of further exploration. Studying high ratings for
happiness among a group of people who, in this case, come from
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different countries, with a multitude of similarities and differences,
may tell us more about why, how, and under what circumstances
they thrive, despite their struggles. In addition, understanding why
some are not feeling as healthy, happy, and hopeful as the rest similarly points us to clues, including a relatively high prevalence of
work injuries and ongoing pain, inequities in work safety training
and employer support for physical fitness, poor financial health,
and sentiments regarding settling into a community for the long
term. The relationships between health, happiness, hope, and various aforementioned aspects of community life (i.e., SDOH) will be
explored in forthcoming publications.
Future research should explore how various SDOH might predict degrees or types of hopelessness or hopefulness (e.g., general
hopelessness vs. hope for the future of one’s community). Kulig
(2012) examined community-level indicators of hope and hopelessness in her work with rural public health nurses and community
members in Alberta, Canada; indicators of hopelessness, as described by participants, included boarded-up buildings, high unemployment rates, loss of meeting spaces, alcoholism, and suicides.
Endeavors to understand how political and SDOH contribute to
health, happiness, and hope can inform which areas to prioritize
and support with greater promise for improving the lives of immigrant and refugee populations.

Limitations
Several limitations of the study should be noted. First, all measures are self-reported and, as such, many of the constructs being
examined were not only subjective, but the respective understanding
of the various constructs may vary from one participant to the next.
Hence, future research would benefit from providing participants
with standardized definitions of constructs (e.g., hope, happiness,
etc.) as well as obtaining objective measures of health such as biomarkers (e.g., cortisol, C-reactive protein, HbA1c) and anthropometrics (e.g., height, weight, waist circumference). Second, women and
men were not equally represented for all ethnic groups participating
in this study. Researchers using RDS recruitment methods may elect
to purposefully provide coupons to equal numbers of female and
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male participants to see if this increases representation in sampling.
Third, our sample was not representative of this town; rather, it was
a community-driven response where CHWs played a critical role in
encouraging community members to come forth, and Whites, in particular, were underrepresented. Finally, acculturative stress, education level, language proficiency, and documentation status were not
assessed in this study, although these have been shown to be associated with health inequities and outcomes.
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Book Reviews
S. J. Dodd, Sex-Positive Social Work. Columbia University Press (2020).
288 pages, $35 (paperback).
Sexuality and sexual health is an understudied and under-discussed area of social work practice in dire need of attentive development; fortunately, the strengths-focused, sex-positive approach of
the author is just what is required. The author seeks to help us have
discussions with our clients and students around issues of sexuality and to acknowledge sexuality as an important area of wellbeing.
Dodd would like us to develop our knowledge about sexual topics
and develop comfort with discussing a wide range of sexual issues.
After all, it is time we figure out as a profession and as practitioners
how to have these important discussions.
Dodd begins each chapter with CSWE competencies as a way to
anchor the reader, and ends each chapter with discussion questions
and suggested resources for further exploration. Dodd starts by using the CSWE competencies to emphasize the importance of bringing sexuality into our practices. Reminding us that we need to have
self-awareness of our own biases and preconceptions, Dodd urges
us to push through our initial discomfort with discussions of sexuality and sexual behavior. The author encourages us to practice, to
learn appropriate language, and to create sex-positive physical or
virtual spaces for our clients. She also offers helpful lists of demographic questions we may ask our clients as a way of beginning to
bring sex, sexuality, gender expression, sexual behavior, and sexual
health into the room and make them available for discussion.
The explication of anatomy, physiology, and arousal provides
basic sexual education that may be missing for those growing up
in a culture which may be missing good general sex education.
Dodd acknowledges the differences between sex and gender and
reminds us to consider how clients may experience these aspects of
themselves. She sensitively addresses issues of intersexuality and
reproductive characteristics with a vagina or a penis as a way of acknowledging those who have varying expressions of embodiment,
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all the while encouraging readers to avoid making assumptions
that may erase or invalidate those whom we serve.
In a chapter on taking a sexual history, Dodd walks us through
the importance of doing this sensitively, from bringing up the topic
of sex, to breaking the ice with our clients, and watching the language we use in our discussions. She then offers several different
methods of obtaining a sexual history and encourages the reader to
find one that works for them and their style of practice. Helpful chapters explore sexual identity and gender identity, and sexuality across
the lifespan. Dodd emphasizes that a focus on communication about
love and intimacy is an important part of this work. Dodd characterizes as “alt sex” those sexualities that move beyond practices “that
are procreative, heterosexual, monogamous and genitally focused”
(p. 156) and acknowledges that this may well be an area of particular
discomfort for teachers and therapists. Dodd brings great sensitivity
to the topic, and reminds the reader to practice the nonjudgmental,
strengths-based, sex-positive attitude she has been presenting in the
text. This is followed by a chapter presenting sexual dysfunctions
and disorders that commonly present in current practice. Here again,
she utilizes a sex-positive, strengths-based lens to view these issues
and to explore their impact on client relationships and wellbeing. In
each of these chapters devoted to specific topics, Dodd includes an
assessment model to use in practice.
Closing chapters address social work ethics in detail, drawing
upon social work values and their importance in this area of practice. She unpacks issues of erotic transference and countertransference, and provides suggestions on how to navigate these potentially
thorny issues. Finally, she concludes the text with an overview and
much encouragement for those in the beginning stages of doing
this work. She stresses that this is a lifelong journey of learning and
growing, and encourages the reader to find their own authentic professional self to use in this important work. At the same time, she
gently reminds the reader to avoid pathologizing client behavior and
refrain from assuming that sexual behavior is relevant to the presenting problem, unless and until the client identifies it as such.
Overall, Dodd has given us a thoughtful, comprehensive, and
welcome text for this area of study and practice. Although we have
improved our abilities to recognize and deal with many aspects of
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human behavior, we still need help and encouragement to incorporate sexuality into our practice. Dodd’s book is accessible and thorough, and, most importantly, is steeped in the best aspects of social
work practice. I’m so glad it is now available.
Melinda M. McCormick
Western Michigan University

Isabel Wilkerson, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents. Random
House (2020). 446 pages, $32 (hardcover).
Isabel Wilkerson’s Caste is a fascinating meditation on racism
in the United States and a reinterpretation of its underpinnings.
Her first book, the highly acclaimed The Warmth of Other Suns, is
an exemplary work of narrative non-fiction that traced the exodus
of Black families out of the Jim Crow South early in the 20th century. In contrast, Caste is a unique and impressionistic work that
incorporates the author’s personal experiences and observations,
comparative historical analysis, and evocative metaphors, parables,
and allegories, all in the service of an extended argument for the
centrality of caste in understanding racism.
Wilkerson refers, of course, to the now-illegal, yet pervasive,
Hindu-based system of cultural, economic, and social hierarchy
that has existed for millennia in India. In the 1930s and 1940s, Black
and White scholars conducted field work in the southern United
States, of which Gunnar Myrdal’s classic An American Dilemma
is the best known. One of Wilkerson’s most interesting chapters
recounts the travails of a Black academic, Allison Davis, and his
colleagues, to complete his field research in the midst of such hyper-segregation. These scholars argued that Jim Crow comprised
an American version of the Indian caste system. However, other
contemporary scholars and activists objected that to view racial oppression through the lens of caste was a grave mistake. First, the
seemingly endless persistence of caste in India, they believed, implied that fundamental change was practically impossible. Second,
the sociologist Oliver Cromwell Cox, for one, argued the concept of
caste diverted focus away from the uniquely savage system of racial
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capitalism and economic exploitation of African Americans in the
American South.
Nevertheless, it is this venerable intellectual framework that
Wilkerson seeks to revive. Caste, she argues, creates the mental
structures that underlie racism and support pervasive racial inequality, shaping social interactions, economic opportunities, cultural practices, cognitive processes (e.g., implicit bias), and prevailing norms in malign, hierarchical ways. As Wilkerson succinctly
puts it, “Caste is the bones, race is the skin.” She identifies eight
“pillars” of caste societies that justify and enforce this system of
social domination: divine will, heritability, the control of marriage
and mating, purity vs. pollution, occupational hierarchy, dehumanization and stigma, terror and cruelty as means of enforcement, and
inherent superiority/inferiority. In a startling chapter on Hitler’s
Germany, we learn that Nazi legal scholars drew directly on Jim
Crow laws for guidance in devising racial laws on such matters as
intermarriage, miscegenation, and the notorious “one drop” rule.
Her purpose in comparing India, Germany, and the United
States is to illustrate commonalities in the workings of racial oppression across borders, and she offers two examples. When Martin
Luther King visited India in 1959, he was taken aback when introduced to a crowd as an American “untouchable” or Dalit, the lowest
caste. However, he quickly came to embrace the term for himself
and his fellow African Americans. Similarly, after Albert Einstein
arrived in the US in 1933, he swiftly became a vocal supporter of
civil rights, noting that, as a Jew, he could easily empathize with
how Blacks in his new country felt about racial discrimination.
Under Wilkerson’s skillful guidance, caste becomes a powerful
lens with which to view the textures of racial inequality. She offers
many accounts of the everyday racism that she, an African American professional woman, has experienced as a citizen, air traveler,
and reporter. In describing her and others’ stories of being disrespected, she pointedly avoids racial identifiers and frames them instead as fraught encounters between members of lower and upper
castes. In one memorable case, a store owner, who had previously
agreed to be interviewed by Wilkerson, refused to believe on meeting her in person that she was a reporter for the New York Times. In
her terms, this upper caste person was threatened by a lower caste
person who has risen above her station. In an increasingly diverse
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society, multiply these status anxieties a millionfold and, presto, a
cultural and political backlash is bound to erupt.
It boiled over with the 2016 election of Donald Trump and the
January 6, 2021 deadly Capitol insurrection by a pro-Trump mob—a
white riot—after he lost his reelection bid. The United States faces
a growing crisis of governance directly tied to the ongoing demographic transition by which non-Hispanic whites will no longer be
the majority caste within a few decades. In response, the far right
and most of the Republican Party seek to lock in minority rule via
the courts, voter suppression, and gerrymandering, supported by
the antidemocratic features of the Senate and the Electoral College. Moreover, a kind of multiracial whiteness may be developing
among some lighter-skinned Hispanics and Asians, which could
allow a reconstituted upper caste to extend its numerical majority
and political dominance.
In a moving final chapter, the author finds herself in her basement with a white plumber wearing a MAGA hat. They are neither
talking nor locating the source of a water leak, so she seeks to find
common ground by mentioning the recent death of her mother and
asking about his own mother. She had died years before, but they
bond over their losses and the mood suddenly lightens. Their relationship is transformed and the previously indifferent plumber miraculously finds the motivation to fix the problem. After he leaves,
he unexpectedly returns to her house to check on the water heater.
They chat amiably, she reports, “almost like family.”
In the end, Wilkerson contends that history, even that of India,
Germany, and the U.S., shows that the divisions engendered by caste
are neither immutable nor permanent. Caste is a treatable disease,
like cancer. What is needed, she believes, is “radical empathy”—walking in each other’s shoes, recognizing that our common humanity is
more significant than our differences, and accepting that all people
have intrinsic worth. It is the upper caste—i.e., white people—who
bear the most responsibility to change. As her story of the plumber
suggests, it is possible to reach across racial and cultural lines. But
can this be scaled up? After all, it was she, the lower caste member,
who initiated the conversation that broke the ice. The hard challenge
is to motivate a large majority of white people to recognize that a
vastly unequal, racialized caste society is not worth upholding, and
to care enough to join in its transformation. Unfortunately, the di-

Book
Reviews
Contesting
the Flawed Consumer

169

mensions of this task are daunting: in the 2020 election, 58 percent of
white voters supported Trump. How to change this is not clear, but
we must.
Reading Caste is an unforgettable experience, not least for the
author’s literary skills and moral depth. However, it is not without
flaws. The emphasis on caste obscures the realities of how class interacts with race. The personal experiences she describes do not,
by and large, reflect the daily struggles of poor and blue-collar
Black and Brown people in the U.S. The vastly disparate impact of
COVID-19 on communities of color results from longstanding inequities in housing, education, employment, and health care, all of
which receive little attention. Although caste has limits as an analytical framework for understanding racism, Wilkerson finds creative
ways to deploy it to reveal deep structures of oppression. A more
conventional book might have focused on the political and economic structures that maintain racial inequality in the United States,
but that would probably have been a less imaginative, less intimate,
and less original work. Highly recommended for students, faculty,
and all human beings.
Edward U. Murphy
Northeastern University

John G. McNutt, Technology, Activism, and Social Justice in a Digital
Age. Oxford University Press (2018). 240 pages, $34.95 (paperback).
To say globalization and the Information and Communications
Technology (ICTs) revolution have profoundly impacted the world
would be an understatement. Locally and globally, people are wired
between friends, families, groups, and communities. Interconnectedness facilitated by ICTs has had a number of positive outcomes
for people around the world, such as the sharing of knowledge,
culture, art, music, and creativity, as well as affordable and immediate widespread communication. ICTs have also fostered myriad
challenges and negative effects regarding human health and wellbeing, digital inequality, information poverty, mass surveillance,
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censorship, and the proprietization of information, technological
tools, and everyday life. Such opportunities and challenges present a classic Catch-22: the very tools that can guide empowerment
and liberation may also foster disempowerment and exploitation.
Despite these internal contradictions and complexities inherent to
technology and human behavior, many seize the potential of ICTs
to work toward social good.
In Technology, Activism, and Social Justice in a Digital Age, John
G. McNutt presents an edited volume that seeks to guide novices
in social activism and social practices within the complexities of
our Digital Age. From case studies to guides, the book draws mostly from academics and “pracademics” in the fields of social work,
social welfare, public policy, public administration, public affairs,
community planning, and urban planning. The volume is organized into five sections: (1) Advocacy, Social Change, and Activism;
(2) Advocacy, Social Change, Activism, and Technology: Community Level; (3) Advocacy, Social Change, and Activism: Policy Level;
(4) Global and International Social Change; and (5) The Future.
Seasoned activists will likely find this book underwhelming,
but the volume may be useful to inexperienced individuals interested in learning how to use various digital tools to accomplish social
justice goals. Despite being broadly aimed at “anyone who is concerned about social justice and social betterment in today’s world,”
the work is Americentric, and moreover tends to speak more to seasoned social workers and other professional disciplines than beginners. This may be confusing and alienating to those looking to jump
into technologically-assisted activism, which seriously detracts from
the volume’s effectiveness and potential reach to broader audiences.
Organized into a number of enticing and well-described sections,
chapters within each theme seem topically uneven, inconsistent, and
even unrelated. While this may be ordinary for edited volumes that
contain different works by different authors, some chapters in this
volume seem off-topic and not entirely relevant to ICTs, such as those
that discuss the morality of advocacy, the basics of lobbying, and other nuanced technicalities. The book reads as if contributors were not
entirely clear on the aim, scope, and intended audience of the book.
In the Global North, globalization has shifted many organizing practices from top-down, public sphere community organizing to bottom-up organizing of community (Stall & Stoecker, 1998).
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Chapters within this volume curiously focus on masculinist public
sphere “battles” and “wins,” overlooking the resurgence of feminist
perspectives that focus on cooperation, communication, and direct
action. This appears as an almost ironic oversight given the strong
links between ICTs, globalization, and these revived forms of organizing, which owe their strength and revitalization—in large part—
to the Digital Age. It is understandable that the work focuses on proprietary software and platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and
Twitter, as this is where the majority of the public sphere now exists,
but the work would be stronger if it included more than casual discussion of free/libre (open source) networks and software, as these
tools are not dependent on surveillance capitalism and corporations.
A discussion of these alternatives and their limitations would be
more consistent with the core values of much social activism, such as
direct democracy, autonomy, ownership, and cooperation.
Nonetheless, the work has a number of strengths which will certainly be useful to those interested in harnessing the power of ICTs
for social justice and social change. While confusing and seemingly
irrelevant, some may value chapters that discuss lobbying laws and
other legal avenues for nonprofits and other third sector organizations. The strongest contributions in the volume are those that provide case studies with their imperfections and points of action, as
well as those that re-iterate that communities have moved toward
a digital sphere, and that, while this can facilitate organizing and
social action, it does not replace face-to-face interaction. In an age
where many sit behind screens “alone together,” a consistent reminder on the importance of face-to-face interaction in organizing,
activism, and advocacy is all the more important and relevant. The
challenge of writing any work on technology and social science is
the rate with which these topics change and evolve. This work may
become technologically obsolete within a short time, but the lessons from the numerous contributions within it will still be useful,
and are those that remind us to augment age-old practices to be instep with the new.
Joel Izlar
University of Georgia
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